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G-1a. Approve Preliminary and Final Plat for Lake Harrison 2nd Addition; and Site Plan for a 16,950 square-foot Water Treatment Facility
4 CITY OF CAANHASSEN 7700 Market Boulevard PO Box 147 Chanhassen, MN 55317 Administration Phone: 952.227.1100 Fax: 952.227.1110 Building Inspections Phone: 952.227.1180 Fax: 952.227.1190 Engineering Phone: 952.227.1160 Fax: 952.227.1170 MEMORANDUM TO: Todd Gerhardt, City Manager FROM: Bob Generous, Senior Planner DATE: September 26, 2016 b4(vo' SUBJ: West Water Treatment Plant — Planning Case #2016-21 PROPOSED MOTION "The Chanhassen City Council approves the preliminary and final plat creating one lot and two outlots for Lake Harrison 2nd Addition; and site plan for a 16,950 square -foot water treatment facility subject to the conditions of approval and adoption of the Findings of Fact." City Council approval requires a majority vote of City Council. Finance Phone: 952.227.1140 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fax: 952.227.1110 The applicants, WSB & Associates and the City of Chanhassen, are requesting Park Recreation subdivision approval to create one lot and two outlots, replatting Lot 1, Block 4 Phone::952.227.11 and Outlot A, Lake Harrison, and site plan approval for a west water treatment Fax: 952.227.11100 plant (WWTP). Recreation Center 2310 Coulter Boulevard PLANNING COMMISSION SUMMARY Phone: 952.227.1400 Fax: 952.227.1404 The Planning Commission held a public hearing on September 6, 2016 to review the proposed subdivision. The Planning Commission voted four for and none against a Planning & Natural Resources motion recommending approval of the project, finding theproject consistent with the Phone: 952.227.1130 zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan. Fax: 952.227.1110 The Planning Commission requested that City Council consider the following: Public Works 7901 Park Place • Available technology, including other potential systems, and incorporate the Phone: 952.227.1300 one that provides a good, high-quality and safe service; and Fax: 952.227.1310 • That this is the best alternative available and not just an easy choice. Senior Center Phone: 952.227.1125 Planning Commission minutes for September 6, 2016 are included in the consent Fax: 952.227.1110 agenda for the September 26, 2016 City Council packet. Website Site Selection www.ci.chanhassen.mn.us The City purchased the site for the filtration plant in 2005 at the time the Lake Harrison development was approved. The City identified and evaluated several potential sites for the future plant before the purchase was made. The parcel the Chanhassen is a Community for Life - Providing for Today and Planning for Tomorrow Todd Gerhardt West Water Treatment Plant — Planning Case 2016-21 September 26, 2016 Page 2 City purchased was viewed as the best site for a future filtration plant. City staff reevaluated alternative sites as requested by some residents. The site of the Children's Learning Center at the corner of W. 78th Street and Galpin Boulevard was one of the sites the City evaluated for the future filtration plant. The Children's Learning Center does have an outlot that is currently not being developed. This outlot is large enough for the filtration plant. It is estimated the outlot would be valued at about $930,000. The soils in the area are known to be poor and it is likely a building constructed on the outlot would need to be supported by piling or other structural techniques. The estimate for additional soil correction or building supports is $260,000. The cost to extend raw water main from the current location to the plant and the necessary truck distribution water main is estimated to cost $1,575,000. A preliminary estimate to construct the plant at the daycare site is $2,765,000 more than the proposed site. If the plant were to be constructed farther south of W. 78th Street, the cost for constructing the trunk water main and the distribution main would be significantly higher. Staff also did contact the property owner of the daycare site. The outlot is not for sale. No other property in the area is currently for sale that would meet the need for a water plant. Many water treatment plants are built in residential areas in the metropolitan area. The City hired an appraisal firm to complete a report comparing residential property values next to water plants to those farther way to determine if there is a discernible difference. This report determined there was no noticeable difference in property values. Water Treatment Plants make good neighbors. They are safe, generate little traffic, are not noisy, and do not generate odors. Treatment Recommendation A Pilot Study was completed spring of 2016 for the western wells which recommended using gravity filtration process with "Greensand" Media. This process is the most cost effective system to remove iron and manganese from the water. This is the same process used at the East Water Plant. The vast majority of water utilities in Minnesota that treat for iron and manganese use this same treatment process or a very similar process because it is efficient and most cost effective. Other treatment systems such as reverse osmosis, nanofiltration or ultra -filtration membranes are much more expensive and may use more chemicals in the treatment process. These plants would also potentially have a larger building foot print. These systems are used typically for desalination, surface water treatment for potable use and to remove contaminants in the water. The West Well Field produces water with high ammonia levels and reverse osmosis is the only membrane capable of removing ammonia. Reverse osmosis produces a very high volume of reject water (approximately 10 to 20 percent of the total plant flow rate) that must be wasted and discharged to the sanitary sewer system. This process would require additional wells to be constructed to offset the high loss of reject water. In addition, it would produce a water quality that is not consistent with the East WTP. It is essential for the two treatment plants to produce a similar water quality to provide a consistent water quality throughout the City's entire water distribution system. Todd Gerhardt West Water Treatment Plant — Planning Case 2016-21 September 26, 2016 Page 2 A chlorine system analysis was completed, April 26, 2016 to help determine the recommended system. Chlorine is used as a disinfectant, to remove ammonia from the water, and to treat iron and manganese. Systems evaluated included, sodium hypochlorite, chlorine gas and on-site generated sodium hypochlorite. Alternative disinfectant systems not evaluated but reviewed included ultraviolet light, ozone, chloramine and chlorine dioxide. These systems are cost prohibitive, not normally used for ordinary iron and manganese removal plants that treat groundwater, and would require a larger building foot print. The Minnesota Department of Health requires minimal levels of chlorine residual in the water distribution system to verify disinfection and to prevent ammonia from entering the distribution system which can convert to nitrite and nitrate, so a chlorine feed system would still be required if alternative disinfection systems where to be used. Chlorine gas is currently being used for disinfection at the well houses of the western well field. The proposed treatment plant would remove these systems from the well houses and consolidate the chlorine gas system at the treatment plant. Chlorine gas is safe and safer than other chlorine systems. It has the lowest 20 -year present worth life cycle cost. The City has not had any safety problems with the current chlorine gas system. The City utility staff is familiarly with using chlorine gas and are trained in emergency response. Chemical delivery vehicles can be scheduled any time of day to avoid potential neighborhood conflicts. Modern chlorine gas systems have many safety features and are proposed in this plant design. Modern chlorine gas feed systems are under a vacuum to the feed points inside the plant. If a feed line ever ruptured the vacuum would be instantly lost and no chlorine gas would leak out of the feed lines. Chlorine gas sensors will continuously measure chlorine gas concentrations down to levels that are less than 1 part per million. If a leak was sensed by the gas sensors, the emergency shutoff valves would close instantly and the ventilation system in the chlorine storage room would shut down and not ventilate gas to atmosphere. The Robo Control valve being proposed for the plant is installed in over 5,000 locations around the world without a single known failure according to the manufacturer. The doors for the chlorine room are sealed so if a chlorine gas leak occurred it would primarily be contained to the chemical room. Utility operations staff are trained to address a leak if one ever occurred inside the plant. Building Security Building security is up the local agency discretion. There are no State or Federal requirements for building security for water plants. The WWTP will have an advanced security system consisting of exterior video cameras on all sides of the building, window sensors, and door contact switches that monitor the plant 24 -hours a day. This system is very similar to the East Plant. All intrusion alarms are sent through the City's Supervisor Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for City staff and police to respond to at all times of the day, 7 -days a week. The regional Homeland Security Protective Supervisor and the Chemical Facility Anti -Terrorism Program (CFAT) Supervisor informed the Minnesota Department of Health's Security Coordinator that there is no regulatory language or directive originating from Homeland Security which requires the provision of security fencing around the perimeter of a chlorine storage area at a water treatment plant. Todd Gerhardt West Water Treatment Plant — Planning Case 2016-21 September 26, 2016 Page 2 RECOMMENDATION Staff recommends approval of the subdivision and site plan subject to the conditions of approval in the Planning Commission staff report. ATTACHMENTS 1. Resolution. 2. Reduced Copy Final Plat. 3. Memo from Sherril Brumm and Jason Messner to Paul Oehme dated 9/6/2016. 4. Chlorine System Analysis Letter from WSB to Paul Oehme dated 4/26/16. 5. Planning Commission Staff Report Dated September 6, 2016. g:\plan\2016 planning cases\2016-21 west water treatment plant\executive summary.doc CITY OF CHANHASSEN CARVER AND HENNEPIN COUNTIES, MINNESOTA DATE: RESOLUTION NO: MOTRON BY: SECONDED BY: A RESOLUTION APPROVING A PRELIMINARY AND FINAL PLAT FOR LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION WHEREAS, the City of Chanhassen has applied for approval of a preliminary and final plat for Lake Harrison 2nd Addition; and WHEREAS, the Chanhassen Planning Commission held a public hearing on September 6, 2016, and found the preliminary plat consistent with the Chanhassen Comprehensive Plan and Zoning ordinance and recommended approval of the subdivision. WHEREAS, the City Engineer and City Planner recommend approval of the preliminary and final plat of Lake Harrison 2nd Addition, under the conditions provided herein; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Chanhassen City Council hereby approves the preliminary and final plat of Lake Harrison 2nd Addition subject to the following conditions: 1. Existing drainage and utility easements on these properties must be vacated prior to recording the final plat. Passed and adopted by the Chanhassen City Council this 26th day September of 2016. ATTEST: Todd Gerhardt, City Clerk/Manager Denny Laufenburger, Mayor YES NO ABSENT gAplan\2016 planning cases\2016-21 west water treatment plant\resolution platting.doc LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS: That City of Chanhassen, a political subdivision under the laws of the State of Minnesota, fee owner, of the following described property situated in the County of Carver, State of Minnesota, to wit Lot 1, Block 4, and Oudot A, LAKE HARRISON, according to the recorded plat thereof, Carver County, Minnesota. Has mused the same to be surveyed and platted as LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION, and does hereby grant to the City of Chanhassen the easements for drainage and utility purposes as shown on this plat. Has mused the same to be surveyed and platted as LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION, and does hereby dedicate the easements as shown on this plat for drainage and utility purposes only. In witness whereof said City of Chanhassen, a political subdivision under the laws of the State of Minnesota, has caused these presents to be signed by Its proper officer this day of_, 20_ SIGNED: City of Chanhassen STATE OF MINNESOTA COUNTY OF The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this _ day of , 20_, by of City of Chanhassen, a political subdivision under the laws of the State of Minnesota. Notary Public, County, Minnesota My Commission Expires Notary Printed Name I Kyle L. Klasen do hereby certify that this plat was prepared by me or under my direct supervision; that I am a duly Licensed Land Surveyor in the State of Minnesota; that this plat is a correct representation ofthe boundary survey; that allmathematical data and labels are correctly designated on this plat; that all monuments depicted on this plat have been, or will be correctly set within one year; that all water boundaries and wet lands, as defined in Minnesota Statutes, Section 505.01, Subd. 3, as of the date ofthis certificate are shown and labeled on this Plat; and all public ways are shown and labeled on this plat. Dated this _day of , 20 Kyle L. Klasen, Licensed Land Surveyor, Minnesota License No. 44606 STATE OF MINNESOTA COUNTY OF The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of , 20_, by Kyle L. Klasen, a Licensed Land Surveyor. Notary Public, _ County, Minnesota Notary Printed Name My Commission Expires CHANHASSEN, MINNESOTA This plat of LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION was approved and accepted by the City Council of Chanhassen, Minnesota, at a regular meeting thereof, held this _ day of , 20_, and is in compliance with the provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Section 505.03, Subd. 2. Al monuments will be set as specified by the City Council and as stated on this plat, according to Minnesota Statute, 505.02, Subd. 1. City Council, Chanhassen, Minnesota By: Mayor By: COUNTY SURVEYOR, Carver County, Minnesota Pursuant to Chapter 395, Minnesota Laws of 1971, this plat has been approved this day of , 20_ John E. Freemeyer, County Surveyor By: Clerk COUNTY AUDITORfTREASURER, Carver County, Minnesota I hereby certify that taxes payable in 20 and prior years have been paid for land described on this plat. Dated this day of , 2p Laurie Davies, County Auditorfrreasurer By: COUNTY RECORDER, Carver County, Minnesota I hereby certify that this plat of LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION was filed this _ day of 20_, at _ o'clock _.M. as Document No. Mark Lundgren, County Recorder By: REGISTRAR OF TITLES, Carver County, Minnesota I hereby certify that this plat of LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION was filed this day of , 20_, at- o'clock _ .M. as Document No. Cad W. Hanson, Jr., Registrar of Titles By: Nu 16 WSS a �a - SHEET 1 OF 2 SHEETS PLAT FILE NO. _ `"R - "� ` LAKE HARRISON 2ND ADDITION jC)CN 1nrN1 pnnit� 7n1r� L I\L_IVVLIV vlvu I L-� ON C.R. DOC. NO. vlvu �1vU � � tri A nnlTtnnl 7 - A r\r\I_i IViV \ "r\V /"tVUI I Iviv �� R.T. DOC. NO. leo I� Graphic Scale (n feet) 0 100 200 1 inch =100 feet II 5 �{ — o H-5 I BEING 5 FEET IN WIDTH, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, AND ADJOINING LOT LINES, AND 10 FEET IN WIDTH, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, AND ADJOINING RIGHT-OF-WAY LINES, AS SHOWN ON THE PLAT. O DENOTES 12 INCH X 14 INCH IRON MONUMENT SET AND MARKED BY LICENSE NO. 446D6. • DENOTES FOUND IRON MONUMENT. THE EAST UNE OF OUTLOT A, LAKE HARRISON, IS ASSUMED TO HAVE A BEARING OF Si 4°4557"W. 8.38 f / jai xe�awn". swsn, s"m�Soo WSB Mm s i�usmuenr�ivai� inu�xn��mimic�� SHEET 2 OF 2 SHEETS PATCHI N MESSNE* R IDGDD & ]BRUMM VALUATION- COUNSELORS MEMORANDUM To: Paul Oehme P.E. Public Works Directory/City. Engineer City of. 6rmm:and hanhassen From: Sherri, )asoA Messner Patchin Messner Dodd &, grumm„ Date: September 6, .2016 Subject: Proposed West Water Filtration Plant The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize physical and, locational characteristics -of . existing Water treatment facilities`in neighboring communities. As: part.of this consultation, we researched sales of residential property in close proximity to those water treatment facilities in other municipalities; .and compared those. sales to sales of .properties 'in the same. neighborhood that are, more distant from the'water treatment facilities..These comparisons.are completed in order to determine :if there is a measurable decrease in.value to those properties adjacent, or in close proximity, to water treatment facilities: Proposed West. Water ri tration Plant The City of Chanhassen .is planriing to use,prairie style architecture, for the proposed plant .building.. An example of a prairie.style building, as well as a sketch`of what the plant would look like using this type of arch'ite'cture, are shown on the following: page;, Extensive landscaping is pla►ined for .th'e-site, .and plantings anal -berms -will be strategically placed to break up sightlines and .enhance.the natural surroundings. An%aerial showing the location :of the proposed plant`also follows. The overall height of the -filter cell and pump room portion of -the buildingvill be consistent . with some of the _homes in the area, -.and the .greatest the building -is above ground will be ,,approximately 17 feet without a sloped roof. In addition, the non -water production area is at a lower elevation and should'be,able to be screened with: berms and landscaping. Sunset Pond ExecuWe-Offiices 13961 West. Preserve:,Boulevard Burnsville; MN 55337, Phone: (952) 895-1205 Fax: (952) 895-1521 City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 2 Filter Cell and Pump Room Nan -Water Production Area 11 &MchAshamd datakmgl wblic} 2010.2013 public pmjectst 201$ projectsLI5-03 vma -Aster t,eahnent plain fcasiblfty stu4W2016 hos quesuon msponsm,docx Sketch of Prairie Style Building PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 3 F- or - M• CHASKA SUBJECT AERIAL 0;� PATCNIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 4 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Our research revealed water treatment facilities in residential neighborhoods in the cities of Chaska, Savage, Plymouth, Victoria, Edina and Eagan. As previously described, we researched sales of residential property in close proximity to these water treatment facilities in other municipalities, in order to compare those sales to sales of properties in the same neighborhood that are more distant from the water treatment facilities. These comparisons are completed in order to determine if there is a measurable decrease in value to those properties adjacent, or in close proximity, to water treatment facilities. Chaska Following is a photograph of the existing Chaska facility. As illustrated on the aerial on the following page, this water treatment facility is located in a residential neighborhood, and is also adjacent to an additional municipal building. The only sale proximate to the treatment facility was lender -owned, so we were unable to do a comparison in the Chaska area. In addition to the aerial located on the following page, a half -section map is located on page 6, which depicts the sales search area. Chaska PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors r+ tM � r1 rO {Aj t City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 6 ,31 �_J —I I yr —HJnH !W I' 4U ILUI City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 7 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Sava e Following is a photograph of the existing Savage facility. As illustrated on the aerial on the following page, this water treatment facility is located in a residential neighborhood. After searching the area summarized on the half -section map on page 9, one listing was found proximate to the treatment facility, and an additional 13 sales were found in the neighboring area. Although Sale 4 is also proximate to the water treatment facility, this sale is not located on the same roadway, and does not have primary visibility to the facility. The sales are summarized in grid format on page 10 and, after adjusting all sales for market conditions to September 2, 2016, there is no discernible reduction in value due to being located near the water treatment facility. Savage PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 9 City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 10 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Savage PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors Savage Date Land Finished Sale Sale Price Adj. Improved Sale of Sale Size SF Price for Mkt. Cond. Sales Near Water Treatment Plant 1 8124 Foxberry Bay Active 0.40 AC 3,444 $445,000 $445,000 Averages 0.40 AC 3,444 $445,000 $445,000 Sales Further from Water Treatment Plant 2 13683 Ashcroft Alcove Pending 0.37 AC 3,240 $374,900 $374,900 3 8135 Fo)berry Bay May -16 0.38 AC 3,201 $384,900 $390,593 4 8225 Carriage Hill Road Sep -15 0.25 AC 3,008 $405,000 $421,420 5 13424 Foxberry Road Aug -15 0.40 AC 3,091 $379,069 $395,476 6 8693 Carriage Hill Draw Jul -15 0.35 AC 3,312 $405,000 $423,639 7 8645 Carriage Hill Court Jul -15 0.30 AC 3,024 $375,500 $392,781 8 13460 Foxberry Road Jun -15 0.26 AC 3,180 $359,000 $376,506 9 8661 Carriage Hill Road May -15 0.31 AC 3,090 $360,900 $379,487 10 8236 Carriage Hill Road Jan -15 0. 32 AC 3,154 $328,000 $348,487 11 8143 Fo)berry Bay Jan -15 0.31 AC 3,600 $403,000 $428,172 12 8131 Fo)berry Bay Dec -14 0.27 AC 2,951 $333,000 $355,569 13 8600 Carriage Hill Road Jul -14 0. 36 AC 3,496 $350,637 $383,716 14 8673 Carriage Hill Road May -14 0.29 AC 3,124 $369,000 $407,733 Averages Apr -15 0.32 AC 3,190 $371,377 $390,652 PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 11 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Plymouth Following is a photograph of the existing Plymouth facility. As illustrated on the aerial on the following page, this water treatment facility is located in a residential neighborhood. After searching the area summarized on the half -section map on page 13, two sales were found proximate to the treatment facility, and an additional six sales were found in the neighboring area. The sales are summarized in grid format on page 14 and, after adjusting all sales for market conditions to September 2, 2016, there is no discernible reduction in value due to being located near the water treatment facility. Plymouth PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM valuation counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 13 City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 14 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Plymouth PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors Plymouth Date Land Finished Sale Sale Price Adj. Improved Sale of Sale Size SF Price for Mkt. Cond. Sales Near Water Treatment Plant 1 11300 42nd Place N. Sep -15 0.40 AC 3,304 $407,000 $417,515 2 11310 42nd Place N. Jun -15 0.28 AC 3,137 $399,900 $409,213 Averages Jul -15 0.34 AC 3,221 $403,450 $413,364 Sales Further from Water Treatment Plant 3 11440 42nd Avenue N. Aug -16 0.50 AC 3,022 $390,000 $391,425 4 11570 42nd Place N. May -16 0.30 AC 3,461 $427,150 $433,393 5 4265 Deerwood Lane N. Oct -14 0.31 AC 3,118 $414,810 $426,444 6 11455 42nd Avenue N. Oct -14 0.26 AC 2,742 $374,662 $385,170 7 11450 42nd Avenue N. Sep -14 0.48 AC 3,257 $394,900 $407,160 8 4275 Cottonwood Lane N. Feb -14 0.28 AC 2,609 $406,000 $427,134 Averages Apr -15 0.36 AC 3,035 $401,254 $411,788 PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 15 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Victoria Following is a photograph of the existing Victoria facility. As illustrated on the aerial on the following page, this water treatment facility is located in a residential neighborhood, and is also adjacent to a municipal fire station. There were no sales from January 2014 to the present that were adjacent or in close proximity to the water treatment facility. In addition to the aerial located on the following page, half -section maps are located on pages 17 and 18, which depict the sales search area. Victoria PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 16 PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 17 City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 18 0 - City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 19 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Edina Following is a photograph of the existing Edina facility. As illustrated on the aerial on the following page, this water treatment facility is located in a residential neighborhood. After searching the area summarized on the half -section map on page 21, four sales were found proximate to the treatment facility, and an additional 18 sales were found in the neighboring area. The sales are summarized in grid format on page 22 and, after adjusting all sales for market conditions to September 2, 2016, there is no discernible reduction in value due to being located near the water treatment facility. Edina PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 21 City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 22 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Edina PATCH IN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors Edina Date Land Finished Sale Sale Price Adj. Improved Sale of Sale Size SF Price for Mkt. Cond. Sales Near Water Treatment Plant 1 301 Monroe Avenue S. Pending 0.18 AC 1,680 $265,000 $265,000 2 312 VanBuren Avenue S. Jul -16 0. 15 AC 1,238 $205,000 $206,133 3 303 Monroe Avenue S. Jul -16 0. 17 AC 1,668 $262,150 $263,599 4 309 Monroe Avenue S. May -15 0.19 AC 1,848 $258,000 $260,852 Averages Feb -16 0.17 AC 1,609 $247,538 $248,896 Sales Further from Water Treatment Plant 5 6655 2nd Street S. Pending 0.21 AC 1,899 $235,000 $235,000 6 417 Monroe Avenue S. Active 0.19 AC 1,516 $275,000 $275,000 7 418 VanBuren Avenue S. Aug -16 0.19 AC 1,800 $270,000 $270,746 8 409 Jackson Avenue S. Aug -16 0.19 AC 1,130 $214,000 $214,591 9 400 VanBuren Avenue S. Aug -16 0. 14 AC 1,688 $264,500 $265,231 10 423 Monroe Avenue S. Aug -16 0.20 AC 1,753 $285,300 $286,089 11 419 Madison Avenue S. Jul -16 0.15 AC 1,248 $228,228 $229,490 12 404 Monroe Avenue S. Apr -16 0.19 AC 1,510 $233,900 $237,132 13 418 VanBuren Avenue S. Aug -15 0.19 AC 1,800 $232,000 $237,272 14 422 VanBuren Avenue S. Jul -15 0. 19 AC 1,474 $211,000 $215,821 15 420 Jackson Avenue S. May -15 0.18 AC 1,446 $242,740 $248,346 16 404 VanBuren Avenue S. Nov -14 0. 14 AC 1,620 $205,000 $211,243 17 417 Monroe Avenue S. Sep -14 0.19 AC 1,516 $224,070 $232,432 18 405 Madison Avenue S. Sep -14 0.14 AC 1,200 $230,000 $238,584 19 409 VanBuren Avenue S. Jul -14 0.24 AC 1,607 $270,000 $281,931 20 401 Madison Avenue S. Jul -14 0. 13 AC 1,856 $226,883 $236,909 21 424 Harrison Avenue S. Jun -14 0. 14 AC 1,650 $230,080 $241,037 22 303 VanBuren Avenue S. Mar -14 0, 17 AC 1,646 $212,850 $289,985 Averages Jun -15 0.18 AC 1,576 $238,364 $247,047 PATCH IN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 23 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Eagan Following is a photograph of the existing Eagan facility. As illustrated on the aerial on the following page, this water treatment facility is located in a residential neighborhood. After searching the area summarized on the half -section map on page 25, one sale was found proximate to the treatment facility, and an additional 12 sales were found in the neighboring area. The sales are summarized in grid format on page 26 and, after adjusting all sales for market conditions to September 2, 2016, the average price of the sales less proximate to the water treatment facility is slightly higher than the sale price of the property that sold nearest the facility. However, it is noted that the water treatment facility in Eagan is part of a large municipal complex, and it is not possible to discern whether or not the slight difference in sale prices is due to the location of the water treatment facility. Eagan PATCHIN MESSNER DODD &C BRUMM Valuation Counselors Cityof Ch -has Proposed West September 6, 21 Page 25 1 City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 26 Water Treatment Facilities in Surrounding Municipalities Eagan PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors Eagan Date Land Finished Sale Sale Price Adj. Improved Sale of Sale Size SF Price for Mkt. Cond. Sales Near Water Treatment Plant 1 3489 Saint Charles Place Apr -16 0.21 AC 1,992 $247,000 $251,545 Averages Apr -16 0.21 AC 1,992 $247,000 $251,545 Sales Further from Water Treatment Plant 2 1597 Boardwalk Jul -16 0.21 AC 2,032 $274,850 $276,873 3 3491 Coachman Road May -16 0.21 AC 1,895 $262,000 $265,857 4 1588 Pacific Avenue May -16 0.33 AC 1,780 $260,000 $263,827 5 3494 Coachman Road Apr -16 0.47 AC 1,800 $272,500 $277,514 6 1580 Pacific Avenue Dec -15 0.25 AC 1,600 $217,500 $224,337 7 3514 Coachman Road Jul -15 0.35 AC 1,560 $230,100 $239,626 8 1669 Boardwalk Jul -15 0.23 AC 1,856 $270,000 $281,177 9 3576 Baltic Avenue Jan -15 0.29 AC 1,857 $229,800 $242,061 10 3578 Coachman Road Oct -14 0.20 AC 1,860 $219,900 $234,567 11 3506 Coachman Road Sep -14 0.79 AC 1,600 $217,000 $232,438 12 3486 Coachman Road Jun -14 0.40 AC 2,000 $242,000 $262,446 13 1665 Boardwalk May -14 0.20 AC 1,750 $238,000 $259,166 Averages Jun -15 0.33 AC 1,799 $244,471 $254,991 PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors City of Chanhassen Proposed West Water Filtration Plant September 6, 2016 Page 27 Summary The data summarized in this memorandum suggest that there is no discernible decrease in value to properties located in close proximity to a water treatment facility. PATCHIN MESSNER DODD & BRUMM Valuation Counselors WSB a a,r�p�1 engineering • planning • environmental• construction 477 Temperance Street St. Paul, MN 55101 Tel: 651-286-8450 Fax: 651-286-8488 April 26, 2016 Mr. Paul Oehme, PE Director of Public Works City of Chanhassen P.O. Box 147 7700 Market Blvd. Chanhassen, MN 55317 RE: Chlorine System Analysis West Water Treatment Plant City of Chanhassen, Minnesota Dear Mr. Oehme: We have prepared this technical memorandum to compare chlorine gas with 1 -ton cylinders, sodium hypochlorite, and on-site generated sodium hypochlorite as they relate to our design of the West Water Treatment Plant. In total, 98% of North American community water systems use chlorine for disinfection. Of those, 62% use chlorine gas, 33% use sodium hypochlorite, and 2% use calcium hypochlorite. The application of calcium hypochlorite is generally reserved to smaller treatment systems when it is utilized. About 3% use on-site hypochlorite generators. In this memorandum, we present the advantages, disadvantages, impurities and/or chemical byproducts, safety aspects, and financial analysis for each option. There are approximately 52,000 community water treatment systems in the United States and 47,000 of these systems serve populations from 100 to 50,000 people. There are 34,000 plants in the 100 to 50,000 population range that are 100% ground water systems and deliver an average daily flow around 3 MGD or less, with a maximum flow of around 5 MGD. The remaining 18,000 systems serve the largest communities and are mainly surface water systems, or are small plants that are surface water systems. Sodium Hypochlorite The City currently uses sodium hypochlorite (liquid chlorine) at the East Water Treatment Plant for oxidation of iron and disinfection. Sodium hypochlorite is typically produced with 12 to 15% available chlorine. Sodium hypochlorite is constantly degrading when it is stored, losing strength and developing by-products. There are ways to slow this degradation to a manageable rate but require additional considerations, such as room cooling systems, dilution systems, and pH management systems. Equal Opportunity Employer wsbeng.com C:\Users\gjohmmn\Desktop\Projrers\Chenhassen\Chaiass , Wesi WTP\Chlorine Analysis\Chlorine Analysis Lm ,-.d .do Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 2 Advantages 1. Proven technology 2. Use of sodium hypochlorite simplifies regulatory compliance 3. No need to handle heavy containers Disadvantages 1. Chemical feed lines need to be replaced on a frequent basis and are more susceptible of leaking 2. Degradation of sodium hypochlorite and the creation of byproducts 3. Because it is not regulated under the USEPA Risk Management Plan (RMP) rule does not mean that it is not a hazardous substance 4. The high pH of sodium hypochlorite can alter the pH of the finished water 5. Adds sodium to the finished water 6. Off gassing and scaling are consequences of feeding sodium hypochlorite which increases maintenance 7. Impurities and/or chemical byproducts - Sodium hypochlorite is typically manufactured in one for two ways, it is either made in a packaged system that adds chlorine gas to caustic soda, or by dissolving salt in softened water, which results in a concentrated brine solution. The solution is electrolyzed and forms a sodium hypochlorite solution in water. The process of adding chlorine gas to caustic soda is by far the most widely used process. There are approximately 60 producers of sodium hypochlorite in the Continental United States. These facilities are mostly located in or near chlorine repackaging plants since chlorine gas is one of their raw materials. Sodium hypochlorite is shipped to the local water treatment plants by tanker trucks or packaged in small carboys for the smaller plants. 8. Decomposition - Sodium Hypochlorite will decompose due to ionic strength, pH, temperature, time, and heavy metal content. This decomposition will occur due to the following two reactions: 1.) Transformation into chlorate, and 2.) Release of oxygen. The chlorate reaction accounts for about 90% of the total decomposition. This reaction is tied to: a. Time — This prohibits operations staff from storing more than a few weeks' worth of product on-site. The general consensus is 30 days maximum of storage. b. Temperature — The warmer the product is the faster conversion to chlorate will be. Some sources of information recommend that the storage room be air conditioned to reduce the conversation rate of chlorate. c. pH — The pH level in the storage tank should be monitored. pH levels below 11 accelerate the formation of chlorate and pH levels above accelerate the formation of perchlorates. There is increasing concern in the government regulating bodies at both the Federal and State level as it pertains to perchlorate and chlorate in potable water. Currently, the USEPA has issued an interim health advisory limit of 15 ppb. California has already set the perchlorate level at 6 ppb, Massachusetts at 2 ppb, and New Jersey at 5 ppb. New Jersey has deferred action until USEPA issues a regulatory determination. If the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) ever establishes a health advisor limit for perchlorate in drinking water, there will be an impact to how sodium hypochlorite is used and stored in potable water applications. Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 3 9. Release of Oxygen - This reaction is caused by trace amounts of heavy metals, such as nickel and copper, left in the product after production. Increasing strength and temperature, decreasing pH, and exposure to light in combination with these heavy metals will increase the rate of this oxygen formation and increase the reduction of hypo strength. This reaction is one of issues responsible for the feed problems that plague sodium hypochlorite metering systems. Additionally rapid acceleration of the solution through piping and equipment restrictions also adds to this issue. It is critical with a sodium hypochlorite feed system to avoid trapping solution in piping sections as this reaction could generate very high pressures. Safety Sodium Hypochlorite should be treated the same respect that has been instilled in water plant operations that employ chlorine gas as their disinfectant. Lack of proper training and knowledge can result in the improper handling of sodium hypochlorite resulting in the release of large amounts of chlorine gas to the atmosphere. Ironically, the largest chlorine release at a water treatment plant was from a plant using sodium hypochlorite. A quantity of 12,000 pounds of chlorine gas was almost instantly released from a tank when ferric chloride was mistakenly added to the sodium hypochlorite tank. The United States Coast Guard operates the National Response Center. All releases of chemicals into the environment must be reported to the center. All calls to the center are logged into a database that can be viewed on their website. While the information is unfiltered it can be sorted by chemical. This database was used to estimate the number of incidences of reported chlorine gas releases in 2014. Each release was reviewed by conducting further research to insure that the release was in fact the chemical that was released, and the location, and type of facility confirmed. The raw data for 2014 was further narrowed down by removing follow up calls, test or drill reports, and unrelated reports. As stated previously, the same NRC database was used to determine the number of chlorine releases from sodium hypochlorite solutions that occurred in 2014.The 2014 results of this are: 84 total chlorine releases from sodium hypochlorite were reported 9 releases were transportation related 29 releases were associated with industrial processes using sodium hypochlorite 13 releases were associated with the manufacture of sodium hypochlorite 1 release at a farm 1 release at a pool supply company 31 releases were associated with potable water, wastewater, and recreation water The majority of the sodium hypochlorite releases were a result of piping failures. Operators also need to keep an eye out for signs or storage tank deterioration. Approximately 60% of the chlorine releases at water plants were a result of sodium hypochlorite releases. Financial Anal This equipment with proper maintenance should last 10 to 15 years before needing to be replaced. Typically, the tanks and the chemical feed lines are the weak link and need to be replaced more frequently. The initial cost of a sodium hypochlorite system, not including Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 4 installation and piping supplies, is $197,000. The estimated labor hours to maintain the system would be approximately 180 hours per year. The unit cost of 12.5% strength sodium hypochlorite is $0.72 per gallon. The unit cost per pound of pure chlorine in 12.5% strength sodium hypochlorite is $0.58 per pound. Assuming that similar dosages are used at the West Water Treatment Plant and similar volumes of water will be treated, the average cost per year for sodium hypochlorite is estimated to be $22,000 per year over a 20 -year period. The total present worth value or cost to feed sodium hypochlorite over a 20 -year period, including equipment, chemicals, electricity, and labor is $850,546 (Note - Assumes average day demand of 2.07 MGD over 20 -year period and demands split equally between West and East WTPs). On-site Generated Sodium Hypochlorite On-site generation of sodium hypochlorite for use in water treatment dates back to the late 1920's. It wasn't until major advances in the anode coatings and base materials in the early 1970's that this process became a viable chlorine supply for water treatment applications. On-site generators produce a 0.8% solution of sodium hypochlorite. For each 1 pound chlorine equivalent required the on-site generator will require 3 pounds of salt, 15 gallons of softened water, and 2 KWH of electrical energy. On-site generators almost always are operated in the batch configuration using a storage tank to store the product as it is being metered to the point of application. Storage tank capacity should be sized to hold 2 or more days' worth of finished product to cover for outages and short term equipment service events. Some water systems install a backup commercial sodium hypochlorite feed system to cover longer term shutdowns. Advantages 1. On-site generation of sodium hypochlorite technology is stable 2. Use of on-site generation of sodium hypochlorite simplifies regulatory compliance 3. Degradation is much slower than commercial sodium hypochlorite. Smaller batches, lower concentrations eliminate most of that concern. Disadvantages 1. Hydrogen is produced during the production of sodium hypochlorite and must be safely diluted and vented to the outside. 2. On-site generation of sodium hypochlorite creates a 0.8% solution, which requires a significantly higher feed rate for each equivalent pound of chlorine fed into the system. 3. As with commercial sodium hypochlorite, because on-site generated sodium hypochlorite is not being regulated under the USEPA RMP rule does not mean that it is not a hazardous substance. The concern is that operators may not be as cautious in their dealings with this chemical compared to other types of chlorine chemicals. 4. Bromide in the brine will turn into bromate in the finished solution. 5. A water chiller or heater may be needed to hold the incoming softened water at a temperature of 600 F to 700F. 6. High cost of equipment and maintenance. 7. The plant operators are also responsible for manufacturing the chlorine as well as controlling the application of the chlorine. Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 5 Impurities On -Site generated chlorine, because of the higher temperatures that are generated during process and the lower pH values have a much higher initial concentration of chlorate. But due to its low initial concentration, the additional decomposition is much slower than the decomposition of commercial sodium hypochlorite. To avoid high bromate levels in the finished product use, a salt that has little to no bromide should be used when generating sodium hypochlorite. aafety All manufacturers of this equipment design in features and interlocks to prevent the ignition of the hydrogen in the system components and solution. However, they do occur. Special room ventilation systems are required to properly ventilate they hydrogen off gases that are detected inside the room. Financial Analysis The main equipment with proper maintenance should last 20 years before needing to be replaced. Every 5 to 7 years the cell plates will need to be replaced. This process can cost as much as $35,000 per replacement. The initial cost of an on-site generation sodium hypochlorite system, including replacement of the cell plates every 5 -years and not including installation and piping supplies, is $590,000. The estimated labor hours to the maintain system would be approximately 370 hours per year. The average cost per pound of pure chlorine at 0.08% strength sodium hypochlorite generated on site is $0.41 per pound. Assuming that similar dosages are used at the West Water Treatment Plant and similar volumes of water will be treated, the average cost per year for on-site generation sodium hypochlorite is estimated to be $15,500 per year over a 20 - year period. The total present worth value or cost to feed sodium hypochlorite over a 20 -year period, including equipment, new cell plates every 5 -years, chemicals, electricity, and labor is $1,269,483 (Note - Assumes average day demand of 2.07 MGD over 20 -year period and demands split equally between West and East WTPs). Chlorine Gas In all of the forms of chlorine used in the Water Treatment industry, chlorine gas is the only one that contains 100% chlorine. It has been the primary disinfectant used in the treatment of potable water for over 100 years. The technology, processes, and procedures used to inject chlorine gas into water are time tested and proven. Modern chlorination systems are almost completely operated with the chlorine under a vacuum, so any piping or apparatus failure would result in air being drawn in to system not chlorine gas escaping. The chlorine gas under pressure in the transportation/storage vessel is reduced to a pressure below atmospheric as soon as it leaves the vessel when the chlorinator is mounted directly to the chlorine vessel. This minimizes the possible piping and apparatus that if failed would release chlorine gas to the atmosphere. Advantages 1. Proven technology 2. Lowest total cost 3. Pure chemical, less fouling and system maintenance 4. The best chemical shelf -life (does not degrade) Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 6 Disadvantages 1. Additional Safety requirements and paperwork 2. When storing at least 2,500 pounds of chlorine on-site at any time a water utility must comply with the EPA Risk Management Plan (RMP) 3. Other State and local regulations may have requirements as it pertains to the storage and usage of chlorine gas Impurities and/or Chemical byproducts AWWA Water Works grade chlorine gas is 99.9% pure. There will be trace amounts of Ferric Chloride in the container. aafety Approximately 12 million tons of chlorine are produced annually in the United States. Only 4%, or 480,000 tons of that production is used in the water industry. This chlorine is produced at 15 locations throughout the United States. It is shipped in bulk, typically by railcars to 44 chlorine repackaging plants located throughout the United States. In turn, they supply the chlorine in 150 pound or 1 -ton containers to water treatment systems in their geographical area mainly by truck. Only a few of the largest water treatment systems use tanker trucks or railcars to receive their chlorine directly from the producers. While a hazardous material, chlorine gas is actually responsible for very few incidents in water and wastewater treatment facilities. In over 95 percent of all treatment facilities the amount of gas chlorine on hand is relatively small, by comparison to industrial use in non -water and wastewater treatment applications. Pharmaceuticals and chemical manufacturing account for the vast majority of chlorine usage, and railroad tank cars are not an uncommon sight at those facilities. Another use that requires those same railroad tank cars of liquefied chlorine gas is sodium hypochlorite (bleach) manufacturing. There were incidents where operations personnel improperly handled the gas chlorine containers or accidentally removed a regulator or fitting without turning off the cylinder valve, as there were incidents with the handling of virtually every hazardous chemical known to mankind. But, with chlorine gas, these are very isolated incidents, and, most importantly, no one has ever died from one of these incidents. It can be very unpleasant, and preventive hospitalization may be necessary for observation, but in the end, personnel return to their jobs in virtually all cases. And, even more importantly, there has been no loss of life, mass evacuations, or mass hospitalizations as a result of chlorine gas leaks at water and wastewater treatment facilities in the United States in more than 20 years, where 150-1b. chlorine cylinders were in use. This is the vast majority of treatment facilities. Where one ton containers were in use, a very few incidents called for erring on the side of caution and people were evacuated from an area around the facility until the leakage was brought under control. Improper mixing of chemicals has repeatedly resulted in large scale releases of chlorine gas from sodium hypochlorite treatment facilities that had no chlorine gas containers on site. A large water treatment facility in Michigan had used gas chlorination for many decades and had an enviable safety record. Concerns by city officials about the storage of gas chlorine containers led them to change the facility over to sodium hypochlorite. Very large storage tanks were installed in the facility for the bleach. A tank truck delivering aluminum sulfate for part of the treatment process, accidentally pumped the chemical into one of the bleach tanks, and 12 workers went to the hospital with chemical Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 7 inhalation distress. As was stated previously, the same NRC database was used to determine the number of chlorine releases from chlorine gas that occurred in 2014. The 2014 results include the following data: • 74 total releases for chlorine gas were reported • 3 releases were transportation related • 28 releases were associated with industrial processes using chlorine gas • 25 releases were associated with the manufacture of chlorine gas • 1 release at a scrap yard • 17 releases were associated with potable water, wastewater, and recreation water The majority of the releases associated with water plants were releases during cylinder or ton container changes. This points to the need for more training, better tools, or a review of operational procedures. References that detail each reported incident can be found on the internet for other countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia. After reviewing the information that is available and comparing with the experiences from both the United Kingdom and Australia, which closely matched the available data for the United States, showed that 60% of the reported "chlorine releases" were the result of mishandling sodium or calcium hypochlorite and 40% of the releases were due to chlorine gas incidents. Storage Requirements for Chlorine Gas A Risk Management Plan (RMP) is required by federal and many state agencies when chlorine is stored above a certain threshold quantity. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) threshold quantity for chlorine gas is 2,500 pounds per site or facility. Additionally, the method of storing chlorine will influence the scope and extent of the emergency plan preparation that is required by the RPM regulations. The water treatment industry uses three techniques for the control of chlorine leaks if they ever occurred at a facility. These techniques are scrubbing, containment, and emergency shutoff valves. Scrubbing is a treatment system that neutralizes the accidental release of chlorine gas by drawing contaminated air through a chemical absorption system. The treated air is discharged to the atmosphere. Scrubbing systems are costly and very high maintenance. In addition, scrubbers typically use hazardous chemicals to neutralize the chlorine gas which are costly to replace and dispose of. Containment systems employ a self-contained vessel within which the chlorine gas cylinder is housed. Accidental leaks of chlorine are kept within the containment vessel, an ASME-rated pressure tank, for recycling to the injection system at a normal flow rate. No atmospheric venting is generated because the leaked gas is kept within the containment vessel. TGO Technologies, Inc. of Santa Rosa, California, has developed self -containment vessels for both 150 -pound and one -ton cylinders that perform this function. Their vessel is referred to as the Chlortainer. Scrubbing, containment, and emergency shutoff valves for chlorine gas are subject to the requirement of an RMP, as stipulated in Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act and Article 80 of the Uniform Fire Code. In Section 112 (r), the EPA developed a list of 77 toxic and 63 flammable substances for which threshold quantities were established. As stated previously, the threshold Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 8 quantities for chlorine is 2,500 pounds. Facilities storing chlorine gas in quantities that equal, or exceed 2,500 pounds are required by statute to prepare a RMP in accordance with 40 CFR Part 68, Subpart G. It is important for plant managers to accurately inventory the quantities of stored chlorine gas cylinders at the plant site. Stored quantities of less than 2,500 pounds do not trigger the preparation of a federal RMP. A further consideration when determining whether a facility must prepare an RMP is the method used to control chlorine leaks. A self-contained, total containment Chlortainer vessel of the type available from TGO Technologies, as described above, is considered a separate process if not manifolded or interconnected to other vessels. That is, a single, unconnected 1 -ton cylinder would be below the exempt threshold quantity of 2,500 pounds and a RMP would not be required. However, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) and Recommended Ten States Standards require a minimum 30 -day supply of each chemical stored on site. The Chanhassen West WTP could need up to six (6) 1 -ton cylinders in order to meet this storage requirement under ultimate development conditions. Therefore, storing a single, unconnected 1 -ton cylinder at the West WTP would not be feasible. In addition, the estimated cost to store six (6) 1 -ton cylinders in six Chlortainers is approximately $750,000. The third technique to help contain a chlorine leak from a cylinder is installing emergency shut- off valves on each stored cylinder. These specially manufactured valves with automation have been developed to meet the more stringent safety requirements imposed by the Risk Management Plan (RMP) requirements. The system is a battery powered fail-safe device designed to provide safety and security where toxic gas cylinders are in use. In addition, these valves meet the requirements of the Uniform and International Fire Codes for storage and use of toxic gases such as chlorine. It is an accepted technology to replace scrubbers for gas leak containment. The automatic valve shutoff system was designed to respond to the requests of utilities that need to improve plant safety and security for the demanding needs of current regulations. The system will close up to two cylinder valves through a controller that is wired to a chlorine leak detector. An automatic valve operator (AVO) is mounted on each cylinder and will close the cylinder's valve on signal from the controller/leak detector. The controller can receive any number of closure signals from sensors such as a gas leak detector, fire alarm, and emergency panic button. The battery operated system will provide sufficient power to close any valve as long as the sensors are operational. Experience with equipment installation and personnel training on the use and operation of AVOs has shown that only one hour of operator training is required. In comparison to the estimated cost for six (6) Chlortainer containment vessels described previously in this memorandum, the estimated cost to provide one ROBO Control Emergency Valve Closure System for six 1 -ton cylinders is only $45,000. Financial Analysis This equipment with proper maintenance should last 20 years before needing to be replaced. The initial cost of a chlorine gas feed system including emergency shut-off valves and scales for six (6) 1 -ton cylinders, not including installation and piping supplies, is $175,000. The estimated labor hours to maintain the system would be approximately 90 hours per year. The average cost per pound of pure chlorine gas is $0.26 per pound. Assuming that similar dosages are used at the West Water Treatment Plant and similar volumes of water will be treated, the average cost per Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 9 year for chlorine gas in ton cylinders is estimated to be $9,830 per year over a 20 -year period. The total present worth value or cost to feed sodium hypochlorite over a 20 -year period, including equipment, chemicals, electricity, and labor is $484,735 (Note - Assumes average day demand of 2.07 MGD over 20 -year period and demands split equally between West and East WTPs). Summary The annual cost for installing and operating a chlorine gas feed system for 1 -ton cylinders would be less expensive than installing and operating either an on-site sodium hypochlorite feed system or a conventional sodium hypochlorite feed system over a 20 year period. The estimated cost for emergency shut-off valves is significantly less expensive compared to Chlortainer containment vessels, so emergency shut-off valves were included with the estimated cost of the chlorine gas system. Chlorine gas has the lowest 20 -year present worth life cycle cost and is the purest chemical of the options evaluated. Method Estimated Unit Cost Per Average Annual Total 20 -Year Capital Cost Pure Pound of 20 -Year Present Worth Chlorine Chlorine Life Cycle Cost Chemical Cost x Chlorine Gas $175,000 $0.26 $9,830 $484,735 with 1 -Ton Cylinders and Emergency Shut-off Valves Sodium $197,000 $0.58 $22,000 $850,545 Hvvochlorite On-site $590,000 (**) $0.41 _ $15,500 $1,269,483 Generated Sodium Hypochlorite Notes — (*) Includes equipment, chemicals, electricity, and labor. (**) Includes replacing cell plates every 5 -years at $35,000 per replacement Unlike sodium hypochlorite, chlorine gas does not degrade and does not add additional bromate or chlorate to the finished water. Chlorine gas feed systems require fewer unplanned maintenance interruptions caused by gas binding and scaling. There are regulations that apply to chlorine gas that add extra costs to this system to cover administration and interaction with State and local emergency response team. Sodium hypochlorite has the second lowest 20 -year present worth life cycle cost but is almost double the cost for a chlorine gas system with I -ton cylinders and emergency shut-off valves. In addition, the unit cost per pure pound of chlorine gas is significantly less than either sodium hypochlorite or on-site generated sodium hypochlorite. Mr. Paul Oehme, PE April 26, 2016 Page 10 On-site generation has the third lowest 20 -year present worth life cycle cost based on a single generator system with no back up. However, due to the fact that the water plant is their own chlorine supplier, some form of a backup system or alternate source for chlorine is needed. This is required to cover for longer term break downs and equipment outages due to planned maintenance. Some plants have a complete or partial redundant backup generation system while others install pumps and associated items required so they can have commercial sodium hypochlorite delivered and stored in the existing on-site generator storage tank. Since the water plant is also the chlorine supplier, a higher level of operator training is needed. Electrical power usage is much higher for on-site generation compared to the other options. Please contact us if you have any comments or questions. Sincerely, WSB & Associates, Inc. Greg F. Johnson, PE Project Manager Water/Wastewater Group Manager gjohnson@wsbeng.com (651) 286-8468 Answers to Questions from HOA Group on the Proposed West Water Filtration Plant 1. Recent alterations of the building scale, appearance, landscaping and placement of the facility on the proposed site and its integration into the residential neighborhoods and natural surroundings. The City engagement plan with the neighborhoods was always to take comments from the residents prior to completing any detailed architectural building drawings or landscape plan. The feedback the City received is being incorporated into the building architecture and landscape plan. Here is a summary of the building changes since the June 2, 2016 open house: The non - water production area (south portion of the building) which includes the control room, chemical rooms, mechanical and electrical room have been lowered 6' to better screen this area. We think we can screen most of this section of the building with berms and landscaping since it is significantly depressed from the existing grade. The elevation of this part of the building is not dictated by the water table. The aeration process along with its building has been eliminated from the north side of the plant. This change decreased the overall length of the building by 40'. We are still planning to have a detention tank but it will be completely underground. The overall building length has been reduced from 178' 4" to 138' 4". The greatest the building is above ground is approximately 17' without a sloped roof. The overall height of the building t is consistent with some of the homes in the area. The length of the filter cell and the pump room is 86'4" long which is about the same length as some homes in the area. As I mention earlier, the non -water production area has been lowered 6' so this area should be able to be screened with berms and landscaping fairly Filter Cell and Pump Room Non -Water Production Area \\cfs5\cfs5\shared data\eng\public\_2010-2015 public projects\_2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\062416 hoa question responses.docx easily. The City is planning to use a prairie style architecture for the building. An example of a prairie style building is shown above. A sketch of what the plant would look like using a prairie style architecture is also shown above. A robust landscape plan is planned for the site. Plantings and berms will be strategically placed to break up site lines and enhance the natural surroundings. WEST WATER TREATMENT PLANT CONCEPT 2. Recent discoveries regarding the water table, wetland setbacks and impacts on the current proposed site vs. alternative site locations previously considered. The site is large enough to accommodate the building and will not have impacts to natural resources in the area. The underground reservoir and backwash reclaim tank are required to be at least 2' above the water table. The additional information gathered over the last year does not change the recommendation. This site is still the best location for the plant based on cost and design considerations. 3. Considerations of the current design and the proximity of the site to current and future neighborhood developments. The closest the plant will be to a neighborhood is to the north off of Manchester Drive. The future park will buffer the properties from the plant. Many trees will be planted in the park and on all sides of the facility for natural screening. The properties around the site are fully developed. \\cfs5\cfs5\shared data\eng\public\_2010-2015 public projects\_2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\062416 hoa question responses.docx 4. Ability to address health, safety and environmental issues (especially to the wetlands) )related to the operations of the facility. Safety is the most important component that is designed into the plant. Many safeguards and redundant safety systems will be included in the plant. In the very unlikely event a liquid chemical leak were to occur, containment systems are built into the plant design so it does not leave the chemical room. An air testing monitor system continuously tests the air in the plant. In the unlikely event chlorine is release into the air, the plant will shut down along with the chemical feed system and ventilation unit. Doors to the chemical rooms have seals and containment equipment. The wetlands on the east side of the site will not be impacted by the project. Stormwater runoff from the site will be treated in the stormwater pond on the west side of the site. 5. Management strategies and procedures to address chlorine exposure (emergency response, pre -hospital and personal protective measures). The Chanhassen Fire Department is trained to the Hazmat Operational Level allowing us to isolate, identify, and evacuate. We have adequate air monitoring equipment and resources to determine the proper evacuation proximity based on the incident. The Hopkins Fire Department is a state Chemical Assessment Team (CAT) and is located 9 miles from Chanhassen. A CAT has the capabilities to assist with monitoring and mitigation. The Carver County Hazmat resource trailer is located in Victoria and is available by mutual aid request. The trailer is stocked with monitoring and decontamination equipment and supplies. 6. Proximity to adequate medical facilities trained in handling hazardous materials and exposure risks. The Ridgeview Ambulance Service is trained and has protocols for hazardous materials exposure. Both 212 Medical Center (6 miles) and Waconia Medical Center (14 miles) have existing plans for hazardous materials exposure and mass casualty incidents. A Level 1 trauma center (HCMG) is located 20 miles away. 7. Plans to address the storage and/or disposal of chlorine containers within the wetlands (dry areas are required). Empty chlorine cylinders will be removed from the plant when full cylinders are delivered. The wetlands around the site will not be impacted by the operations of plant or chemicals used at the plant. The iron and manganese removed from the water will be discharged into the sanitary sewer system and treated by the Metropolitan Council sewer treatment plant in Shakopee just as all the other sanitary flows discharged from Chanhassen. 8. On-going operations at the plant and impact to the surrounding neighborhoods. The plant will have one operator at the plant most weekdays. The plant will be able to be run autonomously after normal business hours and on weekends. Depending on how much filtered water is produced, one or two semi -truck delivery vehicle(s) will be needed per month. Other than routine maintenance work, very few other vehicles will need to make trips to the plant. The operation of the plant is quiet. A standby generator is included in the design for power failure or if Xcel Energy wants to drop the plant off the grid for peak shaving needs. The \\cfs5\cfs5\shared_data\eng\public\ 2010-2015 public projects\ 2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\062416 hoa question responses.docx generator will be operated for a few hours once a month to perform readiness checks. The generator will be installed with a massive muffler that significantly deadens the noise. No other piece of equipment of the plant has any significant noise making which will be heard outside of the plant. The design does not call for any additional street lighting or parking lot lighting. The exterior doors will have small LED lights with motion sensors. Exterior security cameras will be installed. We are seeking guidance on how our HOA Consortium can work with the City to accomplish the following: 1. Better understanding of key factors that are driving the design changes from what was historically and previously communicated over the past 10+ years, to what was proposed on June 2, 2016. After the parcel was purchased in 2005, the City felt it was important to identify this site as the future filtration plant. A sign was installed soon after the property was purchased and information of the future plans for the site were placed on the City website. The City completed several site layouts of the future improvements. At the time of the land purchase, the City was completing a water treatment study and soon after was working on the design and construction of the East Treatment Plant. The City focused resources on the East Filtration plant work and left more detailed work of the West Filtration Plant site when the City determined it was time to start planning to construct the West Filtration Plant. In 2015, soil borings were taken and the plant was sized for the existing and future needs of the City. 2. Better understanding of decision criteria for the site location and overall design, as well as, the investments that have already been made. The City purchased the filtration plant site in 2005 at the time of the Lake Harrison development. The City evaluated other sites for the West Filtration Plant and decide to purchase a few acres from the Lake Harrison development because it was the most cost effective, it was available for purchase. This site was also identified by the Parks Department for a neighborhood park. 3. Better understanding of the rationale for the six (6) year accelerated construction/ implementation timeline from 2023 to fall 2016. The East Filtration Plant was constructed in 2006. At that time, the plan was to construct the West Filtration Plant in 2012. This plan was primarily based on financial considerations. With the economic downturn in 2008, the project was reprogrammed for 2023. With the better financial situation, the City decided to move the project up to 2016. 4. Communicate and ultimately resolve the HOA's key concerns surrounding this project. The City plans to work with the residents in the area to answer their questions. The City plans to have more neighborhood meetings and more dialogue. The City's website will be updated as plans are refined so the most current information is available. \\cfs5\cfs5\shared_data\eng\public\_2010-2015 public projects\_2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\062416 hoa question responses.docx PC DATE: September 6, 2016 re" 1 \ 1. Y ox. CC DATE: September 26, 2016 CITY OF CHANHASSEN REVIEW DEADLINE: October 4, 2016 ...1./ CASE#: 2016-21 N HN S 5 BY: RG, TJ, ML, JM, JS, SS PROPOSED MOTION: "The Chanhassen Planning Commission recommends approval of the subdivision creating one lot and two outlots and site plan for a 16,950 water treatment facility subject to the conditions of approval and adoption of the findings of facts and recommendation." CA.51 - ,' .. 1 :q 4, . +�. -.1c1 ',•-:-4-7 . • .. ', • rt '. "•� - ./ 'fir., • `' rte• j k 7 ,# : ,''. > 4 .l I y y. N C' f s • f f 4 '� V` t ' ``'3 '1i ' „,, ' '> ) r "L:✓I iiiS :4il�t.S.: fid. SUMMARY OF REQUEST: Request for a Site Plan Review and replat of Lot 1, Block 4, and Outlot A of Lake Harrison to construct the West Water Treatment Plant. LOCATION: 2070 Lake Harrison Road (Lot 1, Block 4, and Outlot A, Lake Harrison) APPLICANT: Greg Johnson, P.E. Paul Oehme, P.E., Public Works Director WSB &Associates City of Chanhassen 477 Temperance Street 7700 Market Boulevard St. Paul, MN 55101 P. O. Box 147 (651) 286-8466 Chanhassen, MN 55317 giohnsonawsbeng.com (952) 227-1169 noehme@ci.chanhassen.mn.us PRESENT ZONING: Single-Family Residential, RSF 2020 LAND USE PLAN: Parks and Open Space ACREAGE: 6.57 acres DENSITY: 0.06 F.A.R. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 2 of 11 LEVEL OF CITY DISCRETION IN DECISION-MAKING: The city's discretion in approving or denying a Preliminary Plat is limited to whether or not the proposed plat meets the standards outlined in the Subdivision Regulations and Zoning Ordinance. If it meets these standards, the city must approve the preliminary plat. This is a quasi-judicial decision. The city's discretion in approving or denying a Site Plan is limited to whether or not the proposed project complies with Zoning Ordinance requirements. If it meets these standards, the city must then approve the site plan. This is a quasi-judicial decision. Notice of this public hearing has been mailed to all property, owners within 500 feet. PROPOSAL/SUMMARY Request for subdivision approval to replat Lot 1, Block 4, Lake Harrison and Outlot A, Lake Harrison into one lot and two Outlots and site plan review for a 16,950 square foot water treatment facility. APPLICABLE REGULATIONS Chapter 18, Subdivision Chapter 20, Article II, Division 6, Site Plan Review Chapter 20,Article VI, Wetland Protection Chapter 20,Article XII,"RSF"Single-Family Residential District Chapter 20,Article XXIII,Division 7,Design Standards for Commercial, Industrial and Office- Institutional Developments BACKGROUND The plat for Lake Harrison was approved on July 12, 2005 as Planning Case#2005-14 creating 39 lots, 6 outlots and associated right-of-way for public streets with a variance for a private street and street grade. As part of the development,the City purchased Lot 1, Block 4, in the northeast portion of the site for a future water treatment plant. In addition, a raw water main was extended through the development from the well fields to the north and west in anticipation of the construction of the water treatment plant. On May 9,2005,the Chanhassen City Council approved: Rezoning of the property from RR,Rural Residential,to RSF, Single Family Residential District;Preliminary plat(Subdivision)to create 40 lots,4 outlots and public right-of-way with a variance for a private street and street grade; a 5-foot front yard Variance for Block 2; a Wetland Alteration Permit to fill and alter wetlands on site; and denied the bluff setback variance. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 3 of 11 PRELIMINARY PLAT The city is proposing the replat of Outlot A and Lot 1, Block 4, Lake Harrison into one lot for the water treatment facility and park area and two outlots containing open space and wetlands. The lot shall be developed with a water treatment facility and a neighborhood park. Manchester Drive will be extended to provide a permanent cul-de-sac and parking area for the neighborhood park. The outlots shall contain wetlands and permanent open space. Public streets, water and sewer were provided as part of the Lake Harrison development. EASEMENTS The site plan requires replatting Lot 1, Block 4 and Outlot A, Lake Harrison,therefore the existing drainage and utility easements on these properties must be vacated prior to recording the final plat. �, ,' .\ 1 1 1 f , Y / 1 W UNE OF THE 1 ' MOSTEIY SE 1/4 OF THE t , ,1 1 ;' % / SW 114 OF SEC 3L --- L. i'7'' 02OTA,j`, / \ 1 1�♦ ♦< , / 0 u T L �♦ ♦ i� O i i 198.49- v. MOST N'LY COR 'A♦ ♦♦( / ` I 116.00 / OF LOT 1.BLOCK 4 .A /• : "<,,♦ ,, / Q,< _�♦♦ NROWLINE LOT 1 /' `♦♦;1 ,♦(,� /' 1' Q/ ‘' 111 7'HARRBON BLOCK 4• ♦ / ROAD / ♦♦ ♦♦♦J /� 44 R i ) 111 5 .^. ♦♦ / ' ♦♦ i 11 q='---- -,x'21 ♦ 1 IZ 5 I ♦,-♦♦♦(. -<' 1 {. ,�J I � , ,` , ,Q�7QQ I / 1 1 1, : 1. 1 I COMPLIANCE TABLE Area(sq. Width Depth Hard Cover Notes ft.) (ft.) (ft.) %/sq. ft. Code I 15,000 I 90 125 25/3,750 Lot 1 I 179,858 I 245 44,964 4.13 acres Outot A 45,411 1.04 acres,Contains wetlands (eastern outlot) Outlot B 21,718 0.5 acres, contains wetlands and slope(western outlot) Total 246,987 I I 5.67 acres Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 4 of 11 SITE PLAN REVIEW The city is proposing a 16,950 water treatment facility with underground backwash tanks northeast of the building. In the future, a neighborhood park is being proposed at the end of Manchester Drive. • \ � 1 sr.xa;—ve: 1- 1AKI • HARRISON ROAD, Access to the site will be via a 30-foot wide access off of Lake Harrison Road. The proposed location exceeds the city's minimum access spacing requirement from Galpin Boulevard. The plan includes a paved area in front of the building to accommodate parking and delivery vehicles. Curb and gutter are required around the parking area. The plan includes installing a 90-foot diameter cul-de-sac at the end of Manchester Drive to provide vehicular access and parking for future park amenities in the area. An 8-foot wide bituminous trail is proposed to extend from the parking area; an ADA-compliant curb ramp must be installed. UTILITIES Eight-inch lateral sanitary sewer will be extended from Galpin Boulevard to the site. A water service will be stubbed to the building from the water system improvements that will be installed. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 5 of 11 The Metropolitan Council Environmental Services Sewer Access Charge (Metro SAC)must be paid with the building permit. The West Water Treatment Plant is not subject to the City Sewer Access Charge and Water Access Charge (City SAC and WAC). GRADING AND RETAINING WALLS The site drops 30 feet in elevation from the north (Manchester Drive)to the south(Lake Harrison Road). The water treatment plant is proposed to be built into the slope. Two, 30-foot long retaining walls are proposed at the following locations: 1) At the northwest corner of the building,maximum height of four feet, and 2) At the southwest corner of the building,maximum height 19.5 feet. The following comments must be incorporated into the final grading plan: a) The bottom of wall elevation of the northerly retaining wall is mislabeled (shown as 914.0', appears to be 1014.0'), and b) The 984' contour southwest of the parking area is mislabeled (shown as 884'). SURFACE WATER MANAGEMENT City code requires that a project either meets NURP recommendations or the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Requirements,whichever is more restrictive. As the project will exceed the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System threshold for permanent stormwater management the NPDES permit would be the more restrictive. This requires a net reduction in runoff volume, total phosphorous,and total suspended solids leaving the site post-development. This site will also be subject to the Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed District (RPBCWD) Rule J—Stormwater Management. RPBCWD requires that applicant demonstrate that they can accomplish the following goals: 1) Limit peak runoff from all points leaving the site to at or below the existing rates for the 2, 10 and 100-year return frequency storms. 2) Provide onsite abstraction for 1.1 inches of runoff from all impervious surfaces. 3) Provide, on an annual basis, removal of 60%total phosphorous and 90%total suspended solids. If the RPBCWD criteria are met, this will satisfy the city requirements for stormwater management. A stormwater management plan, including a hydraulic and hydrologic model, discussion of how the proposed best management practices will meet the volume requirements, a water quality model (either P8 or MIDS Calculator), and Walker calculations demonstrating adequate capacity within the existing and proposed conveyance system shall be submitted and approved prior to issuance of any permits. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 6 of 11 The proposed inlet to the existing pond under the driveway(5003)will result in a short circuit condition. This must be modified to maximize the separation and reduce the probability of short circuiting. The proposed inlet into the exiting pond from the proposed cul-de-sac is greater than 16%. This has the potential to accelerate the runoff to the pond and exceed scour velocities. The pipe shall be made shallower and the Walker calculations must demonstrate that scour velocities will not occur at FES 5005. EROSION PREVENTION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL The project exceeds the NPDES permit threshold. The applicant shall prepare a Surface Water Pollution Prevention Plan(SWPPP) and submit to the city for approval prior to the issuance of any permits. No earth disturbing activities may occur until an approved SWPPP is developed. This SWPPP shall be a standalone document consistent with the NPDES Construction Permit and shall contain all required elements as listed in Parts III and IV of the permit. SITE CONSTRAINTS Wetland Protection There exists onsite two wetlands. One wetland exists adjacent to Galpin Boulevard and includes a mitigation area for wetland impacts that occurred with the Lake Harrison development. The other is located at the western limits of the property and also includes a mitigation area. These were delineated in 2008 and were reviewed by city staff this summer to verify that their boundaries have not significantly changed. Any proposed disturbance will be a minimum of 200 feet from the western wetland basin. The easterly wetland is in relatively close proximity to the proposed improvements. Although no impacts are likely to occur from the project,the site must still accommodate the required buffer and setback. The plans should be updated to clearly indicate the wetland boundary and the edge of buffer. Shoreland Management District The property is at least partially within the Shoreland Management District for Lake Harrison. The site must meet the requirements for construction with the Shoreland Management District. ARCHITECTURAL COMPLIANCE The applicant is requesting site plan approval for a 16,950 square-foot water treatment facility. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 7 of 11 - ."'may * 1. Adeli Alpo w 111111, ,fin Size Portion Placement The main entrance to the building is located on the south side of the building. The entrance is covered by roof overhang that is raised up from the rest of the roof. The entrance is tucked into a small entry stoop or porch type area. This facility is not intended for general visitor entry. A ten-foot-tall berm is located to the south of the building adjacent to Lake Harrison Road which will screen the parking area. An accessible ramp is located on the west side of the building. Material, Detail and Color The building materials are primarily a reddish-brown brick veneer with tan stone accent bands and columns of cultured stone veneer. The roof material is a gray metal. A hardietrim trim board and facial frame the roof and building interface as well as along the clerestory window band. Precast stone cap stone provides a ledge for the clerestory window band Height and Roof Design Height is limited to three stories or 35 feet in the Single-Family Residential District. The building has stepped roof heights as it moves up the hill with the highest roof peak 21 feet to the top of roof above grade. The building uses prairie roof style with shallow pitches (12:3) and large eves. On the west,north and east elevations of the northern part of the building and over the southern entrance, a small dormer type roof treatment provides addition height and architectural relief to the roof line and building. Facade Transparency This building is not intended for public view so minimal windows are necessary or advisable. Clerestory spandrels windows are provided on all four elevations of the building with a few clear windows to provide natural lighting within the building. Windows are provided at the office/control room area of the building to the north of the main entrance. All other areas shall include landscaping material and architectural detailing and articulation. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 8 of 11 Site Furnishing The city is providing a trail connection from the park area above to the trail on Galpin Boulevard. The upper area of the site will be developed as a neighborhood park. Loading areas, refuse area, etc. Loading areas are located on the southwest side of the building where the loading dock is located, which is screened from public view by the building orientation, berming and landscaping. No specific outdoor refuse area is proposed. LANDSCAPING Landscaping requirements for the West Water Treatment Plant include bufferyard plantings to the north and foundation plantings around the building. Minimum landscaping requirements are as follows. Landscape Requirement Required plantings Proposed plantings Bufferyard B—240' 3 overstory trees 3 overstory trees 5 understory trees 13 understory trees 9 shrubs 5 shrubs The applicant exceeds quantities for understory trees but falls short for the quantity of shrubs. The understory trees are evergreen that provide year round buffering. An increased number of these plantings provide a better buffer than the shrubs. Staff recommends that the proposed buffer plantings be accepted. The applicant is proposing to preserve a number of existing trees on site and use foundation plantings to break up expanses of the building,buffer site lines from various points and create an aesthetically pleasing grounds. The locations of proposed landscape plantings will need to be field located to work around existing trees. Proposed planting will be placed on site in locations that do not conflict with preserved trees. All existing trees proposed to be preserved will be required to have tree protection fencing installed at the driplines or a minimum of 15 feet from the trunk. MISCELLANEOUS The building is required to have an automatic fire extinguishing system. Building plans must be prepared and signed by design professionals licensed in the State of Minnesota. Retaining walls over four high must be designed by a professional engineer and a permit must be obtained prior to Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 9 of 11 • construction. Detailed occupancy related requirements will be addressed when complete building plans are submitted.The owner and or their representative shall meet with the Inspections Division as soon as possible to discuss plan review and permit procedures. COMPLIANCE TABLE RSF West Water Treatment Plant Building Height 3 stories 1 story 35 feet 21 feet to roof peak Building Setback N - 30' E - 10' N— 108' E- 30' W - 10' S - 30' W - 312' S - 144' Wetland Setback: 20' buffer 20' buffer Building 30' to buffer 50' to buffer Parking 15' to buffer 15' to buffer Parking Stalls 2 6 (One per employee plus one per vehicle normally parked on site.) Parking Setback N - 30' E- 10' N - 396' E - 72' W- 10' S - 30' W - 151' S - 120' Hard Surface Coverage 25% 13% Lot Area 0.344 acre 6.27 acres RECOMMENDATION Staff recommends that the Planning Commission approve the subdivision creating one lot and two outlots and site plan for the water treatment facility subject to the following conditions: SUBDIVISION Existing drainage and utility easements on these properties must be vacated prior to recording the final plat. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 10 of 11 SITE PLAN Building 1. The building is required to have an automatic fire extinguishing system. 2. Building plans must be prepared and signed by design professionals licensed in the State of Minnesota. 3. Retaining walls over four high must be designed by a professional engineer and a permit must be obtained prior to construction. 4. Detailed occupancy related requirements will be addressed when complete building plans are submitted. 5. The owner and or their representative shall meet with the Inspections Division as soon as possible to discuss plan review and permit procedures. Environmental Resources Specialist 1. All existing trees to be preserved shall have tree protection fencing installed at the driplines or a minimum of 15 feet from the trunk, prior to any grading. 2. Proposed landscaping will be field located. Engineering 1. The existing drainage and utility easements must be vacated prior to recording the final plat. 2. Curb and gutter are required around the parking area. 3. An ADA-compliant curb ramp must be installed from the parking area at the Manchester Drive cul-de-sac to the 8-foot wide trail. 4. The following comments must be incorporated into the final grading plan: a) The bottom of wall elevation of the northerly retaining wall is mislabeled (shown as 914.0', appears to be 1014.0'), and b) The 984' contour southwest of the parking area is mislabeled (shown as 884'). 5. The Metropolitan Council Environmental Services Sewer Access Charge (Metro SAC) must be paid with the building permit. 6. The West Water Treatment Plant is not subject to the City Sewer Access Charge and Water Access Charge (City SAC and WAC). 7. The applicant shall prepare a Surface Water Pollution Prevention Plan(SWPPP) and submit to the city for approval prior to the issuance of any permits. 8. A stormwater management plan, including a hydraulic and hydrologic model,volume reduction methods, a water quality model (either P8 or MIDS Calculator), and Walker calculations demonstrating adequate capacity within the existing and proposed conveyance system shall be submitted and approved prior to issuance of any permits. 9. The applicant shall submit and receive all applicable permits from the Riley Purgatory Bluff Creek Watershed District prior to commencement of any work on the site. Planning Commission West Water Treatment Plant—Planning Case 2016-21 September 6,2016 Page 11 of 11 10. The applicant shall submit and receive all applicable permits from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency prior to commencement of any work on the site. 11. The plans shall be modified to clearly demarcate the wetland boundary and the edge of buffer. 12. A vegetation management plan shall be prepared and submitted for review and approval prior to the issuance of a building permit. 13. The plan shall indicate placement of wetland buffer signs. ATTACHMENTS Findings of Fact and Recommendation Development Review Application Lot Split Sketch Reduced Copy Lake Harrison Plat WSB Project Narrative with Appendices A—D Building Elevation North and West Building Elevations East and South Consortium of HOA's Questions & Staff Responses dated August 22, 2016 Email messages from Xcel's Jennifer Abbott&Kim Marinac re: Electric outages in the Lake Harrison neighborhood Public Hearing Notice and Mailing List Jag Reddy Letter Chlorine Plant Accidents List 1998-2013 WISE Phase 3 Water Utility Guidelines Michelle Treptau Email Consortium of HOA Robert Kline Email Email from Arjau K. Chanhassen West Water Treatment Plant Open House Sign Up Form West Water Treatment Plant Project—Open House Comments from Michelle Treptau West Water Treatment Plant Landscape Plan G:\PLAN\2016 Planning Cases\2016-21 West Water Treatment Plant\staff report west water treatment.doc CITY OF CHANHASSEN CARVER AND HENNEPIN COUNTIES,MINNESOTA FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION IN RE: Application of WSB &Associates and the City of Chanhassen for Subdivision and Site Plan approval to replat Lot 1, Block 4, Lake Harrison and Outlot A, Lake Harrison into one lot and two Outlots and site plan review for a 16,950 square foot water treatment facility. On September 6, 2016, the Chanhassen Planning Commission met at its regularly scheduled meeting to consider the application of WSB &Associates and the City of Chanhassen for subdivision and site plan approval. The Planning Commission conducted a public hearing on the proposed development preceded by published and mailed notice. The Planning Commission heard testimony from all interested persons wishing to speak and now makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The property is currently zoned Single-Family Residential,RSF. 2. The property is guided in the Land Use Plan for Parks & Open Space. 3. The legal description of the property is: Lot 1, Block 4, Lake Harrison and Outlot A, Lake Harrison. 4. The Subdivision Ordinance directs the Planning Commission to consider seven possible adverse affects of the proposed subdivision. The seven (7) affects and our findings regarding them are: a. The proposed subdivision is consistent with the zoning ordinance; b. The proposed subdivision is consistent with all applicable city, county and regional plans including but not limited to the city's comprehensive plan; c. The physical characteristics of the site,including but not limited to topography, soils, vegetation,susceptibility to erosion and siltation,susceptibility to flooding, and storm water drainage are suitable for the proposed development; d. The proposed subdivision makes adequate provision for water supply, storm drainage, sewage disposal, streets, erosion control and all other improvements required by the subdivision ordinance; e. The proposed subdivision will not cause significant environmental damage; f. The proposed subdivision will not conflict with easements of record; and g. The proposed subdivision is not premature. A subdivision is premature if any of the following exists: 1) Lack of adequate storm water drainage. 2) Lack of adequate roads. 1 3) Lack of adequate sanitary sewer systems. 4) Lack of adequate off-site public improvements or support systems. 5. Site Plan Review: a. Is consistent with the elements and objectives of the city's development guides, including the comprehensive plan, official road mapping, and other plans that may be adopted; Finding: The proposed development is consistent with the elements and objectives of the city's development guides. b. Is consistent with site plan division; Finding: The proposed development complies with the Site Plan review requirements of the Chanhassen City Code. Utility services are a permitted use in the RSF District. c. Preserves the site in its natural state to the extent practicable by minimizing tree and soil removal and designing grade changes to be in keeping with the general appearance of the neighboring developed or developing or developing areas; Finding: The proposed development designs grade changes to be in keeping with the general appearance of the neighboring developed areas. The building is being built into the side of the hill with a maximum roof height of 21 feet. d. Creates a harmonious relationship of building and open space with natural site features and with existing and future buildings having a visual relationship to the development; Finding: The proposed development creates a harmonious relationship of building and open space with natural site features and with existing and future buildings having a visual relationship to the development. The building is being built into the side of the hill. e. Creates a functional and harmonious design for structures and site features, with special attention to the following: 1) An internal sense of order for the buildings and use on the site and provision of a desirable environment for occupants, visitors and general community; 2) The amount and location of open space and landscaping; 3) Materials, textures, colors and details of construction as an expression of the design concept and the compatibility of the same with adjacent and neighboring structures and uses; and 4) Vehicular and pedestrian circulation, including walkways, interior drives and parking in terms of location and number of access points to the public streets,width of 2 interior drives and access points, general interior circulation, separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and arrangement and amount of parking. Finding: The proposed development creates a functional and harmonious design for structures and site features, subject to compliance with the conditions of approval. e. Protects adjacent and neighboring properties through reasonable provision for surface water drainage, sound and sight buffers, preservation of views, light and air and those aspects of design not adequately covered by other regulations which may have substantial effects on neighboring land uses. Finding: The proposed development protects adjacent and neighboring properties through reasonable provision for surface water drainage, sound and sight buffers, landscaping,preservation of views, light and air and traffic circulation. 5. The planning report#2016-21, dated September 6, 2016 prepared by Robert Generous, et al, is incorporated herein. RECOMMENDATION The Planning Commission recommends that the City Council approve the Subdivision of Lake Harrison and Site Plan for West Water Treatment Plant subject to the recommended conditions of approval contained within the staff report. ADOPTED by the Chanhassen Planning Commission this 6t1 day of September 2016. CHANHASSEN PLANNING COMMISSION BY: Its Chairman 3 /10-2. I COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT Planning Division- 7700 Market Boulevard CITY OF CIIAN}!LASSEN Mailing Address- P.O. Box 147, Chanhassen, MN 55317 Phone: (952) 227-1300 / Fax: (952)227-1110 1011 APPLICATION N FOR DEVELOPMENT REVIEW `� Submittal Date: 4/�/l (13 (� PC Date: -1/tefis--- CC Date: Z 60-Day Review Date:()e -% , I t, I r Section 1: Application Type(check all that apply) (Refer to the appropriate Application Checklist for required submittal information that must accompany this application) ❑ Comprehensive Plan Amendment $600 ,Subdivision (SUB) El Minor MUSA line for failing on-site sewers $100 ❑ Create 3 lots or less $300 ❑ Create over 3 lots $600 + $15 per lot El Conditional Use Permit(CUP) ( lots) ❑ Single-Family Residence $325 ❑ Metes & Bounds (2 lots) $300 ❑ All Others $425 ❑ Consolidate Lots $150 (21 Interim Use Permit (IUP) El Lot Line Adjustment $150 j Final Plat $700 ❑ In conjunction with Single-Family Residence..$325 (Includes $450 escrow for attorney costs)* ❑ All Others $425 *Additional escrow may be required for other applications through the development contract. ❑ Rezoning (REZ) ❑ Planned Unit Development(PUD) $750 ❑ Vacation of Easements/Right-of-way(VAC) $300 El Minor Amendment to existing PUD $100 (Additional recording fees may apply) El All Others $500 ❑ Variance (VAR) $200 Sign Plan Review $150 ❑ Wetland Alteration Permit(WAP) ❑ Site Plan Review(SPR) ❑ Single-Family Residence $150 ❑ Administrative $100 ❑ All Others $275 ❑ Commercial/Industrial Districts* $500 Plus $10 per 1,000 square feet of building area: ❑ Zoning Appeal $100 ( thousand square feet) ❑ Zoning Ordinance Amendment (ZOA) $500 Include number of existing employees: *Include number of new employees: ❑ Residential Districts $500 NOTE: When multiple applications are processed concurrently, the appropriate fee shall be charged for each application. Plus $5 per dwelling unit ( units) ❑ Notification Sign (City to install and remove) $200 ❑ Property Owners' List within 500' (City to generate after pre-application meeting) $3 per address ( addresses) ❑ Escrow for Recording Documents (check all that apply) $50 per document ❑ Conditional Use Permit El Interim Use Permit ❑ Site Plan Agreement ❑ Vacation El Variance El Wetland Alteration Permit El Metes & Bounds Subdivision (2 deeds) El Easements ( easements) TOTAL FEE: ��t Section 2: Required Information VV?S� Description of Proposal: . T( e'tf pia'* Property Address or Location: iii.. i Lrit'd.4-In1f 1 ? } i VZI. Parcel #: /_ 1 .25�1P46450egal Description: LLit .a- , tock. `f fid.�1 ii t A . L r 4-�r.,u 'z'i ch Total Acreage: (o.6(1 Wetlands Present? Yes�❑ No } Present Zoning: FS F Requested Zoning: ,`ice Present Land Use Designation: vtI f[..�l1n1 "Requested Land Use Designation: 't',A- Existing Use of Property: VANUA •� s � ye a^� . {,,Check box is separate narrative is attached. Section 3: Property Owner and Applicant Information APPLICANT OTHER THAN PROPERTY OWNER: In signing this application, I, as applicant, represent to have obtained authorization from the property owner to file this application. I agree to be bound by conditions of approval, subject only to the right to object at the hearings on the application or during the appeal period. If this application has not been signed by the property owner, I have attached separate documentation of full legal capacity to file the application. This application should be processed in my name and I am the party whom the City should contact regarding any matter pertaining to this application. I will keep myself informed of the deadlines for submission of material and the progress of this application. I further understand that additional fees may be charged for consulting fees, feasibility studies, etc. with an estimate prior to any authorization to proceed with the study. I certify that the information and exhibits submitted are true and correct. Name: IAJSU/A kS , I i i C. Contact: . J1/) Address: Lai' Itkr/ *(11 U S - Phone: (/t r-D.gLe —S iCe City/State/Zip: PiAA:t . YYl/\J !J 5/O / Cell: Email: CA oktViS(Th (a, WQoefrIci , ow Fax: Signature: Date: PROPERTY OWNER: In signing this application, I, as property owner, have full legal capacity to, and hereby do, authorize the filing of this application. I understand that conditions of approval are binding and agree to be bound by those conditions, subject only to the right to object at the hearings or during the appeal periods. I will keep myself informed of the deadlines for submission of material and the progress of this application. I further understand that additional fees may be charged for consulting fees, feasibility studies, etc. with an estimate prior to any authorization to proceed with the study. I certifyrtnfo � that the information and exhibits submitted are true and correct. Name: (111.1, r 4 (.�.'N n l'i-Nzs--t't Contact:±TAAAThelirri e Address: V"wOO -144(tt •& e Phone: CCA- "�c�1— 1 I(11' ry City/State/Zip: l/v3N/l 1/1 any, , ,1')1\) S d I r Cell: Email: ►�oE,�lrvi,P(c�, (].t J DJ h?5t5a7 441)4 'Cc Fax: This application must be completed in full and be typewritten or clearly printed and must be accompanied by all information and plans required by applicable City Ordinance provisions. Before filing this application, refer to the appropriate Application Checklist and confer with the Planning Department to determine the specific ordinance and applicable procedural requirements. A determination of completeness of the application shall be made within 15 business days of application submittal. A written notice of application deficiencies shall be mailed to the applicant within 15 business days of application. Signature: C � /�/✓� Date: o/////G. PROJECT ENGINEER(if applicable) Name: Contact: Address: Phone: City/State/Zip: Cell: Email: Fax: Section 4: Notification Information Who should receive copies of staff reports? *Other Contact Information: ❑ Property Owner Via: El Email ❑ Mailed Paper Copy Name: ❑ Applicant Via: ❑ Email ❑ Mailed Paper Copy Address: ❑ Engineer Via: ❑ Email ❑ Mailed Paper Copy City/State/Zip: ❑ Other* Via: ❑ Email ❑ Mailed Paper Copy Email: INSTRUCTIONS TO APPLICANT: Complete all necessary form fields, then select SAVE FORM to save a copy to your device. PRINT FORM and deliver to city along with required documents and payment. SUBMIT FORM to send a digital copy to the city for processing (required). CO 0 ib- L p / 1 ``QbO��� o r ` ,� d ONpyo��V7 N�d�y0� L ? : < 1NnOp _A' . Eu Ii Tr i w co U o ~OV s1 0 co 2'z z/ // C U) DwO /YN � � o og � a Zt ZO =0C / o c // 6. 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Owner: City of Chanhassen Legal Description: Date Proposed: September 2016 Vicinity Map: Attached, Appendix A Intended Use and Occupancy: The site will be used for the construction of the West Water Treatment Plant. The City studied potential locations for the water treatment plant beginning in 2003. At that time, five sites were evaluated, all in the Galpin Boulevard area due to its proximity to the City's well field. The final site was selected based on size, feasibility, availability for purchase, and cost. The water treatment plant will include one main building; a driveway, loading area, and parking lot; and a tank that will be almost entirely submerged. The estimated average occupancy is one person. Also located on the property will be elementary and preschool playgrounds and a bike trail. Land Use: The planned land use for the property, as outlined in the City's 2030 Comprehensive Plan, is Public/Semi-Public. Property Tabulation: Parcel Size 6.57 acres 286,100 square feet Gross Floor Area 1 16,950 square feet Percent of Site Covered by 5.9% Building Percent of Site Covered by 13.2% Impervious Surface (includes parking area) Percent of Site Covered by 1 D/o Parking Area Projected Number of 2 Employees Number of Parking Spaces 3 Required Number of Parking Spaces 4 plus 1 handicapped Provided Building Height at Roof Peak 21 feet Building Use(s) Municipal Water Treatment Building a legacy—your legacy. Equal Opportunity Employer I wsbeng.com KA01694-720Ndmin\Docs\Planning Commission\PlanningCommission_Submittal jtems.docx West Water Treatment Plant City of Chanhassen Planning Commission Submittal August 5,2016 Page 2 Required Plan Items: Item Number I Description Location 1 Property line Drawing C-15 dimensions 2 Grading and Drawing C-15 drainage plans 3 Existing and Appendix C proposed points of egress/ingress 4 Vehicular circulation Appendix C system 5 I Landscaping plan I Appendix B 6 Trash enclosure None information 7 Rooftop equipment None location 8 Signage location and None detail 9 I Lighting information I In design 10 Building elevations Appendix B (with color) 11 I Utility plan I Drawings C-13 and C-14 1 12 Hazardous materials Appendix D— 12,000 lbs of chlorine gas 13 I Fire protection I See below 14 Other information N/A required by City 15 Photocomposite Appendix A images and renderings Fire Protection: The building will include an overhead fire sprinkling system. The system will be connected to the watermain outside the building via a 6" or 8" line that will enter the south side of the building. K:\01694-720\Aomin\Docs\Planning Commission\PlanningCommission_Submitlal_Ilems.00cx APPENDIX A SITE MAP w.n:w...w,wm,.�s. �.,c,MMm.e _ �� - :t.. • 1CO z " 3Nd�Lana-- S LL + , „„ . 4; J C ,aaob � N + t`a zt iii. . rr, `r . , s., N, .......• t; t .1...‘ „ 1.. _ ii,„ _ _ k f F a • le, 4 . 2b Spy ..l. .. 4 • t c p ;K O •w y. 0 ; .fir*r', gi- / • v e ,.. • eiitl . ....., . .. . , vikt„. wM+ e C t;;1't' N �y 4 i I .� °A ie Nid)vj �. . w.. aa J 4 C •�w Y� semco ;�� 0 `a" ft co itEs A ivey r , , , •` t,7 ISI ''•1 S .�, r--- 5 '•-...Y 41 s, 4. 'e. .C' semv. t« 0 a '" K' .� „ ` iftk i li,,,lt,./ 4# 4 _. '' 4-10 , ~t pe' }t 14 Q to c toot r*. , , s d ar t v A N d E 3 .70':' Y< tt MC1t"�L`AY a .0 '` a...t4: .i.-JO., A. .. ; O' 4114_ APPENDIX B LANDSCAPING AND SITE RENDERINGS 1 j •l • ;,.N. * r y. t„ .. .: -7 . t. 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', -• s,`j n 4'`. p i raili 11 ,-, '' .•< ••• ek •-• 't ti 0 e- lt*:' f ,, ' ::, z..,..,a , . .1/4 '7-tt...7 v.., / 117 411." ,. • t Ar • j ei -., Jet-- i2 .• - *' ,1 - 4alita • f •., , 'r ti ' • 1 ^ ' • si n ; ... 0 • .....1:‘,•,,??,41,, . • , ...- -Y.,-• ...:* ''.1.:,•.., -. , ' , •.. -,;+,s,.• • ... . , • 40,.., ,..„ ., ..,, ,•A 44, V i '‘ • 1 ' '94 • ' i •••• ..' WI '. 4 ,4,. -- .• -,...„=,` -- , 0 tip , •It.4, , 4 I • • •3 , . - fr,s',.:',:- ..i, A • v, , ii imis. ' - - 1,1jk 1,210.-'i'4' • k APPENDIX C PARKING AND TURNAROUND PLAN _ I I nil —I AO 1,11,7•7 V nn v nom! valI. .—Is awl ��,"--"'m.'1,43rnt ,...�., dO Alla ii 1d 9x ,.116».. z 1Ntl1d1N3W1V3a12131VM1S3M SMo vvw L. W 0- 0- <aa az I 0 3a 4K2 - \ ' \ „....412-ea7 V7 W 'ch.. 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I ;II!II1 illi1I' 7-= :. — o m �unn°°°l i�I Il i'll ll,I _ _ ,- IItHt uiaii IoI IIlIII11!TIl16hIII i!vI111111111fMfI11jII111111III 111111 l 'a W -—0.B�°6�Y--4 I 1 W C r y n t TT I z L JF 1 �__ L E j E L i I ` u;8 I gg 2 WEST ELEVATION Ay SCALEI 1/8' = 1' k�� IDJM PROJECT NUMBER 16-015 CITY PROJECT NUMBER 15-03 EXTERIOR ELEVATIONS A1-06 WSB PROJECT NUMBER 01694-720 CONSORTIUM OF HOA'S POSITION/RESPONSE -AUGUST 22, 2016 The HOA Consortium's position at this time is that there are a number of issues and concerns that have still not been adequately addressed. The 400+households continue to have questions regarding the following issues and concerns: 1) Planning& Zoning- Given the opportunity to place the proposed facility in the most appropriate location for the overall good of the City's Master Plan, is the proposed site truly the best location? Would it be more appropriate to have the facility located in proximity of other commercial buildings (keeping like things together; not in the middle of a residential area)? Given all of the recent land related issues revolving around the estate of Prince, should the City consider what impact and opportunities this will have on the future Master Plan? Is the City making decisions based on information that is 10+ years old or truly looking to the future and what is in the best interest of the overall Master Plan? The City believes the site the City purchased in 2005 is the best location for the plant. The plant will be buffered from residential properties by a City park to the north, a wetland complex and Gaplin Blvd. to the east, a stormwater pond and Lake Harrison Road to the west and Lake Harrison Road and a large wetland complex to the south. If the plant would move and be constructed on open parcels zoned residential south and east of the proposed plant site, it would not have the same buffers that exist at the proposed site but would truly be constructed in someone's backyard. Many water plants in the metropolitan area are constructed in residential areas. The proposed plant will have high architectural features so it blends into the neighborhood. There is no commercial or industrial property in close proximately to the west well field to construct the plant. 2) Utilities & Infrastructure - Has it been verified with Xcel Energy that the proposed site will not have power outages like those that occur fairly frequently in the surrounding neighborhoods? Has the City considered Carver County's plan to resurface Galpin Blvd. in 2017 and how this might be an opportunity to consider an alternative site with less cost implications? Could there be an opportunity to work with Carver County to have the City take control of Galpin Blvd. and receive assistance in infrastructure costs for an alternative site? The City has been discussing the future water treatment plant and capacity needs with Xcel Energy and has also asked them about electrical outages in the area and reliability. Xcel Energy has available capacity to service the proposed treatment plant with the existing infrastructure. Besides extending power to the site, Xcel Energy is planning to upgrade a transformer at Galpin Blvd. and Hwy. 5. Power outages in the Lake Harrison Road area are mainly due to storm damage,public damage, and equipment failure. The outages are not from a lack of electrical capacity. Customers in this area will benefit from the new Lake Bavaria substation being constructed south of the City of Victoria because more power lines will be undergrounded. Carver County is planning to complete a pavement preservation project for Galpin Blvd. in 2018. This project is mainly a resurfacing project. The City is planning to \\cfs5\cfs5,shared_data\eng\public_2010-2015 public projects,_2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\eonsortium of hoa.docx directionally drill the utilities along Galpin Blvd. to save on restoration costs. The plan is to have the utilities installed prior to the County resurfacing Galpin Blvd. The City's utility project and the County's resurfacing project are completely independent so there is no cost saving if the plant were to be moved to an alternative site. Galpin Blvd. is on the County's turn back list of roadways to transfer jurisdiction to the City. The City and the Carver County have not come to terms on the turn back. 3) Economic& Tax Implications -Has the City studied the potential negative impact on future residential developments as land along the Galpin Blvd. corridor is developed,by placing the water treatment facility in the proposed location? Has the City studied the "real impact" on property values and tax base for the surrounding 400+residences,by locating the facility on the proposed site verses another site with commercial zoning? What is the negative impact on property values if the Department of Homeland Security requires a large security fence with barb wire at the top as some websites are suggesting with this type of facility? Many water plants in the metro area are constructed in residential neighborhoods. The City has looked at property values of these homes and has not found that are any different than other homes in the area. The City has hired an appraiser to review this issue in more detail. The proposed plant will have very little impacts to the residents in the area. • The proposed plant will have high architectural features so it blends into the neighborhood. • No additional street lights will be included in the project. The plant will have down lit, low watt LED wall pack lighting on the building like residential properties. These lights are primarily for the security cameras. • The plant will not generate much traffic. One plant operator will be at the plant during the week. The plant will run autonomously after working hours and on weekends. One or two delivery trucks will come to the plant per week. • The plant would generate very little noise. A standby generator is included in the design for power failure or if Xcel Energy wants to drop the plant off the grid for peak shaving purposes. The generator will be operated for a few hours once a month to perform readiness checks. The generator will be installed with a substantial muffler that significantly deadens the noise. No other piece of equipment of the plant has any significant noise making which will be heard outside of the plant. • The plant does not give off any smells or odors. No toxic fumes are generated or will be given off by the plant. The City Code does not allow barb wire nor would it ever be proposed around the perimeter of the plant. It is highly unlikely any federal department would require barb wire to be placed around these facilities since a large number of water plants in the country are in residential neighborhoods. The City has included a robust security system with the plant. No future fence is planned for the plant. \\cfs5\cfs5\shared_data\eng\public\_2010-2015 public projects\_2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\consortium of hoa.docx 4) Environmental& Wetland Concerns -The City has told us there is no need for an Environmental Impact Study. This may be factually true,but, there will be some amount of negative impact on the surrounding wetlands by placing the facility on the proposed site. Should the City consider how much impact is truly acceptable verses "no impact" with an alternative commercial site? What is the "real impact" on the surrounding residential area if an environmental chlorine gas accident occurs on the proposed site? It is extremely unlikely any negative impacts to the surrounding wetlands will result from constructing the plant. The impervious areas (pavements and roof) will be drained to the stormwater pond located on the south side of the site and treated according to Best Management Practices (BMPs). All stormwater runoff that drains to the wetlands to the east will be from the trail and the grassy areas which is not much different than the current runoff conditions. No chlorine gas is expected to escape from the building and migrate into the wetlands. There are four levels of safety in the current design which include 1)Modern day gas delivery systems are based on a vacuum, instead of pressure. Broken pipes will not exhaust gas in a vacuum-driven system 2) chlorine gas monitors, 2)a sealed chlorine storage room, and 3) emergency shutoff valves attached to each cylinder. According to the manufacturer that supplies the emergency shutoff valves, there are over 5,000 installations worldwide and not a single valve has ever failed and caused a chlorine leak into the environment. Nationwide, there have been more accidents and spills associated with other forms of chlorine such as sodium hypochlorite. If an emergency shutoff valve ever failed and chlorine and gas leaked inside the sealed chlorine room, city staff would receive an alarm from the chlorine monitor/SCADA system and immediately repair the leak as they are trained to do. 5)Alternative Site Costs-What are the"real costs",not estimated costs, associated with locating the proposed facility at another site? If the "real costs" are not significantly more, should the City consider an alternative site for the overall good of all of Chanhassen? The site of the Children's Learning Center at the corner of W. 78th Street and Galpin Blvd. was one of the sites the City evaluated for the future filtration plant in 2005. The Children's Learning Center does have an outlot that is currently not being developed. This outlot is large enough for the filtration plant. It is estimated the outlot would be valued at about$930,000. The soils in the area are known to be poor and it is likely a building constructed on the outlot would need to be supported by pilings or other structural techniques. The estimate for additional soil correction or building supports is $260,000. The cost to extend raw water main from the current location to the plant and the necessary trunk distribution water main is estimated to cost$1,575,000. The estimate to construct the plant at the daycare site is $2,765,000 more than the proposed site. Staff also did contact the property owner of the daycare site. The outlot is not for sale. If the plant were to be constructed farther south of W. 78th Street, the cost for constructing the trunk water main and the distribution main would be significantly higher. \\cfs5\cfs5\shared_data\eng\public\_2010-2015 public projects\_2015 projects\15-03 west water treatment plant feasiblity study\consortium of hoa.docx From: Abbott, Jennifer Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 2:00 PM To: Swanson, Michelle M; Marinac, Kim 3 Cc: Oehme, Paul Subject: RE: Outages in the Lake Harrison neighborhood Michelle, Here is what I'm showing for outages at that address.That address isn't a City facility though. It looks like a resident. I did work with Paul Oehme to get them enrolled in the Energy Efficient Buildings program to capture any rebate potential through their project at the WTP.They enrolled July 1St of this year. Start Time Duration Device Primary Cause 5/26/2016 2:51:00 AM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 3/26/2016 8:51:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Polymer 3/24/2016 7:54:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Unknown Cause Not Determined 7/22/2015 2:48:00 AM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Unknown Cause Not Determined 7/18/2015 12:21:00 Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Porcelain AM 7/12/2015 11:28:00 10h 44m FUSE OH J57062F08 Veg Tree Outside Main Corridor PM —6/24/2015 11:10:00 Oh Om BKR WEST GATE WSG362 Unknown Cause Not PM — — Determined 5/27/2015 8:12:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Polymer 4/10/2015 3:22:00 PM Oh 53m FUSE OH J57062F09 Animal Contact Other 2/24/2015 6:29:00 PM 6h 53m ML OH 336 AL 5029796.0 Connector Failure Shoot On 1/28/2015 2:57:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Public Damage Broken Pole 1/28/2015 2:57:00 PM 3h 19m SWITCH_OH_WSG36203 Public Damage Broken Pole 8/21/2014 11:38:00 3h 7m FUSE OH J57014F08 Public Damage Dig-In AM — — 6/25/2014 1:44:00 PM Oh 11 m BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Intentional Clear for Trbl/Emer 6/19/2014 10:54:00 Oh Om BKR WEST GATE WSG362 Unknown Cause Not AM — — Determined 6/14/2014 7:45:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Unknown Cause Not Determined 3/30/2014 12:25:00 Oh 37m XFM UG J57034T09 No Outage--Okay on Arrival PM — — 3/30/2014 12:22:00 Oh Om BKR WEST GATE WSG362 Unknown Cause Not PM — — Determined 2/18/2014 3:01:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Porcelain 2/3/2014 4:22:00 PM 2h 54m RCL R1630VRC Recloser Fail to Close& Latch 6/27/2013 9:09:00 PM Oh 1 m BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Porcelain 6/21/2013 2:07:00 AM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Veg Tree Inside Maint Corridor 6/12/2013 10:25:00 Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Polymer AM 6/7/2013 9:49:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Polymer 8/29/2012 8:35:00 PM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Arrester Porcelain 7/15/2012 9:33:00 AM 5h 47m ML OH 336 ACSR 3565891.0 Public Damage OH Line — — Contact 7/13/2012 5:18:00 PM 2h 58m FUSE_OH_J57014F08 Veg Tree Inside Maint Corridor 6/19/2012 4:26:00 AM Oh Om BKR_WEST GATE_WSG362 Lightning Strike 7/1/2011 8:06:00 PM 41h 29m ML_OH_336_AL_70314926.3 Veg Tree Inside Maint Corridor Oehme, Paul Subject: FW: Outages in the Lake Harrison neighborhood From: Marinac, Kim J [mailto:kim.j.marinac@xcelenergy.com] Sent: Friday, August 26, 2016 10:50 AM To: Swanson, Michelle M <michelle.m.swanson@xcelenergy.com> Cc: Abbott,Jennifer<jennifer.m.abbott@xcelenergy.com>; Machemehl, Linda K<linda.k.machemehl@xcelenergy.com>; Oehme, Paul <poehme@ci.chanhassen.mn.us> Subject: RE: Outages in the Lake Harrison neighborhood I reviewed the concerns: • Customers in this area of WSG362 will benefit from the new Lake Bavaria sub in the sense the exposure on WSG362 will be reduced. Customers in this area will still be fed from WSG362, however, the OH feeder will be shorter. • Outage history includes a variety of causes: Storms, Public Damage, equipment failure, etc.. None of which are due to lack of capacity. • When a new customer(site) requests service, we design it to meet the new demand. • When the new water treatment plant requests service and if the proposed peak is similar to 201 W 79t'St, we will have to increase the size of the stepdown transformers on Galpin (just N of Hwy 5). The designer(Linda Machemehl) will take care of that after discussing with me. Costs to the customer will depend on work needed and revenue justification. • Paul O had called me on this also (we talked today)—thus the reason he is copied. Kim Marinac, P.E. Xcel Energy Senior Area Engineer 5505 Manitou Rd, Shorewood, MN 55331 P: 952-470-3377 E: kim.i.marinac@xcelenergy.com 1 CITY OF CHANHASSEN AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING NOTICE STATE OF MINNESOTA) ) ss. COUNTY OF CARVER ) I, Kim T. Meuwissen,being first duly sworn, on oath deposes that she is and was on August 25,2016, the duly qualified and acting Deputy Clerk of the City of Chanhassen, Minnesota; that on said date she caused to be mailed a copy of the attached notice of Site Plan Review and Replat of Lot 1, Block 4, and Outlot A of Lake Harrison to construct the West Water Treatment Plant, Planning Case 2016-21 to the persons named on attached Exhibit "A", by enclosing a copy of said notice in an envelope addressed to such owner, and depositing the envelopes addressed to all such owners in the United States mail with postage fully prepaid thereon; that the names and addresses of such owners were those appearing as such by the records of the County Treasurer, Carver County, Minnesota, and by other appropriate records. „..4. 1.4.47-17 o 0 , 0 Kim)T. Meuwissen, Depu Jerk Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3( day of A'14,7 . 2016. 0 Cr‘-' 1 81//A- U Nobry Public �.:_, ,; 4. 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I have forwarded this to the City Engineer and our consultant. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me. Bob Robert Generous,AICP Senior Planner 7700 Market Boulevard P.O.Box 147 Chanhassen, MN 55317 (952) 227-1131 bgenerous@ci.chanhassen.mn.us Chanhassen is a Community for Life— Providing for Today and Planning for Tomorrow From:Aanenson, Kate Sent:Thursday, September 01, 2016 7:48 AM To: Gerhardt,Todd Cc: Generous, Bob Subject: FW: Letter to the Planning Commissioners-West Water Treatment Plant I responded to Jag and told him I would forward these attachments. Kate From:Jag Reddy Finailto:iag.reddv@gmail.coml Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2016 11:30 PM To:Aanenson, Kate Cc: Robert Kline Subject: Letter to the Planning Commissioners-West Water Treatment Plant Dear Ms. Aanenson, 1 Please pass on the attached letter and the attachments to all the Commissioners. I unfortunately do not have individual emails for the Commissioners. I appreciate your help in forwarding this material to the Commissioners before next Tuesday's meeting. Thank you, Jag Aug 31, 2016 Dear Planning Commission Members, I am a resident of Chanhassen that is concerned about the planned West Water Treatment Plant in my neighborhood. I am writing to you to express my concerns in two particular areas— installation of a treatment plant that uses harsh chemicals in a residential neighborhood and safety and security of the water treatment plant. Chlorine gas based Water Treatment plant: There are 2724 registered chlorine gas based plant in the US. Over the past 15 years, over 600 major accidents (12% incident rate) were reported at facilities storing chlorine. These incidents resulted in 779 injuries and two deaths, almost 22,000 people evacuated, and over$127 million in property damage. See attached list for state-by-state data. Please see below links for news stories of some serious chlorine gas accidents at water treatment plants. http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/opin ion/times/story/2015/mar/17/ch Iori ne-scarepoints-needsafetv-review/293640/ http://www.kmbc.com/news/hazardous-materials-crews-respond-to-parkville-incident/36395890 http://www.l2news.com/news/local/valley/chlorine-leak-prompts-evacuation-of-several-peoria-. homes/280316586 http://www.newswest9.com/story/30883057/tceg-i nvestigati ng-deadly-explosion-in-midland-evacuated-residents- speak-out http://www.mrt.com/news/top stories/article I0860226-b33d-11 e5-a0a8-3b5d099171 c1.html http://www.whas11.com/news/local/crews-responding-to-active-chlorine-tank-leak-at-scottsburg-water- treatment-plant/296243434 Anyone who Googles "Chlorine Gas Accident Water Treatment Plant" will see the long list of incidents that are constantly taking place across the country. Given the challenges with the Chlorine treatment process, why would the City of Chanhassen choose this treatment method and most importantly, why would the city decide to install this treatment plant in the middle of—400 single-family residences with young children. • Why would we not consider a better technology—membrane technology with secondary treatment that uses no chemicals? Minneapolis uses this technology in their plant. • Why would we not consider relocating this plant to a non-residential location, away from residential population? 2 Aug 31, 2016 Dear Planning Commission Members, I am a resident of Chanhassen that is concerned about the planned West Water Treatment Plant in my neighborhood. I am writing to you to express my concerns in two particular areas—installation of a treatment plant that uses harsh chemicals in a residential neighborhood and safety and security of the water treatment plant. Chlorine gas based Water Treatment plant: There are 2724 registered chlorine gas based plant in the US. Over the past 15 years, over 600 major accidents (12% incident rate)were reported at facilities storing chlorine.These incidents resulted in 779 injuries and two deaths, almost 22,000 people evacuated, and over$127 million in property damage. See attached list for state-by-state data. Please see below links for news stories of some serious chlorine gas accidents at water treatment plants. http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/opinion/times/story/2015/mar/17/chlorine-scarepoi nts-needsafety review/293640/ http://www.kmbc.com/news/hazardous-materials-crews-respond-to-parkville-incident/36395890 http://www.12 news.com/news/local/vallev/chlorine-leak-prompts-evacuation-of-several-peoria- ho mes/280316586 http://www.newswest9.com/story/30883057/tcea-i nvestiaati na-dead Iv-exp losion-i n-m id la nd- evacuated-residents-speak-out http://www.mrt.com/news/top stories/article I0860226-b33d-11 e5-a0a8-3b5d099171 c1.html http://www.whasll.com/news/local/crews-responding-to-active-chlorine-tank-leak-at-scottsburg= water-treatment-plant/296243434 Anyone who Googles "Chlorine Gas Accident Water Treatment Plant" will see the long list of incidents that are constantly taking place across the country. Given the challenges with the Chlorine treatment process, why would the City of Chanhassen choose this treatment method and most importantly, why would the city decide to install this treatment plant in the middle of^'400 single-family residences with young children. • Why would we not consider a better technology—membrane technology with secondary treatment that uses no chemicals? Minneapolis uses this technology in their plant. • Why would we not consider relocating this plant to a non-residential location, away from residential population? Safety and Security of the Water Treatment Plant:, The safety and security of our water sources and treatment facilities is of critical importance to all of us. The current plans for the West Water Treatment facility do not call for many of the strict guidelines recommended by American Society of Civil Engineers,American Water Works Associations and Water Environment Federation. See attached the guidelines from the Industry association. In addition,there are additional requirements from the EPA and the Dept. of Homeland Security. In order to comply with all these requirements and many more,the facility design will have to incorporate many physical barriers, intrusion prevention methods, electronic sensors/alarms, locking devices, perhaps even chain- link fences, barbed wire and padlocks. I am concerned that the current design doesn't protect the facility adequately from various potential threats. The many federal/state requirements will make this facility look like a "high-security prison". Imagine how this would fit into the neighborhood with 400+ beautiful homes. • What will happen to the real-estate values in the neighborhood? In turn,to the tax revenue base for the City of Chanhassen? • Would the Planning Commission allow for the deterioration of home values in one of the most sough-after section of the City of Chanhassen? • Why would the City not consider all future requirements and relocate the facility to a site that would accommodate all the safety and security consideration? I fully agree that we have to plan for the future and invest in water and wastewater infrastructure. I sincerely hope that the Planning Commission and the City officials take into consideration all potential issues and address all concerns before approving this project. I look forward to our discussion on Tuesday, Sept 6 regarding these issues.Thank you for your time and your service on the Planning Commission. Regards, Jag Reddy 6925 Lake Harrison Circle Chanhassen, MN 55317 (860) 384-5337-Cell Table 1. Facilities Using Chlorine(1998-May 2013) Total Facilities Currently Number of Total Total Total Property State Reporting, Registered Accidents facilities with Injuries Evacuated Damage 1998-2013 Facilities,2013 accidents TX 664 509 80 42 152 10,294 $77,669,192 CA 479 220 27 20 25 56 $500,150 PA I 182 I 120 I 12 I 10 I 27 I 1I $100.,300 11 GA. I 1 ' 65 I 86 I 19 1 9 I 25 I 62 I $900 1 OH 1 151 I 8 i I 29 I 16 I 20 I 1.,243 I `8255.,500 SC I 134 I 79 I 3 I 2 I 0 i 0 I $0 1114 I 124 I 75 I 118 I 11 I 15 I 0 I $ 00.,200 Ais I 107 I 70 I 17 I 7 I i'i 1 32 I SO OK I 99 I 68 I 113 I 8 I 1.2 I 15.1 I `$890..000 A., I 91 1 62 1 41 I 9 I 28 I 2 I 1611,000 1 MO I 8') I 47 I 5 1 5 I :I I 0 I $600„000 Co I 72 I 43 I 14 I 5 I 13 I 160 I $421,000 AL I 66 I 11 33 I 3 I 3 I 5 I 0 I i0 WA I h63 i 28 I 16 I 5 1 32 I 63 I $30.,500 OTi I 52 I 23 I 7 I 2 I 6 I 0 I 525,025 MA I 43 I 19 ' I 2 ' I ' 2 I 1 I 0 I >22,556 11 lUT I 39 I 28 I 17 1 6 I IS I 0 1 $5,000 W, $0 CT I 34 I 10 I 4 I 4 I 20 I 40 I $5,000 ,402,800 Nd I 29 I 14 I 17 i 4 I 9 I 0 I $0 MT I 19 I 9 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I SO N $0 M11s I 17 I 8 I 13 I 3 I 9 I 0 I $0 SI 0 1 • D I 16 9 I o I n I u o $0 NH I :14 I 9 I 6 _I 3 I 7 I 32 I SO 111 1 171.1 I 13 I 6 I 1 I 1 I 2 I o 1 $0 AK I 7 I 2 I 2 I 1 I 5 I 0 I $ ,000,000 $0 vi' I 3 I 2 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I $0 Total I 4,791 I 2,724 I 612 I 323 I 779 I 2:,1789 I $127,864,076 i ASCE/AWWA Draft American National Standard for Trial Use Draft American National Standard for Trial Use Guidelines for the Physical Security of Water Utilities December 2006 ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers Publication of this draft standard for trial use and comment has been approved by the American Society of Civil Engineers and the American Water Works Association.Distribution of this draft standard for comment shall continue for no longer than six American Water Works months from the date of publication.It is expected that following Association this public comment period,this draft standard,revised as necessary,will be submitted to the American National Standards The Authoritative RPSOWCE sere rater' Institute for approval as an American National Standard.A public review in ache end e with established use he i ANSIproceduresbefre a is �� � required at the end of the trial use period and before a draft ® standard for trial use may be submitted to ANSI for approval as So, FPres r gf,Enha ent ncing an American National Standard.This draft standard is not an tbeGlobalitincrEnvironment American National Standard.Comments should be directed to: ASCE AWWA 1801 Alexander Bell Drive 6666 W.Quincy Avenue Reston,VA 20191 Denver,CO 80235 Attn:Standards Department Attn:Standards Department Or email:wise@asce.org Or email:standards@awwa.org Contents Foreword V Purpose of the Guidelines v Background of the Development v Use of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use vi Special Issues vii Disclaimer viii Acknowledgements ix 1.0 Application of Guidelines 1-1 1.1 Introduction 1-1 1.2 Methodology for Applying These Guidelines 1-6 2.0 Raw Water Facilities 2-1 2.1 Scope 2-1 2.2 Facility Mission 2-1 2.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 2-1 2.4 Benchmark Security Measures 2-2 3.0 Wells and Pumping Stations 3-1 3.1 Scope 3-1 3.2 Facility Mission 3-1 3.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 3-2 3.4 Benchmark Security Measures 3-2 4.0 Water Treatment Plants 4-1 4.1 Scope 4-1 4.2 Facility Mission 4-1 4.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 4-1 4.4 Benchmark Security Measures 4-2 5.0 Finished Water Storage Facilities 5-1 5.1 Scope 5-1 5.2 Facility Mission 5-1 5.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 5-2 5.4 Benchmark Security Measures 5-2 6.0 Distribution Systems 6-1 6.1 Scope 6-1 6.2 System Mission 6-1 6.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 6-1 6.4 Benchmark Security Measures 6-2 7.0 Water System Support Facilities 7-1 7.1 Scope 7-1 7.2 Facility Mission 7-1 7.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 7-2 7.4 Benchmark Security Measures 7-2 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES jjj Appendices A Physical Security Elements A-1 1.0 Fencing and Perimeter Walls A-1 2.0 Gates A-4 3.0 Site Areas A-6 4.0 Facility Entrances A-7 5.0 Bollards and Other Vehicle Barriers A-8 6.0 Exterior Surfaces A-8 7.0 Outdoor Security Lighting A-9 8.0 Signage A-10 9.0 Electronic Security Systems A-11 10.0 Access Control Systems A-15 11.0 Closed Circuit Television(CCTV) Surveillance A-16 12.0 Security,Controls, and SCADA Wiring A-19 13.0 Building Elements A-19 14.0 Hatches/Vaults and Vents A-21 15.0 Online Water Quality Monitoring A-22 16.0 Operator Devices A-22 17.0 Chemical Fill-Line Locking Devices A-23 18.0 Hydrants A-23 19.0 Manholes A-23 B Glossary and Abbreviations B-1 C References C-1 Figures 1-1 Concept of Delay Calculation 1-4 1-2 Example Decision Tree 1-7 1-3 Typical Cost-to-Risk Reduction Curve 1-9 Tables 1-1 Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix 1-4 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities 2-4 3-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations 3-4 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants 4-4 5-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities 5-4 6-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Distribution Systems 6-3 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities 7-4 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES iv Foreword This Draft Standard for Trial Use(DSTU)has been developed as a joint effort between the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)and the American Water Works Association (AWWA)with technical input from the Water Environment Federation(WEF),in accordance with ASCE Rules for Standards Committees.The consensus process includes balloting by a balanced standards committee and reviewing during a public comment period. This DSTU will be reviewed and considered for approval as an American National Standard upon completion of the six-month public comment and trial use period. The provisions of these documents have been written in permissive language and,as such, offer to the user a series of options or instructions,but do not prescribe a specific course of action.Significant judgment is left to the user of these documents. These guidelines use common U.S. units with the International System of Units (SI)in parenthesis. This approach is in the best interest of ASCE,AWWA,and WEF at the time of development of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use. Purpose of the Guidelines This Draft American National Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) applies to physical security for facilities used in potable water source,treatment,and distribution systems. Background of the Development Highlights related to the creation of all the Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements (WISE)guidance documents and/or standards in the early years of the twenty-first century are summarized below: (1) Under the U.S. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002(PL 107-188), drinking water utilities serving more than 3,300 customers were required to conduct vulnerability assessments (VAs) of their water systems.These VAs often recommended security improvements to reduce the risk of malevolent acts (which may also reduce the risk associated with natural events).Similar requirements for wastewater utilities have yet to be promulgated,but the protection of wastewater utility facilities using similar approaches has been promoted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and various industry organizations. In addition,ASCE,AWWA, and WEF agreed to work together to develop materials to assist in the implementation of security recommendations and the overall improvement of water and wastewater infrastructure security. The project was funded by USEPA under a cooperative agreement to foster public/private partnership in water and wastewater security. This project is known as the USEPA Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements (WISE)Project. (2)The three organizations each became responsible for a portion of the project: AWWA led the drinking water supply,treatment, and distribution systems effort;WEF led the wastewater and stormwater collection,treatment,and disposal systems effort;and ASCE DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES V led the effort concerning the methodology and characteristics pertinent to design of contaminant detection and monitoring systems for both water and wastewater systems. (3) Phase 1 of the USEPA WISE project focused on the creation of Interim Voluntary Security Guidance documents (ASCE 2004,AWWA 2004a,and WEF 2004). The purpose of these documents was to provide a centralized starting point for utilities as they integrate modern security practices into the management,operation,construction,or retrofit of their water, wastewater,and stormwater systems.Training materials were developed in Phase 2 to disseminate the information contained in the Phase 1 guidance documents. (4)Under the direction of USEPA, Phase 3 focuses solely on the development of physical security guidelines for water,wastewater, and stormwater facilities. These voluntary consensus guidelines are to be published as Draft American National Standards for Trial Use through ASCE's and AWWA's American National Standards Institute(ANSI)- accredited standards development process. The primary reviewers were within the ASCE WISE Standards Committee (SC),Water Supply Subcommittee,Wastewater and Stormwater Subcommittee,and the USEPA/ASCE/AWWA/WEF WISE Project Phase 3 Team. (5)The sections compiled in these guidelines are intended to provide direction to water utilities on how to design or retrofit their infrastructure,with consideration given to their unique circumstances and threats. A discussion of the various security threats and incidents that have occurred at water and wastewater utilities is provided in an American Water Works Association Research Foundation(AwwaRF)report by Welter(2003).This document can provide additional information in the assessment of security measures for utilities. (6)The USEPA Water Security Working Group presented its report on Water Sector Security Findings to the National Drinking Water Advisory Council(NDWAC) on May 18,2005 (WSWG 2005). Those findings include fourteen features of an"active and effective" security program.These guidelines address the following NDWAC features,which discuss physical security: (a) Establish physical and procedural controls to restrict access to utility infrastructure to only those conducting authorized,official business and to detect unauthorized physical intrusions. (b)Incorporate security considerations into decisions about acquisition,repair,major maintenance,and replacement of physical infrastructure;this should include consideration of opportunities to reduce risk through physical hardening and the adoption of inherently lower risk design and technology options. (7)These guidelines should be implemented in concert with the other features and approaches described in the NDWAC Report(WSWG 2005). Use of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use Major points for the trial use of this document imply: (1) It is the responsibility of the user of an ANSI standard or guideline to determine that the products and approaches described in the standard or guideline are suitable for use in the particular application being considered. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES vi (2)To effectively use these draft guidelines,a water utility should first complete a VA of its system. This VA should be completed in accordance with a generally accepted methodology such as the Risk Assessment Methodology for Water(RAM-WTM),the Vulnerability Self- Assessment Tool(VSATTM),or other acceptable method.The resulting information will guide the utility in defining the capabilities and motives of its design basis threat(DBT) and in ranking each facility's criticality within the system. The VA will also help to define the anticipated response time and response capability that,with the capabilities of the DBT,will characterize the robustness required for an effective security system. (3) The selection and recommendation of the physical protection approaches and measures contained in these guidelines are best engineering practices based on the collective experience and judgment of the WISE Standards Committee members.The physical security measures should be combined with management policies, operational procedures,and network security systems to form a comprehensive security system that provides multiple layers of protection or"protection in depth" for critical assets. (4)These guidelines contain information that utilities should consider when applying specific security technologies and methods to individual facilities or assets.These are described in Sections 2.0 through 7.0,which,in conjunction with the Foreword, 1.1 Introduction and its subsections,and Appendices in this document,can be used as standalone documents. (5) It is important to recognize that a physical protection system should be designed as a site-specific system integrated into facility operations,response force capabilities,and the overall utility's security system to ensure that there are no gaps in protection. Furthermore, simply implementing the recommendations contained herein is no guarantee that an adversary cannot compromise a specific facility or critical asset. Special Issues (1)These guidelines describe physical security approaches to delay or detect malevolent parties whose actions may otherwise defeat the mission of the utility. Enterprise-wide security approaches,while extremely important to any balanced security system,are beyond the scope of these guidelines.These approaches include management policies, administrative procedures,operational practices, and network security approaches, including supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA)networks. Contaminant detection and monitoring systems,although briefly referenced in these guidelines,are also best employed as an integrated,enterprise-wide system. Guidance on enterprise-wide security approaches is provided in the USEPA WISE Phase 1 Interim Voluntary Security Guidance documents(ASCE 2004,AWWA 2004a, and WEF 2004). (2)Added water security is beneficial for continuity of business,protection of water quality, provision of sufficient water quantity,and protection of public health and safety.Thus, when implementing the security measures provided in these guidelines,the multiple benefits should be taken into account by utility staff and other stakeholders. (3)Within the scope of this document,domestic and international terrorists have been considered a special category of design basis threats.With significantly enhanced tool and weapon capabilities,terrorists may be politically or ideologically motivated to cause maximum human casualties,often without regard for the terrorist's personal survival. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES vii Effectively protecting a facility from such a threat requires specialized security knowledge and equipment,and response forces typically not available to utilities.A utility that concludes it is facing such a threat should seek guidance from specialized security experts and/or enhance its emergency response planning and execution to mitigate the consequences of such a terrorist attack.Strategies to counter such a defined threat may require higher-level measures than described in these guidelines. Disclaimer The information presented in this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use guidance document is intended to assist water utilities as they strive to improve the safety and security of their facilities,their employees,and the public.While the strategies and methods described can reduce risk and enhance response and recovery actions,they cannot guarantee that any possible act of vandalism,violence,or terrorism will be prevented or stopped.As such,those responsible for the content and publication of this document can provide no guarantees for the performance of any actions taken in response to this guidance. This document has been prepared in accordance with recognized engineering principles and should not be used without the user's competent knowledge for a given application.The publication of this DSTU is not intended to warrant that the information contained therein is suitable for any general or specific use,and those responsible for the content and publication of this document take no position respecting the validity of patent rights.The user is advised that the determination of patent rights or risk of infringement is entirely their own responsibility. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES viii Acknowledgements These voluntary guidelines were developed during the USEPA WISE Project,Phase 3 under the direction of the ASCE WISE Standards Committee.This committee consisted of the individuals listed below through the end of the Committee balloting process. The members of the WISE Water Supply Subcommittee,which was the primary review group before the first WISE SC pilot sections ballot,are also provided below.The CH2M HILL WISE Project Phase 3 Team members listed below drafted the document and assisted in the resolution reporting during the balloting process.The USEPA personnel listed with the Project Team reviewed material during the monthly WISE Project Partners conference calls of the USEPA WISE Project. Clifford L. Bowen,PE Conrad G. Keyes,Jr.ScD, Robert C. Williams,PE, William C. Boyle,PhD,PE, PE,PS,D.WRE (Chair) DEE DEE M. Patricia Lamb,CUSA Water Supply Subcommittee Erica M. Brown Thomas J. Lane,PE Edward E. Baruth (AWWA) Jeanette A. Brown,PE,DEE Srinivasa Lingireddy,PhD, PE Beth Behner(AWWA) Jonathan W. Bulkley,PhD, PE Thomas J. Linville,PE Clifford L. Bowen,PE Ivan Burrowes Daniel L. Lynch,PE, DEE Scott Brooks James B. Conboy,PE,DEE John W. McLaughlin, PE Erica M. Brown Joseph W. Dellapenna,Esq. Brian M. Murphy,PE Clyde R. Dugan Clyde R. Dugan Irwin M. Pikus,PhD,Esq. Neil S. Grigg,PhD,PE John H. Easton,PhD J.Alan Roberson,PE Todd Humphrey,PE Findlay G. Edwards,PhD, Kyle E.Schilling,PE,DEE, M. Patricia Lamb,CUSA PE (Vice Chair) D.WRE (Vice Chair) Wayne Einfeld Charles R.Stack,MPH Thomas J. Lane,PE Jorge A. Garcia,PhD, PE C.Wesley Strickland,Esq. Thomas J. Linville,PE Neil S. Grigg,PhD,PE Lloyd V. Urban,PhD,PE John W. McLaughlin,PE (Chair) Yakir J. Hasit,PhD,PE James Van Norman Todd Humphrey,PE Gregory J. Welter,PE, DEE Brian M. Murphy,PE James A.Roberson,PE C. Dale Jacobson,PE, DEE James F.Wheeler,PE Roy Robinson(Past Chair) Jyung Seok Jeong Harold F.Wiedeman,PE James S.Wailes,PE (AWWA) DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES ix The USEPA ASCE/AWWA/WEF WISE Project Team that worked with the CH2M HILL and its subconsultant Richard Brady and Associates,Inc.team members listed below organized and carried out the Phase 3 plan during June 2005 through the end of 2006. They included: L.Christian Hanson,CAE Yakir J.Hasit,PhD,PE Richard D.Brady,PE,DEE (ASCE;WISE Project (Methodology and (Richard Brady and Manager and Recording Characteristics Associates,Inc.) Secretary for the WISE SC) Subcommittee Vice Chair) Dale D.Gabel,PE Conrad G.Keyes Jr.ScD, Jeanette A. Brown,PE,DEE Forrest M.Gist,PE PE,PS.D.WRE(WISE (Wastewater/Stormwater Standards Committee Subcommittee Chair) Kristine K. Hargreaves, Chair) AIA William C. Boyle,PhD,PE, Findlay G.Edwards,PhD, DEE(Wastewater/ Yakir J.Hasit,PhD,PE PE(WISE Standards Stormwater Subcommittee Committee Vice Chair) Vice Chair) Sam Irrinki,PE John W.Mc Laughlin,PE Stacy Passaro,PE,BCEE Alan B.Ispass,PE,DEE (Water Supply (WEF;WISE Project Jacqueline T.Kepke,PE Subcommittee Chair) Manager) M.Jane Mailand M.Patricia Lamb,CUSA James S.Wailes,PE (Water Supply (AWWA;WISE Project Lena Perkins Subcommittee Vice Chair) Manager) USEPA Irwin M. Pikus,PhD,Esq. CH2M HILL Team (Methodology and Gregory Spraul Characteristics Jason M. Assouline Subcommittee Chair) Paul A. Berg,PE DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINE FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES x 1 .0 Application of Guidelines 1.1 Introduction These water utility guidelines recommend physical and electronic security measures for physical protection systems to protect against identified adversaries,referred to as the design basis threats (DBTs),with specified motivation,tools,equipment,and weapons. Additional requirements and security equipment may be necessary to defend against threats with greater capabilities. 1.1.1 Elements of a Physical Protection System Effective physical and electronic protection systems balance four elements (AWWA 2004a): deterrence,detection, delay,and response. 1.1.1.1 Deterrence Security measures such as lighting,the presence of closed circuit television(CCTV), a clearly visible facility with no visual obstructions,or people in the area may deter an adversary from attacking a facility. Deterrence is not generally considered a part of a physical protection system with a predictable level of effectiveness;however,it can reduce the occurrence of crime or low-level vandal attacks. 1.1.1.2 Detection Security measures such as sensors are intended to detect the presence of an intruder. An effective detection system should include electronic features such as sensors as well as cameras or visual observation for assessment of alarm validity. Depending on the types of sensors,a detection system may include lighting systems, motion detectors,monitoring cameras,access control equipment,or other devices. 1.1.1.3 Delay Security features such as physical barriers are designed to delay an adversary until a response force can interrupt the adversary's actions. Delay features consist primarily of physical hardening devices often employed in multiple layers to provide protection in depth. Delay features are only effective when placed within a layer of detection. 1.1.1.4 Response (1) Response refers to actions taken to interrupt the adversary's task. Utility staff,the utility's security response force, or law enforcement may carry out the response with the appropriate responder dependent on the threat and policy of the utility. (2)The capabilities of the responders to a security event,including number, authority,and weaponry, should be greater than the capabilities of the perceived threat to the facility. The appropriate response force should be identified during the facility's vulnerability DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-1 assessment(VA)with notification,communication,and protocol requirements established in the utility's emergency response plan or similar plan. (3) Figure 1-1 illustrates the interaction of detection(at the perimeter fence and exterior door), delay (fence,exterior door,and interior door),and the response time to an adversary's sequence of actions. This figure was originally developed by Mary Lynn Garcia of Sandia National Laboratories and uses a thief(that is,a criminal)as the DBT to illustrate the time required for delay. Utilities should develop their own time sequence as part of their vulnerability assessment process. —0- Perimeter - Door PerimeterDoor Detection ii Detection i .,:t dk A Ak.sir_J.Alk ii.I.AiA.4a_ALL Room U Access Critical 111 Asset -\nj 1 M..7-=`S II II\V.:_=\\\ \\;Lh iLla ,o. rc,%.,ua0.:b,;pm IN i, L'v'. Task Task Task Task Task Task Task I 1 i 2 _ i 3_ i 4_ i 5_ i 6 _i 7 i - I i i ( Total Task 8 ) i - Time 3 Minutes Time Estimate Task Time Cumulative Time Adversary Task (minutes) (minutes) Task Description Response 1 0.1 Climb over fence 1st Alarm 7, 2 0.3 0.4 Run 250 feet(76 m) 3 0.8 1.2 Force door 2nd Alarm Effective 4 0.4 1.6 Walk 150 feet(46 m) response 5 0.2 1.8 Cut door lock time 6 0.1 1.9 Walk to asset Response Force Arrives 7 0.2 2.1 Disable asset Stop Adversary — 8 0.9 3.0 Escape 3.0 Total Time FIGURE 1-1 Concept of Delay Calculation(adapted from Garcia,2001) DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-2 1.1.2 Design Basis Threat DBTs considered in these guidelines address persons who intend to interrupt the water treatment or delivery processes,contaminate the water,or trespass on the water utility property in order to commit a malevolent act. The following subsections summarize the objectives,motives, and fundamental security approaches for each DBT used in this guideline.Table 1-1 contains additional information on the objectives,motives,and capabilities of DBT levels.The table also elaborates on the differences between base and enhanced DBT levels. 1.1.2.1 Vandal (1)Vandals are intent on defacing,damaging,or destroying property.They primarily seek targets of opportunity, using stealth to avoid detection.Adversaries in this group do not intend to injure or kill people (although such may occur as an accidental result of their actions),and are assumed to be unarmed. (2)Security approaches for a base-level vandal threat generally consist of placing physical barriers between the assets and public areas,and visual detection of intruders by utility staff or the general public. Use of appropriate perimeter fences and gates,adequate perimeter and area lighting, and hardened locks often provides sufficient deterrence from all but the most motivated vandals.Where the damage that could be caused by vandals is of relatively low cost to repair,utilities should consider whether it is more cost-effective to focus on consequence mitigation,that is,the repair or replacement of assets,than investing in expensive security systems and protective measures. (3)An enhanced threat created by a more intense or invasive vandal (one consisting of a greater number of individuals that plan the activities or that has access to larger or more capable tools)requires security approaches that detect and delay the intruder until the appropriate response force can stop the threat. These measures are generally only appropriate when the value of the assets is sufficient that consequence mitigation is a more costly or an unacceptable approach. Liability issues should also be considered. 1.1.2.2 Criminal (1)The primary motivation for a criminal is the desire to obtain equipment,tools,or components that have inherent value and can be sold.Criminals typically use stealth to avoid apprehension,and response times should focus on the time for the adversary to obtain the asset. Depending on the level of desperation or sophistication,criminals may be armed and willing to injure or kill to accomplish their objectives. (2)Protective approaches against the base level of criminal threat with limited hand tools are focused on deterrence and delay.Visual barriers act as a deterrent to prevent the detection of assets by an opportunistic criminal. Prevention or delay of the removal of equipment and other targets can result from physical separation from public areas, adequate lighting, and physical barriers such as fences,protected heavy-duty locks,high- quality doors and strikes,cabinets,and similar features. Multiple layers of protection provide additional delay to the adversary in completing his objective. Replacement or repair of some equipment in lieu of extensive security systems may be an appropriate and cost- effective approach. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-3 TABLE 1.1 Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix Characteristic I Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider' Objective Damage,deface,or destroy targets of Theft of valuable assets Disruption,destruction,or Property damage,theft,disruption, opportunity contamination;destroy public destruction,or contamination confidence in utility/governmental agency Motivation Thrill,dare,grudge Financial gain,grudge Political,doctrinal,or religious causes, I Revenge,financial gain,political cause, II grudge collusion with outsider Base I Enhanced J Base Enhanced J Base I Enhanced Base I Enhanced Planning/system Little or none Possible Little,opportunistic Definite Definite Definite Limited access to Extensive access knowledge equipment, to equipment, facilities,SCADA, facilities,SCADA, or networks networks,and security systems; greater system knowledge Weapons None None Unlikely Knives,hand Knives or hand Automatic and Unlikely Knives,hand guns,or rifles guns,toxic semi-automatic guns,or rifles, materials weapons,toxic toxic materials materials Tools and Readily available Basic hand tools Hand tools or Sophisticated Basic hand tools Unlimited variety Tools or Tools or Implements of hand tools or (e.g.,pliers,wire readily available hand and/or (e.g.,pliers,wire of hand,power, equipment equipment destruction equipment cutters,hammers, tools or equipment power tools cutters,hammers, and thermal tools available at the available at the available at the crowbars), at the facility(as crowbars) (including tools facility. facility. facility,spray paint baseball bats,or needed) such as cutting firecrackers. torches, contaminant agents,IEDs and IIDs) Contaminants None Possible None None Probable Probable Possible Possible Asset damage Minimal Possible J Minimal Possible Possible Significant Significant Significant Injuries None Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible (unintentional) II Fatalities None Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible (unintentional) II 'The insider may possess similar objectives or motivations to the other DBT categories,but will have access to facilities without causing suspicion.Insiders include:employees,vendor representatives,delivery persons,consultants,and onsite contractors. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-4 (3) Equipment with significant monetary or mission-related value that the utility determines must be protected from an enhanced criminal threat with significant planning or substantial hand,power,and possibly thermal tools requires a security system that detects the adversary and physically delays the theft until the appropriate response force arrives. 1.1.2.3 Saboteur (1)A saboteur is typically motivated by political, doctrinal,or religious causes,although revenge may also be a motivation.These individuals primarily use stealth to achieve their objectives,but they can be armed and willing to injure or kill others if threatened.The saboteur is bent on damage or destruction of the utility's facilities or generating a lack of public confidence in the utility's ability to protect the public.Effectively defeating a saboteur may require a response force more robust than that typically needed for the other DBT categories and may require the capabilities of a trained Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)team. (2)The difference between a base and enhanced level of threat from a saboteur is defined by the capabilities and methods. The base saboteur threat often possesses simple tools and attempts to either contaminate the water system by introducing a toxic compound or damage the facility components to prevent its operation.The security approach for defeating this threat is to detect the intruders,quickly assess that the intruders are a threat, and delay them until a response force interrupts their actions. (3)Additional physical delay features are required to adequately impede an enhanced saboteur threat with more sophisticated tools and weapons,which can include explosives, and the ability to not only contaminate the water but also to destroy critical facilities. Depending on the capabilities of the saboteurs,security features may be required to resist an attack from an improvised explosive device(IED)such as a pipe bomb or an improvised incendiary device(IID). 1.1.2.4 Insider (1)An insider is a person with knowledge of the utility who has access to the facilities or portions of the system as part of his or her daily work activities.Insiders may be disgruntled employees or contractors with employee-level access and may be armed.Insiders may also include personnel being manipulated by or working in collusion with criminals or saboteurs.Objectives of insiders may include compromising the effectiveness of the utility facilities,contaminating the public water supply,humiliating the utility's management, stealing records or other information,stealing items of value(for example,tools,money, parts,computers,or televisions),or injuring other employees. (2)The approach for preventing insider threats includes effective control of staff access to critical areas through management policies(for example,a two-person access rule)and possibly an electronic access control system(for example,individualized card readers)to document entry. Access to the facility's supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) and other instrumentation and control software and hardware should also be controlled. Effective access control to prevent insider tampering is typically achieved through tiered access strategies,such that higher levels of access rights are necessary to access increasingly more critical physical areas or software systems.This should be combined with background checks to ensure only trusted individuals have access to critical assets.Consequence mitigation should also be considered. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-5 (3) An enhanced insider threat has more in-depth system knowledge and generally has a higher level of access rights to critical equipment,facilities,SCADA,computer networks, and security systems. Protection from an enhanced threat requires additional management policies,increasingly more robust electronic access control, and computerized monitoring systems where consequence mitigation is unacceptable. Management policies are not addressed in these physical security guidelines;however,the physical security elements that complement those policies are presented. 1.2 Methodology for Applying These Guidelines This section, "Methodology for Applying These Guidelines," applies to all subsequent sections in this document and contains instructions that describe the basic steps for its use. This section also contains information that utilities should consider when applying the overall guidelines to their specific facilities and needs.Sections 2.0 through 7.0 describe specific security technologies and methods that can be applied to individual facilities or assets.These sections,in conjunction with the Foreword, 1.1 Introduction and its subsections,and Appendices in these guidelines,can be used as standalone documents. 1.2.1 Instructions for Applying These Guidelines The following steps list,in order, the actions a utility should take as it applies these guidelines to its facilities. Figure 1-2 presents an example of a decision tree a utility would use as it follows these steps for a particular asset. 1.2.1.1 Step 1 —Vulnerability Assessment (1) Complete a water system-wide VA and define the following: (1) Critical assets to be protected (2) DBT and its capabilities and motives (3) Response force capabilities and response time (4) Recommended security approach to reduce risk (2) Several methodologies have been developed to assist utilities in completing vulnerability assessments.These include: (1) Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities(RAM-WTM) developed by Sandia National Laboratories in partnership with the American Water Works Association Research Foundation (Sandia Corporation 2002) (2) Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSATTM) developed by the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA,which is now known as the National Association of Clean Water Agencies <NACWA>) (NACWA 2005) (3) "Asset Based Vulnerability Checklist for Wastewater Utilities," produced by AMSA (NACWA 2002) DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-6 System VA Defines: 1. Critical asset:Aboveground Water Storage Tank Step 1 - 2. Capabilities and Motive of the DBT: Corn plete VA Local kids intent on vandalism using hand tools and spray paint. a Response force:Local police, 15 minute response time Step 2 - Characterize DBT 1 DBT Matches: Base Vandal Threat I I Benchmark Security Recommendation: I Basic perimeter fence(chain link) tep 3 - Is Ides fy Security No:Local codes Recommended No:Neighbors Ornamental Consider not allow have aesthetic Measuresfences Measure concerns Fencing I Appropriate for (alternate Site-specific IIP physical security Conditions? easure) Enhan(.&nsider ighting Yes CCT (altsecurity me Step 4- Is Consider Consider Recommended applying a surface Consequence Measure No that allows easy Mitigation Cost-effective for the removal of graffiti Risk Reduction* (consequence 1 Achieved? mitigation) Yes *Note:Risk reduction incorporates the likelihood Install of a successful attack and Recommended the consequence or damage Measure resulting from an attack FIGURE 1-2 Example Decision Tree DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-7 (4) "Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems," prepared by the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators and National Rural Water Association(ASDWA 2002) (5) "Protecting Your Community's Assets: A Guide for Small Wastewater Systems" published by the National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities (NETCSC 2002) The last three documents are suited primarily for small utilities with a limited number of assets. 1.2.1.2 Step 2—Design Basis Threat (1)Compare the DBT identified in the VA to the DBT levels described in 1.1.2. Select the appropriate DBT category(more than one may be selected): vandal,criminal, saboteur,or insider. (2) Within each of these DBT categories (see Table 1-1), determine whether the base level or enhanced level of security is appropriate. 1.2.1.3 Step 3—Identify Security Measures (1) Using the security measures table contained within the appropriate facility section of these guidelines,locate the column that applies to the selected DBT category at either the base level or enhanced level to identify the recommended physical and electronic security measures. Ensure that the appropriate level of protection is applied consistently to all elements of the facility to avoid any weak points. (2)Compare VA-recommended security approaches to the recommendations in the table and determine whether changes to the recommendations are warranted. (3) Deviations may be appropriate for a DBT that is defined differently (for example,with greater capabilities) from those presented in 1.1.2. Based on an analysis of the DBT's capabilities and the anticipated response time for an adequate response force,a utility may determine that it is necessary to apply the recommended enhanced level measures plus additional security measures to provide a greater or more consistent level of security. (4) Deviations may also be appropriate based on specific site conditions or external requirements (for example,local ordinances,standards, or codes),the criticality of the asset, or the response time or capability of the responders. In these cases,the utility should consider alternate security measures that accomplish similar objectives to the measure recommended in the table.Where certain measures may be less desirable (such as the barbed wire in a residential neighborhood), they may be offset by other measures (such as providing natural surveillance that may deter intruders averse to being caught in the act). 1.2.1.4 Step 4—Consider Consequence Mitigation (1)Consider the costs of the recommended security features and determine whether mitigation of the consequences is more cost-effective than applying the recommended security measures. A utility may wish to reduce the amount of physical hardening and electronic security (such as secure fencing,hardened doors and windows,closed-circuit television cameras) that is applied if it is more feasible,reliable,and cost effective to repair DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-B or replace a damaged asset. For example, a utility may decide to bypass a booster pumping station or use a portable pump located off-site in the event that a permanent pump is damaged instead of implementing additional security measures. (2) As illustrated in Figure 1-3,a cost-risk reduction curve can be a useful tool in determining the point at which the risk reduction associated with implementing additional security measures is marginal (WEF 2004). Management and operational measures to lower consequences are important elements of a utility or facility security plan that are not addressed in these guidelines. A O Advanced 4111 Perimeter Develop Emergency Detection Response Plan System Camera N Develop Security System Policies and Procedures • 4 ® Door Contact Alarms v Improved Locks and Door Hardware Risk Reduction FIGURE 1.3 Typical Cost-to-Risk Reduction Curve(taken from Exhibit 1-13,WEF 2004) 1.2.2 Additional Information to Assist in Applying These Guidelines The following sections provide additional information that will be helpful as the subsequent sections of these guidelines are reviewed and considered for implementation. 1.2.2.1 New and Existing Facilities (1)These guidelines can be applied to new and existing facilities. For new facilities,the VA to identify the key assets and appropriate DBT should be conducted during the early design phases,for example,during conceptual design,and should be consistent with the VA for the utility's other facilities. In addition to incorporating the appropriate security measures identified in these guidelines into the design,consideration should be given to using security-focused design approaches.Examples would include limiting routes of access to critical assets, selecting building materials that are less prone to vandalism or forced entry, arranging building orientations to provide visual site control,providing redundant critical assets,and locating redundant critical assets in nonadjacent areas. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-9 (2) Most of the security measures can be applied as retrofits to an existing facility.The exceptions are those measures that require minimum site dimensions to be effective (for example, double-layer fencing or set-back distances) or are dependent on other site-specific conditions (for example,landscaping or site lighting). In applying these guidelines to existing facilities, a utility should ensure that a consistent protection layer is achieved;for example,the delay capability of a pry-or break-resistant door added to a facility should match the resistance provided by the facility's other doors,windows,walls, and roof. 1.2.2.2 Local Codes and Required Aesthetics The application of these guidelines needs to consider local codes, ordinances,restrictive covenants,and aesthetic requirements. For example,local codes may limit the extent and intensity of site lighting. Required aesthetics may limit the height or material type of a fence, or it may not be appropriate to use a fence with outriggers and barbed wire for a facility that is located in a park-like or residential neighborhood setting. 1.2.2.3 Assets Not Under Utility Control These guidelines apply only to assets that are within the control of the utility. For critical assets that are not owned by the utility,the utility needs to coordinate protection of the assets with the owning parties. 1.2.2.4 Balance of the System Where multiple facilities are located in a single complex,consider the security measures needed for each type of facility and integrate the measures to provide the most effective approach. 1.2.2.5 Value of the Asset The relative value of an asset or facility is determined through the VA process and may be contingent on perceived or actual monetary value,value to the process,value to the community,or potential consequences if out of service. A higher value asset may warrant enhanced security measures when compared to a lower value asset. 1.2.2.6 Levels of Security Measures Each section of this document recommends security measures for base and enhanced levels in each DBT category that are deemed appropriate to a wide range of facility types.The choice between applying the base level or enhanced level of security depends upon the DBT, the criticality of the asset,and the response time and capability of the responders. It may be appropriate for a utility to apply security features in excess of those identified as enhanced. It may also be appropriate for a utility to apply alternative solutions to achieve a similar level of security for all facilities. 1.2.2.7 Response Time and Capabilities If the anticipated response time is high or if the response capability is low,additional security measures may be warranted. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 1-10 2.0 Raw Water Facilities 2.1 Scope (1)This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers raw water facilities that are components of a municipal drinking water system and under the control of the utility. It is limited to surface raw water facilities:river and lake intakes,pipelines and canals that are used to convey raw water,valve vaults and control structures used on these transmission lines and structures, and other facilities upstream of the treatment plant. It does not include wells or pumping stations, as these facilities are addressed in Section 3.0. It also does not include chemical feed facilities—these are addressed in the water treatment plant section(4.0). (2)This section establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting raw water facilities from vandal,criminal, saboteur,and insider threats. Threats and malevolent acts of concern include damage or destruction of individual facilities,or introduction of a chemical or biological agent that contaminates the water supply. (3) A dam is commonly a raw water facility that may be under the control of a utility. Large reservoir dams are not addressed in this guideline because destruction of dams is considered a terrorist activity and therefore is not within the capability of the design basis threats of this guideline. Dam appurtenances can be protected in a similar manner to other raw water appurtenances described herein.Small dams,including diversion dams,can be protected using the approaches outlined for other raw water facilities and,therefore,are addressed in this guideline. 2.2 Facility Mission The mission of this facility is to provide a supply of water to treatment plants.The facilities include storage reservoirs,basins,intakes,pipelines,and valve vaults. Generally,the facilities are not continuously staffed. They may be visited periodically by staff so that the staff can check the facilities,perform maintenance activities,conduct raw water monitoring, and respond to alarms.The facilities are often isolated from the general public,although in some cases,raw water impoundments and rivers are popular recreation areas.These facilities may vary greatly in size,from large raw water reservoirs covering many acres to smaller conveyance structures.The security strategy for a given facility may vary depending on its size.For example,installation of a continuous perimeter fence may not be feasible at facilities with large areas. In these cases,alternate security strategies should be employed. 2.3 Philosophy of Security Approach (1) An effective security approach for raw water facilities includes equipment or systems to deter, detect, delay,and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective,or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat.The equipment and DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-1 systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities of the DBT,which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition,equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. (2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals,criminals,saboteurs,and insiders. Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats—base and enhanced—upon which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based,are presented in Table 1-1, Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix.Threats with capabilities less than or greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that may preclude their implementation. (3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence,detection, and delay are provided in this guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities(AWWA 2004a) and are not addressed here. 2.4 Benchmark Security Measures (1)Table 2-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If the threat includes more than one DBT,for example, an enhanced criminal and a base insider,the security system should include the recommended security measures for both threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark (V). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended. The security measures of Table 2-1 have been grouped into the following categories: • Perimeter(reservoir impoundments,intake structures,raw water pumping stations, open channels) • Site(area between perimeter and facility structures) • Facility Structures • Water Quality Monitoring • Closed Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) • Closed Circuit Television-Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras) • Power and Wiring Systems • Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) -Physical Security (2) Security decisions are site and utility specific, and the measures identified in the table are good practice options to be considered,not rules to follow. Additionally,the measures presented in the table are for typical raw water facilities. Facilities with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or more robust security measures. Appendix A provides additional details on security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 2-1 where applicable). DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-2 (3) Special considerations may be warranted for: • Large dams because of their potential public safety implications and because they are not addressed within this guideline • Raw water components that do not have redundancy such as single raw water transmission pipelines • Facilities with public access such as intakes on rivers or impoundments DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-3 TABLE 2.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders ll o Applicable Sections Security Measure a 11 m Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, G Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security w o Elements Perimeter(reservoir impoundments,intake structures,raw water pumping stations,open channels) Basic perimeter fencing or • V 1.0,1.1,8.1 perimeter walls Enhanced climb/cut-resistant • V V V V ✓ 1.2,1.4,1.5 fencing or walls Foundation enhancements for • V V 1.7 fencing to prevent tunneling Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • I I V 5.0 vehicle access Intrusion detection at perimeter • V V V ✓ 1.6,3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, 11.0 Key-locked entrance gate • V I ✓ V V 2.1,10.2 Entrance gate controlled by using • • V V V V 2.2,2.3,10.3,10.4, access control system 10.5 Intercom and remotely controlled • • V V V V 2.2,2.3 electronic gate lock for visitors Guardhouse and manned entrance • • ✓ gate to control site access Perimeter site lighting • V V I V V V V I 7.0 Gate entrance lighting • V V V V I 7.0(4),(5),(6) DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-0 TABLE 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders T c Applicable Sections Security Measure m . Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, o ;; Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o Elements Hardened site openings larger than • ✓ ✓ ✓ V ✓ V 1.1,13.2,14.3 96 square inches(62,000 square millimeters)in area(e.g.,grates on culverts) "No Trespassing"signage(every V ✓ V V V V 8.1 50 feet[15 meters]) Site(area betweenperimeter d facifi structures) Motion-activated lighting I Ian • ✓ ✓ I ✓ 7.0(9) Perimeter minimum clear zone • • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 3.0 distance Second layer of basic fencing • I I I I ✓ V 1.0,1.1 Enhanced second layer of fencing • V 1.2, that is climb/cut resistant Intrusion detection at second layer • ✓ ✓ ✓ 3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, of fencing 11.0 Foundation enhancements for • V 1.7 second layer of fencing Bollards or vehicle barriers around • V ✓ V V critical exterior equipment Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • V 5.0 vehicle access to area within second layer of fencing DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-5 TABLE 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Security Measure w 0 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security eElements Electronic access-controlled • • V V 2.2,2.3,10.4 entrance gate for second fence Signage,buoys and/or float lines to • V delineate no-entry zone around lake or river intakes Transformer(outdoor)—locked • V V V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(outdoor)—locked • V V V V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center 1 • V V V V 13.3 (outdoor)—locked protective cage Landscaping that does not obscure • V V V V V ✓ V V 1.6,3.0(3) building or other assets Manholes—locked with security • V V V V V fastener Manholes—intrusion detection on • • V V V lock Facility Structures Locking caps for valve operator I • V V V V covers Valve vault hatches—mechanically • V 10.2,14.2 fastened or locked with shroud over lock DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2.6 TABLE 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders T c Applicable Sections Security Measure i d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, 0Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o Elements Valve vault hatches—double hatch • ✓ V V 10.2 doors with shrouded lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • • V V 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, doors with shrouded lock and 11.0 intrusion detection Protective grating or screen to • V V ✓ V shield open basins from objects that are thrown from outside the perimeter fence Industrial-type,tamper-resistant • V V V V V door hinges Key-locked entrance door • V V V 10.1,10.2,13.2(6) Exterior doors with status switch • V V V V V V 8.2,13.1 contact alarmed to security Electronic access-controlled • • V V V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.2 entrance door Automatic locking critical interior • • V V ✓ V V doors,with access control Double entry system or secured • • V lobby entry(mantrap) Blast-resistant exterior doors' • V DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-7 TABLE 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, o Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o Elements Bollards or vehicle barriers • V V 5.0 protecting vehicle doors Break-resistant glass • ✓ V V ✓ ✓ Blast-resistant windowsb • I I I V Glass-break detection at windows • I V V ✓ V 9.3 Interior motion detection • ( I I ✓ V ✓ V 9.3 Grilles or other barriers at skylights • V V V 13.3 and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Grilles or other barriers with • • V V V intrusion detection at skylights and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Locked roof hatches • I V V V V V 14.3 Locked roof hatches with intrusion • • V V V alarm Roof access ladder with locked • ✓ V V V V shroud Roof access ladder with locked • • ,/ V V shroud and intrusion alarm DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-8 TABLE 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders T o Applicable Sections Security Measure d d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, o Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o Elements Transformer(indoor)-locked • ✓ ✓ V 13.4 protective barrier or cage Generator(indoor)-locked • V ✓ V V 13.4 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center • I V V V 13.4 (indoor)-locked protective cage E Water Quality Monitoring On-line water quality monitoring • ✓ V V 15.0 Closed Circuit Television—Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) CCTV-All facility exterior doors • I ✓ I I ✓ ✓ V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV-Hatches,vaults • I 1 ✓ V V V ✓ 11.0,11.1,11.2 [Closed Circuit Television—Surveillance(pan-tilt-zoom[PTZ]cameras) CCTV-Main gate • I I I ✓ V V ✓ 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV-Impoundment,immediate • ✓ V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 area near intake,open channels, similar facilities CCTV-Main entrance door • V ✓ V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV-Site surveillance • V ✓ V V ✓ 11.0,11.1,11.2 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-9 TABLE 2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Raw Water Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure d I Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, o Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security cl Elements CCTV—Interior protected areas • I I I ✓ I ✓ I V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 P 1 Power and Wiring Systems All electrical panels locked • V V V V ✓ V V 12.0 Backup power to security • • V V V V V V 12.0(5) components(as indicated):UPS, typically All electrical wiring in conduit • I V V V V V V V V 12.0(1) Redundant communication paths • I V V Electronically supervised security • V V V V V V 12.0(2) wiring Redundant critical utility(power, • V V natural gas,etc.)connections SCADA-Physical Security Locked PLC/RTU enclosure(s) I • I V V V V V V 1 V 13.0 Tamper switch on enclosure(s) I I • V V V V V I V 12.1 All instrumentation wiring in conduit I • I V V V V V V V I V 12.0(1) Notes: a Many of the security measures identified in this table may also provide deterrence. b Blast-resistant doors and glass are also bullet resistant. DECEMBER 20W GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 2-10 3.0 Wells and Pumping Stations 3.1 Scope This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers water wells and pumping stations used within a water system. It establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting a well or booster pumping station(referred to as the facility in this section)from vandal,criminal,saboteur,and insider threats.Threats and malevolent acts of concern include contamination of the aquifer or contamination of the water that enters the distribution system from a well or pumping facility;or damage or destruction of the pumping station equipment that creates a public health hazard or prevents transmission of water to the end user. 3.2 Facility Mission (1)The mission of a well facility is to withdraw groundwater from an aquifer to be used as drinking water supply. Generally,operations and maintenance staff only periodically visit these facilities to perform maintenance activities or to respond to failure alarms.These facilities may be isolated from the general public or located in residential,park-like settings or in the midst of denser populated urban areas. Multiple wells can be found at one location,and well facilities are often co-located with storage tanks or other utility-owned infrastructure such as maintenance buildings. (2)The mission of a pumping station is to pump raw water to a treatment facility(an intake pumping station),or to lift potable water from a lower service zone to a higher zone. Pumping stations may be exposed or in buildings above grade or may be located in below- grade vaults.Their capacities may range from a thousand gallons per day (3.8 cubic meters per day) to more than a million gallons per day (>3,800 cubic meters per day).Generally, operations and maintenance staff only periodically visit these facilities to perform maintenance activities or to respond to failure alarms. Although typically isolated from the general public,these facilities can be located in residential,park-like settings, or in the midst of denser populated urban areas. (3)Wells and pumping stations have been grouped together for the purpose of this guideline because they have similar components, staffing patterns,and types of locations, and thus can be protected in similar ways. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 3-1 (4) More detailed information on wells can be found in AWWA Standard A100-06:Water Wells(2006). More detailed information on pumping stations can be found in Pumping Station Design by Jones,et al. (2005). 3.3 Philosophy of Security Approach (1) An effective security approach for wells and pumping stations includes equipment or systems to deter,detect, delay,and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The equipment and systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities of the DBT,which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition, equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. (2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals,criminals,saboteurs,and insiders. Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats,base and enhanced,upon which the benchmark security measures in this section are based,are presented in Table 1-1, Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that may preclude their implementation. (3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence,detection,and delay are provided in this section.Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities(AWWA 2004a) and are not addressed here. 3.4 Benchmark Security Measures (1)Table 3-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If the threat includes more than one DBT,for example an enhanced criminal and a base insider,the security system should include the recommended security measures for both threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark (V). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended. The security measures of Table 3-1 have been grouped into the following categories: • Perimeter • Site (area between perimeter and enclosed facilities) • Facility Structures • Water Quality Monitoring • Closed Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) • Closed Circuit Television-Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras) DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 3.2 • Power and Wiring Systems • Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) -Physical Security (2)Security decisions are site and utility specific,and the measures identified in the table are good practice options to be considered,not rules to follow.Additionally,the measures presented in the table are for typical well and pumping station facilities.Facilities with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or more robust security measures.Appendix A provides additional details on security measures(specific sections are referenced in Table 3-1 where applicable). DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 3-3 TABLE 3.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Security Measure a G Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security d D Elements 4 Perimeter Basic perimeter fencing or • V 1.0,1.1,8.1 perimeter walls Enhanced climb/cut-resistant • V V V ✓ V 1.2,1.4,1.5 fencing or walls Foundation enhancements for • V V 1.7 fencing to prevent tunneling Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • V 5.0 vehicle access Intrusion detection at perimeter • V V V V 1.6,3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, 11.0 Key-locked entrance gate • V ✓ V V 2.1,10.2 Electronic access-controlled • • ✓ ✓ V V 2.2,2.3,10.3,10.4, entrance gate 10.5 Perimeter site lighting • ✓ V V V V V 7.0 Gate entrance lighting • V V V V 7.0(4),(5),(6) Hardened site openings larger than • V ✓ V V V V 1.1,13.2,14.3 96 square inches(62,000 square millimeters)in area(e.g.,grates on culverts) DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 3-0 TABLE 3-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure m d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o m 0 Elements "No Trespassing"signage(every V ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ V 8.1 50 feet[15 meters]) I Site(area between perimeter and enclosed facilities) • Motion-activated lighting • ✓ V V ✓ 7.0(9) Perimeter minimum clear zone • • ✓ V ✓ V 3.0 distance Second layer of basic fencing • ✓ V 1.0,1.1 Enhanced second layer of fencing • V 1.2, that is climb/cut resistant Intrusion detection at second layer • ✓ V ✓ 3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, of fencing 11.0 Foundation enhancements for • V ✓ 1.7 second layer of fencing Bollards or vehicle barriers around • ✓ ✓ ✓ V critical exterior equipment Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • ✓ 5.0 vehicle access to area within second layer of fencing Electronic access-controlled • • V V ✓ 2.2,2.3,10.4 entrance gate for second fence DECEMBER 20W GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 35 TABLE 3-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure sw Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, ❑ Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security m Elements Transformer(outdoor)—locked 0 V V V ✓ 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(outdoor)—locked 0 V. V V V ✓ 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center 0 V V V V 13.3 (outdoor)—locked protective cage Chemical storage and feed 0 V V ✓ V 13.3,17.0 equipment(outdoor)—locked access • Chemical storage and feed 0 0 V V V 13.3,17.0 equipment(outdoor)—locked access with intrusion detection Landscaping that does not obscure • V V V V V V V V 1.6,3.0(3) building or other assets Manholes—locked with security 0 V. V V 19.0 fastener Manholes—intrusion detection on 0 • V V V lock Minimize exterior signage 0 V V V V indicating the presence or locations of assets DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 36 TABLE 3.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders o Applicable Sections Security Measure m 15 2 Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security Elements 0 I Facility Structures Locking cap on aboveground well 0 ✓ ✓ I I casing Locking cap on air lines extending • V V ✓ V through well casing Protective cage around • V V V aboveground well casing and air lines Locking cap on monitoring wells • V V V V Protective cage around monitoring • V V V wells Locking caps for valve operator • V ✓ V V covers Valve vault hatches—mechanically • V 10.2,14.2 fastened or locked with shroud over lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • V V V 10.2 doors with shrouded lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • • V V 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, doors with shrouded lock and 11.0 intrusion detection DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 3-7 TABLE 3.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security w 0 Elements Industrial-type,tamper-resistant 1 • V V V V V door hinges Key-locked entrance door • I I V V V 10.1,10.2,13.2(6) Exterior doors with status switch • ✓ V V V V V 9.4,13.2 contact alarmed to security Electronic access-controlled • • V V V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.2 entrance door Automatic locking critical interior • • V V V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.2 doors with access control Double entry system or secured • I • V lobby entry(mantrap) Blast-resistant exterior doors° • I I I I V Bollards or vehicle barriers • V ✓ 5.0 protecting vehicle doors Break-resistant glass • I V V V V V Blast-resistant windowsb • I I I V Glass-break detection at windows • V V V V 9.3 Interior motion detection I • I V V V V 9.3 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 38 TABLE 3.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections m '0 a) Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix Security Measure G w Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security m O Elements Grilles or other barriers at skylights • ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Grilles or other barriers with • • V V V 14.1 intrusion detection at skylights and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Locked roof hatches • I I V ✓ V V V 14.3 Locked roof hatches with intrusion • • V ✓ V alarm Roof access ladder with locked • V V V V V shroud Roof access ladder with locked • • V V V shroud and intrusion alarm Transformer(indoor)—locked • V V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(indoor)—locked • V V V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center • V V V 13.3 (indoor)—locked protective cage Chemical fill lines at building • V V V V V 17.0 exterior—locked access DECEMBER 20W 3-9 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES TABLE 3-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure dBase Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix 0 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security y D Elements Chemical fill lines at building • • V V V exterior—locked access with intrusion detection Chemical storage and feed • V V V V 13.1 equipment(indoor)—locked access Chemical storage and feed • • V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.1 equipment(indoor)—locked with intrusion detection Water Quality Monitoring On-line water quality monitoring • V V V 15.0 Closed Circuit Television—Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) CCTV—All facility exterior doors • I V I V ✓ V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Hatches,vaults • V ✓ V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 Closed Circuit Television—Surveillance(pan-tilt-zoom[PTZ]cameras) CCTV—Main gate • V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Main entrance door • V V V V I 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Site surveillance • V V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Interior protected areas • I V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 DECEMBER 2006 3-10 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES TABLE 3-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wells and Pumping Stations System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure d d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, 0 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security p Elements Power and Wiring Systems All electrical panels locked • V I ✓ V V V V ✓ 12.0 Backup power to security • • V ✓ V V V V 12.0(5) components(as indicated):UPS, typically All electrical wiring in conduit • ✓ ✓ ✓ V ✓ V V ✓ 12.0(1) Redundant communication paths • V V Electronically supervised security • V V V V V ✓ 12.0(2) wiring Redundant critical utility(power, • ✓ V natural gas,etc.)connections SCADA-Physical Security Locked PLC/RTU enclosure(s) • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I ✓ ✓ 13.0 Tamper switch on enclosure(s) • V V V ✓ V V 12.1 All instrumentation wiring in conduit • V V ✓ V V V V V 12.0(1) Notes: Many of the security measures identified in this table may also provide deterrence. Blast-resistant doors and glass are also bullet resistant. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 3-11 4.0 Water Treatment Plants 4.1 Scope This section of the Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers water treatment plants used within a municipal drinking water system. It establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting a water treatment plant(referred to as the facility in this section) from vandal,criminal,saboteur,and insider threats.Threats and malevolent acts of concern include damage or destruction of individual treatment processes or equipment,or introduction of a chemical or biological agent that contaminates the drinking water supply. Employee safety and public health concerns can be caused by the intentional release of hazardous chemicals or toxic gasses, or by damaging ventilation and other life-safety control features.The potential for malevolent individuals to create intentional fire and explosive hazards may be additional concerns requiring security features. 4.2 Facility Mission (1)The mission of this facility is to treat source water to drinking water standards. Water treatment plants may produce from one hundred thousand gallons (380 cubic meters)to one hundred million gallons (1,140,000 cubic meters) per day, although there are smaller and larger plants in operation. The facilities to produce treated water include below-grade, ground level, and elevated basins and tanks;buildings housing chemical systems;electrical and control systems;staff facilities;and clearwell storage facilities. Large water treatment plants are routinely staffed on a continuous basis;small facilities are likely to be staffed only periodically to adjust treatment settings,perform maintenance activities,conduct process monitoring,and respond to failure alarms. Although often isolated from the general public,these facilities can be located in residential settings,or in the midst of denser populated urban areas. Because of safety concerns, the public generally has no direct access. (2) More detailed information on specific functions and treatment processes is contained in the Water Treatment Plant Design -4th Edition, (AWWA/ASCE 2005a). 4.3 Philosophy of Security Approach (1) An effective security approach for water treatment plants includes equipment or systems to deter, detect, delay,and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective, or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The equipment and systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities of the DBT,which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition,equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-1 (2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals,criminals,saboteurs,and insiders. Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats—base and enhanced—upon which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based,are presented in Table 1-1,Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that may preclude their implementation. (3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence,detection,and delay are provided in this guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities(AWWA 2004a) and are not addressed here. 4.4 Benchmark Security Measures (1) Table 4-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If the threat includes more than one DBT,for example an enhanced criminal and a base insider,the security system should include the recommended security measures for both threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark (V). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended. The security measures of Table 4-1 have been grouped into the following categories: • Perimeter • Site (area between perimeter and facilities) • Facility Structures • Water Quality Monitoring • Closed Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) • Closed Circuit Television-Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras) • Power and Wiring Systems • Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) -Physical Security (2)Security decisions are site and utility specific,and the measures identified in the table are good practice options to be considered,not rules to follow.Additionally,the measures presented in the table are for typical water treatment plants. Facilities with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or more robust security measures. A water treatment facility may have chemical injection facilities downstream of clearwell storage to adjust and maintain chemical attributes of the finished water.These chemical facilities (chemical supply lines and metering equipment)may be outside of the boundary of the water treatment plant campus, but should be treated using similar security measures to those recommended for the treatment plant perimeter and facilities. Appendix A provides additional details on security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 4-1 where applicable). DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-2 (3)Special considerations should be provided for security of extremely critical assets or facilities such as in-plant pumping stations,main electrical switchgear,emergency generators,disinfection systems,or SCADA/security computer equipment.Special security considerations should also be provided for water treatment plants that store large volumes of hazardous or toxic chemicals,for example,chlorine or ammonia gas.The extremely critical or hazardous assets may be the target of a DBT that is more capable than the DBT for the remainder of the water treatment plant,thus the critical assets may require additional security measures.Security approaches for these assets should be based on protection-in- depth principles,where multiple layers of security measures are employed around the critical assets to detect and delay the adversary.An example would be the security system for protecting a chlorine gas disinfection system from an enhanced saboteur threat.This system might include a second fence within the confines of the perimeter fence surrounding only the chlorine storage and feed building and enclosing a minimum 100-foot(30-meter), well-lighted clear zone between the second fence and storage facility.The fence system could include intrusion detection,vehicle crash barriers,and access-controlled gates with limited authorization rights.The disinfection building may be constructed of blast-resistant materials and include blast-resistant and access-controlled personnel and vehicle doors.A gas-scrubber system with the capacity to neutralize multiple containers of the hazardous gas should be considered.Closed-circuit television cameras(CCTVs)could be used to assess the threat of intruders and monitor authorized personnel activities. Depending on site and response-force specifics,additional security measures may be warranted. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-3 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders = Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure d d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, O Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security 07 I] Elements Perimeter Basic perimeter fencing or • I V 1.0,1.1,8.1 perimeter walls Enhanced climb/cut-resistant • V V ✓ V ✓ 1.2,1.4,1.5 fencing or walls Foundation enhancements for • V V 1.7 fencing to prevent tunneling Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • ✓ 5.0 vehicle access Intrusion detection at perimeter • ✓ V V V 1.6,3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, 11.0 Key-locked entrance gate • V V V V 2.1,10.2 Electronic access-controlled • • V V ✓ ✓ 2.2,2.3,10.3,10.4, entrance gate 10.5 Intercom and remotely controlled • • V V V V 2.2,2.3 electronic gate lock for visitors Vehicle sally port gate entrance for • • V ✓ V 4.0 delivery vehicles Guardhouse and manned entrance • • V gate to control site access Perimeter site lighting • V V V V V ✓ 7.0 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-4 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure ed Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security 0 Elements Gate entrance lighting • V V V V 7.0(4),(5),(6) Hardened site openings larger than • ✓ V V ✓ V V 1.1,13.2,14.3 96 square inches(62,000 square millimeters)in area(e.g.,grates on culverts) Provide separate visitor vehicular • • V sign-in checkpoint. "No Trespassing"signage(every V V V V V V 8.1 50 feet[15 meters]) Site(area between perimeter and facilities) Motion-activated lighting I • V ✓ I V V 7.0(9) Perimeter minimum clear zone • • V V V V 3.0 distance Locate public or visitor parking as • V far away from the facility as practical,but at least 30 feet (9 meters)away Second layer of basic fencing • V V 1.0,1.1 Enhanced second layer of fencing • V 1.2, that is climb/cut resistant Intrusion detection at second layer • V ✓ V 3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, of fencing 11.0 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4.5 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure 15 O Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security m G Elements Foundation enhancements for • V V 1.7 second layer of fencing Bollards or vehicle bafflers around V ✓ ✓ ✓ • critical exterior equipment Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • ✓ 5.0 vehicle access to area within second layer of fencing Electronic access-controlled • • V V V 2.2,2.3,10.4 entrance gate for second fence Transformer(outdoor)—locked • V V V ✓ 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(outdoor)—locked • V V V V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center • V V V ✓ 13.3 (outdoor)—locked protective cage Chemical storage and feed • V V V V 13.3,17.0 equipment(outdoor)—locked access Chemical storage and feed • • ✓ ✓ V 13.3,17.0 equipment(outdoor)—locked access with intrusion detection Landscaping that does not obscure • V V V V V V V ✓ 1.6,3.0(3) building or other assets DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-6 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure m w Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o d 0 Elements Manholes—locked with security • V V V V V fastener Manholes—intrusion detection on • • V V V lock Minimize exterior signage • I V V V indicating the presence or locations of assets Facility Structures _ Locking caps for valve operator • ✓ ✓ ✓ I covers Valve vault hatches—mechanically • V 10.2,14.2 fastened or locked with shroud over lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • ✓ ✓ V 10.2 doors with shrouded lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • • V V 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, doors with shrouded lock and 11.0 intrusion detection Clearwell hatch/manway— • V 8 hardened lock with shroud or mechanically fastened Clearwell hatch/manway—double • V V V 8 layer doors with shrouded lock DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-7 TABLE 4.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders = Applicable Sections Security Measure a Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o Elements Clearwell hatch/manway—double • • ✓ ✓ 8 layer doors with shrouded lock and intrusion detection Clearwell vent:gooseneck pipe • ✓ 8 type—use double screen Clearwell vent:rectangular or circle • ✓ 8 (larger than pipe)—single layer with shrouded lock Clearwell vent:rectangular or circle • ✓ ✓ V 8 (larger than pipe)—double layer with shrouded lock Clearwell vent:rectangular or circle • • V V 8 (larger than pipe)—double layer with shrouded lock and intrusion alarm Overflow outlet for clearwell: • V ✓ ✓ screen and/or flap valve with cage Overflow outlet for clearwell: • • ✓ V screen and/or flap valve with cage and intrusion detection Intrusion detection on top of • V V V 4 clearwell or clearwell area Access ladder for clearwell— • V V V V 5.2 locked shroud DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-H TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c a Applicable Sections Security Measure m Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, GLevel Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security Elements Access ladder for clearwell— • I • V V V 5.2 locked shroud with intrusion alarm Remote clearwell isolation by • ✓ ✓ ✓ means of automated valve Protective grating or screen to • ✓ V V V shield open basins from objects that are thrown from outside the perimeter fence Industrial-type,tamper-resistant I • ✓ V V ✓ V door hinges Key-locked entrance door • I I V V I I I V 10.1,10.2,13.1 Exterior doors with status switch I I • ✓ V V V V V 9.4,13.2 contact alarmed to security Electronic access-controlled • • V V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.1 entrance door Automatic locking critical interior • • I I V V V V ✓ 10.1,10.3,10.4 doors with access control Double entry system or secured • I • V lobby entry(mantrap) Visitor waiting area • I • I I I I V V Blast-resistant exterior doors° • I I I I I I I V I I DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-9 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure mBase Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, G Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security m 0 Elements Bollards or vehicle barriers • ✓ ✓ 5.0 protecting vehicle doors Break-resistant glass • i I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ ✓ Blast-resistant windows' • ✓ Glass-break detection at windows • I I ✓ ✓ ✓ V I 9.3.1 • Interior motion detection • I ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9.3 Grilles or other barriers at skylights • ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Grilles or other barriers with • • ✓ ✓ ✓ 14.1 intrusion detection at skylights and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Locked roof hatches • ✓ I ✓ I ✓ ✓ ✓ I Locked roof hatches with intrusion • • ✓ ✓ V alarm Roof access ladder with locked • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ shroud Roof access ladder with locked • • ✓ ✓ ✓ shroud and intrusion alarm DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-10 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure W d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, G Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security d p Elements Transformer(indoor)—locked • ✓ V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(indoor)—locked • V V ✓ V. 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center • ✓ ✓ V 13.3 (indoor)—locked protective cage Chemical fill lines at building • V V V V V 17.0 exterior—locked access Chemical fill lines at building • • V V V exterior—locked access with intrusion detection Chemical storage and feed • ✓ V ✓ 13.1 equipment(indoor)—locked access Chemical storage and feed • • ✓ V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.1 equipment(indoor)—locked with intrusion detection L Water Quality Monitoring On-line water quality monitoring • ✓ ✓ V 15.0 IClosed Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) CCTV—All facility exterior doors I I • I I ✓ V I V 1 ✓ I V I ✓ I 11.0,11.1,11.2 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4.11 TABLE 4.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders r c Applicable Sections Security Measure m u Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, 2 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security O Elements CCTV—Hatches,vaults I • I I V V I V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 Closed Circuit Television—Surveillance(pan-tilt-zoom[PTZ]cameras) CCTV—Main gate • I I V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Main entrance door I I • V V V V 1 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Site surveillance • I ✓ V V V I V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Interior protected areas • I I I V V V V I 11.0,11.1,11.2 Power and Wiring Systems J All electrical panels locked • V V V V V V V 12.0 Backup power to security • • V V V V V V 12.0(5) components(as indicated):UPS, typically All electrical wiring in conduit • I V V V V V V V ✓ 12.0(1) Redundant communication paths • I I I V I V Electronically supervised security • V V ✓ V V V 12.0(2) wiring Redundant critical utility(power, • V V natural gas,etc.)connections DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-12 TABLE 4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water Treatment Plants System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders T c Applicable Sections Security Measure Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security p Elements i SCADA—Physical Security Locked PLC/RTU enclosure(s) I • I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ I ✓ I I 13.0 Tamper switch on enclosure(s) I I • I I ✓ ✓ ✓ V V V 12.1 All instrumentation wiring in conduit I • I V I V V V ✓ V V ✓ 12.0(1) Notes: Many of the security measures identified in this table may also provide deterrence. 6 Blast-resistant doors and glass are also bullet resistant. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 4-13 5.0 Finished Water Storage Facilities 5.1 Scope This section of the Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers water storage tanks and finished water reservoirs used within a potable water distribution system. It establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting a storage tank or reservoir(referred to as the facility in this section)from vandal,criminal,saboteur,and insider threats.The malevolent act of greatest concern is the intentional contamination of the drinking water with a toxic agent.A similar,related concern is contamination with a foreign substance that does not cause health effects,such as a dye,but does create a loss of confidence or even panic among the utility's customers. Other concerns include destruction or damage to the tank or reservoir and related appurtenances so that it cannot serve its intended purpose,or destruction or damage such that a rapid release of the stored water causes property damage and possibly harm to people living near the tank or reservoir. 5.2 Facility Mission (1) The mission of this facility is to store potable water for distribution to customers.Storage is needed to meet daily flow fluctuations,for fire fighting,and for emergencies.Three types of potable water storage are typically employed in the water industry: aboveground water storage tanks,elevated tanks,and covered reservoirs.Aboveground water storage tanks are constructed of concrete,steel,fiberglass reinforced plastic (FRP),or wood with the tank floor situated at grade (that is,it is not an elevated tank on columns).The diameter and height of this type of tank will vary depending on volume requirements. Elevated tanks are typically of steel construction with the tank itself perched on steel legs.The tank is accessible via a ladder or system of ladders. Covered finished water reservoirs may be slightly larger and are often constructed below grade but with access and vents at or above grade. (2) Usually, these facilities are not staffed, and operations and maintenance personnel visit the sites infrequently to perform maintenance activities or to respond to failure alarms.The tanks and reservoirs are often located in residential,park-like settings or in the midst of more densely populated urban areas where the public has access to the base of the tank. In other cases, the tanks are isolated from general public access. Potable water storage facilities at more remote locations within a distribution system may be provided with chemical facilities (chlorine and/or ammonia)to maintain chemical attributes of finished water as it progresses through the distribution system. Measures to address chemical facilities are presented in Section 4.0 (Water Treatment Plants) and are not included here. (3) AWWA Manual M-42, Steel Water-Storage Tanks, (1998)and D100-05:Welded Carbon Steel Tanks for Water Storage(2005b)provide additional information on the design and function of steel water storage tanks. Concrete tank standards and information are provided in AWWA's D110-04 (2004b),D115-95 (1995) and American Concrete Institute's (ACI)371R-98 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5-1 Guide for the Analysis, Design, and Construction of Concrete-Pedestal Water Towers. FRP tanks are covered in AWWA standard D120-02 (2002). 5.3 Philosophy of Security Approach (1) An effective security approach for water storage facilities includes equipment or systems to deter, detect, delay,and respond to a threat prior to achieving his/her objective or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat.The equipment and systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities of the DBT,which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition,equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. (2) DBTs considered in this section include vandals,criminals,saboteurs,and insiders. Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats— base and enhanced— upon which the benchmark security measures in this section are based,are presented in Table 1-1, Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that may preclude their implementation. (3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence, detection, and delay are provided in this section.Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities(AWWA 2004a) and are not addressed here. 5.4 Benchmark Security Measures (1) Table 5-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If the threat includes more than one DBT,for example,an enhanced criminal and a base insider,the security system should include the recommended security measures for both threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark (V)in the table.A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended.The security measures of Table 5-1 have been grouped into the following categories: • Perimeter • Site (area between perimeter and facilities) • Facility Structures • Closed-Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) • Closed-Circuit Television-Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZJ cameras) • Power and Wiring Systems • Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) -Physical Security DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5.2 (2)Security decisions are site and utility specific,and the measures identified in the table are good practice options to be considered,not rules to follow.Additionally,the measures presented in the table are for typical water storage facilities.Storage tanks with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or more robust security measures.Appendix A provides additional details on security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 5-1 where applicable). DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5.3 TABLE 5.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders Applicable c .2 Sections In ABase Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Appendix A, Security Measure m d Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level 0 m Physical Security p Elements Perimeter S Basic perimeter fencing or l • V 1.0,1.1,8.1 perimeter walls Enhanced climb/cut- • ✓ V ✓ ✓ V 1.2 resistant fencing Foundation • ✓ V 1.7 enhancements for fencing to prevent tunneling Bollards or vehicle barriers • ✓ 5.0 limiting vehicle access Intrusion detection at • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1.6,3.0,7.0,9.1, 9.2,11.0 perimeter Key-locked entrance gate • V V V V 2.1,10.2 Electronic access- • • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2.2,2.3,10.4 controlled entrance gate Perimeter site lighting • V ✓ V ✓ V V 7.0 Gate entrance lighting • V V ✓ ✓ 7.0(4),(5),(6) Hardened site openings • V V V V V V 1.1,13.2,14.3 larger than 96 sq.inches (62,000 sq.mm.)in area (e.g.,grates on vents) DECEMBER 2006 5-4 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES TABLE 5.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable a, o Sections in A Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Security Measure d a Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Appendix A, 0 c Physical Security Elements "No Trespassing"signage V V V ✓ ✓ ✓ 8.1 (every 50 feet[15 meters]) r Site(area between perimeter and facilities) Motion-activated lighting • I V V V V 7.0(9) Perimeter minimum clear • • V ✓ V V 3.0 zone distance Locate public or visitor • V parking as far away from facility as practical,but at least 30 feet(9 meters) away Second layer of basic • ✓ ✓ 1.0,1.1 fencing Enhanced second layer of • V 1.2 fencing that is climb/cut resistant Intrusion detection at • ✓ V V 3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, second layer of fencing 11.0 Foundation • V V 1.7 enhancements for second layer of fencing DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5-5 TABLE 5.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable La Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Sections in Security Measure d d Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Appendix A, 0 G Physical Security Elements Bollards or vehicle barriers • ✓ I ✓ ✓ around critical exterior equipment Bollards or vehicle barriers • 1 5.0 limiting vehicle access to area within second layer of fencing Electronic access- • • ✓ ✓ ✓ 2.2,2.3,10.4 controlled entrance gate for second fence Transformer(outdoor)— • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 locked protective barrier or cage Generator(outdoor)— • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 locked protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 center(outdoor)— locked protective cage Chemical storage and • ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3,17.0 feed equipment(outdoor) —locked access DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 68 TABLE 5.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System I Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable A Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Sections in Security Measure a d Appendix A, O Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level m Physical Security G Elements Chemical storage and • • V ✓ ✓ 13.3,17.0 feed equipment(outdoor) —locked access with intrusion detection Landscaping that does not • V V V V V V V V 1.6,3.0(3) obscure tank or other assets Manholes—locked with • V ✓ V security fastener Manholes—intrusion • • V V ✓ detection on lock Minimize exterior signage • V V V V indicating the presence or locations of assets 1 Facility Structures' Locking caps for valve • V ✓ ✓ V operator covers Valve vault hatches— • V 10.2,14.2 mechanically fastened or locked with shroud over lock DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5-7 TABLE 5-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders Applicable c oSections m Security Measure d d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Appendix A, m Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level physical Security p Elements Valve vault hatches— • V ✓ ✓ 10.2 double hatch doors with shrouded lock Valve vault hatches— • • V V 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, double layer doors with 11.0 shrouded lock and intrusion detection Tank hatch/manway— • V 10.2 mechanically fastened or locked with shroud over lock Tank hatch/manway— • V V V 10.2 double layer doors with shrouded lock Tank hatch/manway— • • V ✓ 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, double layer doors with 11.0 shrouded lock and intrusion detection Tank vent:gooseneck • V pipe type—double screen Tank vent:rectangular or • ✓ 10.2,14.1,14.3 circle(larger than pipe)— single layer shroud, locked DECEMBER 2006 5A GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES TABLE 5.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System I Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable >, .tu Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Sections in Security Measure , �; Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Appendix A, o o Physical Security Elements Tank vent:rectangular or • ✓ ✓ ✓ 10.2,14.1,14.3 circle(larger than pipe)— double layer with shrouded lock Tank vent:rectangular or • • V V 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, circle(larger than pipe)— 11.0,14.1,14.3 double layer with shrouded lock and intrusion alarm Overflow outlet:screen • V V V and/or flap valve with cage Overflow outlet for • • V V clearwell:screen and/or flap valve with cage and intrusion detection Intrusion detection on top • V V V 7.0,9.1,9.2,11.0 of tank or tank area Access ladder—locked • V V V V shroud Access ladder—locked • • V V ✓ 7.0,9.1,9.2,11.0 shroud with intrusion alarm DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5b TABLE 5.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders Applicable >, 4 Sections in wBase Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Security Measure y Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Appendix A, O d Physical Security 0 Elements Remote reservoir isolation • V V V by means of automated valve Protective grating or • V V V V screen to shield open basins from objects that are thrown from outside the fence Transformer—locked • V V V 13.1,13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator—locked • V V V V 13.1,13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control • V V V 13.3 center—locked protective cage Chemical fill lines at • ✓ V V V 17.0 building exterior—locked access Chemical fill lines at • • V V V building exterior—locked access with intrusion detection Chemical storage and • V V 13.1 feed equipment(indoor)— locked access DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5-10 TABLE 5-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable m .0 Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Sections in Security Measure w a, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Appendix A, G o Physical Security Elements Chemical storage and • • V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4, feed equipment(indoor)- 13.1 locked with intrusion detection r 1 Water Quality Monitoring Online water quality • V V V 15.0 monitoring I Closed Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) CCTV-All facility exterior • V V V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 doors CCTV-Hatches,vaults, I • V V V V I V 11.0,11.1,11.2 ladder guards J 1 I Closed Circuit Television-Surveillance(pan-tilt-zoom[PTZ]cameras) CCTV-Main gate • V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV-Main entrance • V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 door CCTV-Site surveillance • V V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV-Interior protected • V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 areas DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 5.11 TABLE 5-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Finished Water Storage Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders Applicable c .2 Sections in Security Measure e d Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Appendix A, O Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security D Elements Power and Wiring Systems All electrical panels locked I • ✓ V V V ✓ ✓ V 12.0 Backup power to security • • V V ✓ ✓ V ✓ 12.0(5) components(as indicated):UPS,typically All electrical wiring in I • V V V ✓ I V ✓ V V 12.0(1) conduit Redundant • V ✓ communication paths Electronically supervised • ✓ V ✓ ✓ ✓ V 12.0(2) security wiring Redundant critical utility • V V (power,natural gas,etc.) connections I SCADA-Physical Security Locked PLC/RTU • V ✓ V I V ✓ ✓ V 13.0 enclosure(s) Tamper switch on • V V ✓ ✓ V ✓ 12.1 enclosure(s) All instrumentation wiring • V V V ✓ V V V V 12.0(1) in conduit • Notes: Many of the security measures identified in this table may also provide deterrence. DECEMBER 2D06 5-12 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 6.0 Distribution Systems 6.1 Scope This section of the Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers the water distribution system component of municipal drinking water systems. It establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting a water distribution system from vandal,criminal,saboteur, and insider threats.Threats and malevolent acts of concern include damage or destruction of individual facilities or equipment,or introduction of a chemical or biological agent that contaminates the drinking water supply. 6.2 System Mission The mission of these systems is to distribute drinking water to the customers of the system. Water distribution systems may range up to many square miles (kilometers) in area.They include pipelines,isolation and control valves,hydrants,customer meters,backflow valves, air release valves,pressure-reducing valves, small chemical storage and injection facilities, and related items (Mays 2000). As the name suggests,these facilities are distributed throughout the community that is served by the water system and rarely have defined facility perimeters.Most pipelines and valves are buried and therefore,out of sight of the public.However,every customer has a direct connection to the system through their service line. Other sections of these guidelines cover finished water storage facilities,pumping stations,and chemical facilities (see Section 4.0 for chemical facilities). 6.3 Philosophy of Security Approach (1) An effective security approach for water distribution systems includes equipment or systems to deter,detect, delay,and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective,or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The equipment and systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities of the DBT,which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition, equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. (2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals,criminals,saboteurs,and insiders. Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats—base and enhanced—upon which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based,are presented in Table 1-1,Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that may preclude their implementation. (3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence,detection, and delay are provided in this guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation,including hydraulic isolation of DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 6-1 potentially contaminated sections of the distribution system,are presented in the Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities(AWWA 2004a)and are not addressed here. (4) Because distribution systems are so expansive and include so many assets,utilities may need to conduct evaluations that are in addition to their VAs to identify the most critical facilities and locations within their distribution systems.These evaluations may include extended period simulation hydraulic modeling to determine the potential water quality impacts of a contamination event and where to focus security measures to minimize risk. (5)As of the publication of this document,research was ongoing with respect to developing online contaminant monitoring instruments. As these instruments are improved,they will become a more integral part of physical security systems for distribution systems. Refer to the Interim Voluntary Guidelines for Designing an Online Contaminant Monitoring System (ASCE 2004)and to regular updates on the EPA web site for information on the topic of online contaminant monitoring. 6.4 Benchmark Security Measures (1) Table 6-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If the threat includes more than one DBT,for example an enhanced criminal and a base insider,the security system should include the recommended security measures for both threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark (V). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended. The security measures of Table 6-1 have been grouped into the following categories: • System Structures • Water Quality Monitoring • Power and Wiring Systems • Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) -Physical Security (2)Security decisions are site and utility specific,and the measures identified in the table are good practice options to be considered,not rules to follow. Additionally,the measures presented in the table are for typical distribution systems. Facilities with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or more robust security measures. Appendix A provides additional details on security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 6-1 where applicable). (3) Distribution systems present challenges in developing adequate detection and delay approaches,as many facilities are not constructed with defined perimeters or site areas and are frequently accessible to the public. Based on the results of the VA and subsequent evaluations described in the previous sections,utilities may elect to apply these security measures on a subset of their assets in the most critical locations.For example,the recommendations for valves may be applied to only the most critical valves,rather than every valve in the distribution system. Additional information on distribution system security can be found in Murphy et al. (2005). DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 6-2 TABLE 6-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Distribution Systems System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c g Applicable Sections Security Measure Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, 0 d Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level c Physical Security Elements I System Structures Bollards or vehicle bafflers around V V ✓ ( V • critical exposed equipment Locking caps for valve operator • V V V V covers Valve vault hatches—mechanically • V 10.2,14.2 fastened or locked with shroud over lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • V V V 10.2 doors with shrouded lock Valve vault hatches—double hatch • • V ✓ 7.0,9.1,9.2,10.2, doors with shrouded lock and 11.0 intrusion detection Provide locking devices for • V V V contractor's temporary connections Use uni-directional customer • V ✓ meters to reduce backflow potential Exposed pipelines:provide fence • V V . barrier to limit access to appurtenances DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 63 TABLE 6-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Distribution Systems System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders Applicable Sections Security Measurem a Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o C Elements Exposed pipelines:provide fence • • V barrier to limit access to appurtenances and include detection Locking covers for control, • V V V V pressure-reducing,air-relief,and other valves Locking covers with detection for • • ✓ V V control,pressure-reducing,air- relief,and other valves Locking cover for sampling stations • ✓ I I V V Locking cover with detection for • • V sampling stations Hydrants:provide locking • V ✓ mechanisms Backflow prevention valves or • V tamper switches installed on connections to multi-family residential connections and commercial facilities(e.g.,motels) Backflow valves to limit potential • V ✓ for reverse flow at interconnections to neighboring water systems, wholesale customers,or customer connections to industrial facilities DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 6-0 TABLE 6-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Distribution Systems System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c > 4 Security Measure Applicable Sections to Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, w d Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security Q Elements Water Quality Monitoring Online water quality monitoring • V ✓ V V 15.0 i Power and Wiring Systems i All electrical panels locked • I I ✓ I V ✓ ✓ V V V 12.0 Backup power to security • • V V ✓ V V V 12.0(5) components(as indicated):UPS, typically All electrical wiring in conduit • I I V V V V V V V V 12.0(1) Redundant communication paths I • I I I I I I I V I I V Electronically supervised security I • ✓ V V V V V 12.0(2) wiring Redundant critical utility(power, I • V V natural gas,etc.)connections SCADA-Physical Security Locked PLC/RTU enclosure(s) I L I I V V V I V V V V I I 13.0 Tamper switch on enclosure(s) I I • I I V I ✓ I V V I V ✓ I 12.1 All instrumentation wiring in conduit I • I I V V V I V V V V V I 12.0(1) Notes: a Many of the security measures identified in this table may also provide deterrence. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 6-5 7.0 Water System Support Facilities 7.1 Scope This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use presents guidelines for security for support facilities that are part of municipal drinking water systems. It establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting water support facilities from vandal,criminal,saboteur,and insider threats.Threats and malevolent acts of concern include damage or destruction of individual facilities. 7.2 Facility Mission Water system support facilities include administrative buildings,maintenance yards,sites for material and vehicle storage,and laboratories. The common element linking these facilities is that they may not be in direct contact with the drinking water. If a facility such as a laboratory or storage yard is located at the water treatment plant,then the security guideline for water treatment plants should be referenced.This guideline applies to those facilities that are not located at a water treatment plant, or water pumping station,or intake facility,or otherwise in direct contact with the potable water. Because support facilities may be located apart from the water flow,they have a low risk for being avenues of intentional contamination of the water supply. Support facilities may also have the following common factors that are often different from other water system facilities: • Large number of people entering and leaving the facility,including the public • High vehicle traffic • Fuel tanks to supply utility fleet • May provide storage for utility vehicles,which as moving assets,present unique challenges • In the case of laboratories,may house chemicals or even pathogens that are used in tests • May be symbolic of the utility's image,such as a headquarters facility • May be combined with other government facilities, such as an administrative facility within the city hall or a maintenance yard combined with other city maintenance functions The assets in a support facility may include maps,Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)/controls,reports,cash,business systems,heavy and mobile equipment,laboratory equipment and chemicals,and tools. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7-1 7.3 Philosophy of Security Approach (1)An effective security approach for water support facilities includes equipment or systems to deter, detect, delay, and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective, or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat.The equipment and systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities of the DBT,which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition,equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. (2)DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals,criminals,saboteurs,and insiders. Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats—base and enhanced—upon which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based,are presented in Table 1-1,Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix.Threats with capabilities less than or greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that may preclude their implementation. (3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence,detection,and delay are provided in this guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities (AWWA 2004a)and are not addressed here. 7.4 Benchmark Security Measures (1)Table 7-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If the threat includes more than one DBT,for example an enhanced criminal and a base insider,the security system should include the recommended security measures for both threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark (✓). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended. The security measures of Table 7-1 have been grouped into the following categories: • Perimeter • Site (area between perimeter and facilities) • Facility Structures • Closed-Circuit Television-Alarm Assessment(fixed cameras) • Closed-Circuit Television -Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras) • Power and Wiring Systems • SCADA -Physical Security DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7-2 (2)Security decisions are site and utility specific,and the measures identified in the table are good practice options to be considered,not rules to follow.Additionally,the measures presented in the table are for typical water support facilities.Facilities with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or more robust security measures.Appendix A provides additional details on security measures(specific sections are referenced in Table 7-1 where applicable). (3)Special considerations should be provided for security of extremely critical assets or facilities such as SCADA,security equipment,and network computer servers,hubs and related systems,and dangerous chemicals and pathogens located in analytical laboratories. DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7-3 TABLE 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure d g Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, G Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security m 0 Elements IPerimeter Basic perimeter fencing or • ✓ I 1.0,1.1,8.1 perimeter walls Enhanced climb/cut-resistant • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1.2,1.4,1.5 fencing or walls Foundation enhancements for • ✓ ✓ 1.7 fencing to prevent tunneling Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • ✓ 5.0 vehicle access Intrusion detection at perimeter • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1.6,3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, 11.0 Minimize vehicle access points • • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ and/or number of entrance gates Key-locked entrance gate • ✓ I ✓ ✓ ✓ 2.1,10.2 Electronic access-controlled • • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2.2,2.3,10.3,10.4, entrance gate 10.5 Intercom and remotely controlled • • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2.2,2.3 electronic gate lock for visitors Vehicle sally port gate entrance for • • ✓ ✓ ✓ 4.0 delivery vehicles Guardhouse and manned entrance • • 1 gate to control site access DECEMBER 20W GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7-4 TABLE 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders o Applicable Sections Security Measure d a Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security m 0 Elements Perimeter site lighting • V V V V V V 7.0 Gate entrance lighting I • I I ✓ I I V V V 7.0(4),(5),(6) Hardened site openings larger than • V V V V V V 1.1,13.2,14.3 96 square inches(62,000 square millimeters)in area(e.g.,grates on culverts) Separate visitor vehicular sign-in • • V checkpoint "No Trespassing"signage(every ✓ V V V V V 8.1 50 feet[15 meters]) 1 Site(area between perimeter and facilities). - Motion-activated lighting • ✓ V V V I I 7.0(9) Perimeter minimum clear zone • • V V V V 3.0 distance Public or visitor parking located as • V far away from the facility as practical,but at least 30 feet (9 meters)away Eliminate parking underneath • V facilities Second layer of basic fencing • I I I I V I I V 1.0,1.1 DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7-5 TABLE 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections Security Measure Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security GElements Enhanced second layer of fencing • ✓ 1.2 that is climb/cut resistant Intrusion detection at second layer • I ✓ ✓ 1.6,3.0,7.0,9.1,9.2, of fencing 11.0 Foundation enhancements for • ✓ ✓ 1.7 second layer of fencing Bollards or vehicle barriers around • I ✓ ✓ ✓ critical exterior equipment Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting • ✓ 5.0 vehicle access to area within second layer of fencing Electronic access-controlled • • ✓ ✓ ✓ 2.2,2.3,10.4 entrance gate for second fence Transformer(outdoor)—locked • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(outdoor)—locked • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3 (outdoor)—locked protective cage Chemical storage and feed • ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13.3,17.0 equipment(outdoor)—locked access DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7'6 TABLE 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, G Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security d p Elements Chemical storage and feed • • V V V equipment(outdoor)—locked access with intrusion detection Fuel storage tanks—locate at least • V ✓ 100 feet(30 meters)from all buildings and away from perimeter fence lines Landscaping that does not obscure • V V V V V V V V 1.6,3.0(3) building or other assets Minimize exterior signage • V V V V indicating the presence or locations of assets s Facility Structures Industrial-type,tamper-resistant • V V ✓ V V door hinges Key-locked entrance door • ✓ I V V Exterior doors with status switch I • ✓ V ✓ V V V 9.4,13.2 contact alarmed to security Electronic access-controlled • • V V V V V entrance door Automatic locking critical interior • • V V V V V 10.1,10.3,10.4 doors with access control DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7-7 TABLE 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objectives Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders 1 c > B Applicable Sections Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Security Measure o -3 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security Q Elements Double entry system or secured • • ✓ lobby entry(mantrap) Visitor waiting area • • I V ✓ Provide dedicated meeting room • V V located outside secured interior for meetings with visitors or vendors Design building circulation to • V V ✓ provide unobstructed views of people approaching controlled areas or critical assets Blast-resistant exterior doors' • I I I I V Bollards or vehicle barriers • V V 5.0 protecting vehicle and personnel doors Break-resistant glass • I I V I V ✓ I ✓ I V Blast-resistant windowsb • I I I I I V Glass-break detection at windows • I V V V ✓ 9.3.1 Interior motion detection • I V V I V V 9.3 Windows located away from doors • ✓ V V V V V so that intruders cannot unlock the doors through the windows DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7$ TABLE 7.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objective' Vandals I Criminals Saboteurs Insiders fI c 3 Applicable Sections Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, Security Measure y 0 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security d 0 Elements Grilles or other barriers at skylights • V V V 13.3 and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Grilles or other barriers with • • V V V 14.1 intrusion detection at skylights and louvers over 96 sq.in. (62,000 sq.mm) Locked roof hatches I • I I V V I V V V Locked roof hatches with intrusion • • V V ✓ alarm Roof access ladder with locked • V V V V V shroud Roof access ladder with locked • • V V V shroud and intrusion alarm Transformer(indoor)—locked • V ✓ ✓ 13.3 protective barrier or cage Generator(indoor)—locked • ✓ V V V 13.3 protective barrier or cage Switchgear/motor control center • V V V 13.3 (indoor)—locked protective cage Chemical fill lines at building • I • ✓ V ✓ V exterior—locked access DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 73 TABLE 7.1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c a 3 Applicable Sections Security Measure w Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, C Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security o Elements Chemical fill lines at building • • ✓ ✓ ✓ exterior—locked access with intrusion detection Chemical storage(indoor)—locked • V ✓ 13.1 access Chemical storage(indoor)—locked • I • V ✓ V V 10.1,10.3,10.4,13.1 with intrusion detection Closed Circuit Television—Alarm Assessment(fixe. �, CCTV—All facility exterior doors I • I I V V I Vlilt V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Hatches,vaults I • I I 1 I I ✓ V ✓ ✓ 11.0,11.1,11.2 EClosed Circuit Television—Surveillance(Pan-tilt-z [ TZ]cameras = CCTV—Main gate I • I I I I V V V ✓ 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Main entrance door I • I I I I I V V V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Site surveillance I • I I I I V V ✓ V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 CCTV—Interior protected areas I • I I I I I V ✓ V V 11.0,11.1,11.2 DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 10 TABLE 7-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Water System Support Facilities System Objective' Vandals Criminals Saboteurs Insiders c Applicable Sections 0 Security Measure a/ Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced in Appendix A, 0 Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Physical Security d 0 Elements 1 Power and Wiring Systems All electrical panels locked • ✓ V V V V V V 12.0 Backup power to security • • V V V V V V 12.0(5) components(as indicated):UPS, typically All electrical wiring in conduit • I V V V V V V V V 12.0(1) Redundant communication paths • I I V V Electronically supervised security • V V V V V V 12.0(2) wiring Redundant critical utility(power, • V V natural gas,etc.)connections Incoming site utilities—harden • V power,gas,water,waste and their facility entry points SCADA—Physical Security Locked PLC/RTU enclosure(s) • V V V V V V V 13.0 Tamper switch on enclosure(s) I • I V V V V I V V 12.1 All instrumentation wiring in conduit • V V V V V V V V 12.0(1) Notes: 'Many of the security measures identified in this table may also provide deterrence. b Blast-resistant doors and glass are also bullet resistant. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 7.11 APPENDIX A Physical Security Elements The design of any security measure must always take safety and maintenance considerations into account. These guidelines apply only to assets that are within the control of the utility.For critical assets that are not owned by the utility,the utility needs to coordinate protection of the assets with the owning parties. 1.0 Fencing and Perimeter Walls (1)The primary goals of fencing and perimeter walls are to establish a legal demarcation by defining the perimeter boundaries of a facility,to present a barrier that causes an intruder to make an overt action to penetrate that demonstrates intent,and to create a delay barrier against unauthorized access. (2)Secondary goals may include screening the facility against visual observation, establishing a clear zone enhancing lighting and surveillance,and providing a means to install intrusion detection sensors. 1.1 Chain-Link Fencing (1)For terms related to chain-link fencing systems,refer to American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)F552,"Standard Terminology Relating to Chain Link Fencing" (ASTM 2O05d). For detailed specifications and design information related to chain-link fencing and posts,refer to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10,"Design Guidelines for Fencing, Gates,Barriers,and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b) and Federal Specification RR-F- 191/2D,"Fencing,Wire and Post, Metal (Chain-Link Fence Gates) (Detail Specification)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center 199Oa). Both documents have been approved for public release and are available online. Aluminum fabric,poles,or accessories are not recommended for security applications. (2) Base-level fence guideline is galvanized steel chain-link fence post with a 6-foot(1.8- meter [m]) or greater fabric height. Enhanced-level fence guideline is galvanized steel chain- link fence post with an 8-foot(2.4-m)or greater fabric height. (3)Fence fabric should be one piece and should be coated with zinc or polyvinyl chloride (PVC). PVC over zinc-coated steel is recommended in harsh,corrosive environments. (4)Base-level fabric wire gauge should be a minimum standard wire gauge of No. 9 and mesh pattern of 2-inch(50-millimeter [mm]) diamond mesh or smaller. (5)Enhanced-level chain-link fencing should comply with the requirements for the base- level guideline chain-link fencing,except use No. 6 or No. 8 gauge fencing fabric in place of No. 9 gauge and select mesh patterns less than 2-inches (50 mm) across. DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-1 (6) Post strength and stiffness for base-level and enhanced-level chain-link fences should meet ASTM F1043,"Standard Specification for Strength and Protective Coatings on Steel Industrial Chain Link Fence Framework," Group 1A requirements (ASTM 2005c) for heavy industrial fences. Follow manufacturer's standard with allowance for minimum embedment below finished grade. (7) The average dimension between line posts for chain link fences is recommended to be no more than 10 feet(3 m)when measured center-to-center between posts and parallel to the fence grade (ASIS 2004,Chapter 3 -Chain Link Fencing). For additional guidance on installing chain-link fencing,refer to RR-F-191K/GEN,"Fencing,Wire,and Post Metal(and Gates,Chain-Link Fence Fabric,and Accessories) (General Specification)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center 1990b);ASTM F567,"Standard Practice for Installation of Chain-Link Fence" (ASTM 2005e);and Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10, "Design Guidelines for Fencing,Gates,Barriers,and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b)for guidelines on connection of fencing mesh to posts for security applications. (8)The ASIS"Protection of Assets" manual (ASIS 2004) further identifies that post hole depth be a minimum of 24 inches(610 mm),plus an additional 3 inches (76 mm) for each 1- foot(0.3-m)increase in fence height over 4 feet(1.2 m),such that an 8-foot(2.4-m)fence requires 36-inch(910-mm) depth for post holes.The hole should be backfilled with concrete ]into the excavation hole(2500 pounds per square inch [psi] [17,000 kilopascals])and the concrete extended 2 inches (50 mm)above grade,with a crowned surface to shed water. (9) Where fences cross a stream,culvert,swale,depression or other openings that fencing does not enclose,where opening size is 96 square inches (62,000 square mm) or larger, these openings should be protected by additional grilles,fencing,or other barriers against penetration. Refer to 13.3 of this Appendix and to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10, "Design Guidelines for Fencing,Gates,Barriers,and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b)for recommendations and construction of grilles. 1.2 Anti-Climb/Anti-Cut Fencing (1) If the design basis threat(DBT)warrants, a specialized anti-climb/anti-cut fence such as wire-panel mesh fencing should be considered. (2) Wire-panel mesh fabric wire gauge should be a minimum of No. 8 wire gauge. (3) Wire-panel mesh pattern should be non-climbable,with 0.5-inch by 3-inch(13-mm by 76-mm)mesh pattern,welded at each intersection. (4) Fabric wire should conform to ASTM A853-04, "Standard Specification for Steel Wire, Carbon, for General Use," Grade AISI 1006 as specified by the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) (ASTM 2005b).After welding,the fabric is hot-dipped and galvanized with a zinc coating followed by a polyvinyl chloride (PVC)coating. 1.3 Ornamental Fencing (1)Site conditions and local codes may dictate the use of aesthetically pleasing fence materials. In such cases,ornamental fences of steel,aluminum or wrought iron should be considered. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-2 (2)As an example of aluminum fencing meeting the requirements,base-level ornamental fence should be a picket fence,8-foot(2.4-m) picket height or greater,constructed of HS-35 aluminum alloy. Nominal picket spacing should be 5 inches (130 mm)on center or less. Pickets may include spiked tops, depending on the DBT. (3)Suggested minimum sizes for fence pickets are 1-inch(25-mm) square by 0.062-inch (1.6-mm)thick,while suggested minimum fence rail dimensions are 1.625-inch(41-mm)by 0.070-inch(1.8-mm) thick top walls,and 1.625-inch(41-mm)by 0.100-inch(2.54-mm)thick side walls. (4) Line posts for aluminum ornamental fences should be constructed of HS-35 aluminum alloy,with suggested dimensions of 2.5-inch(64-mm)square by 0.075-inch(1.9-mm) thick. Follow manufacturer's standard with allowance for minimum embedment below finished grade. (5)Gate posts for aluminum ornamental fences should be constructed of HS-35 aluminum alloy of minimum dimensions 6-inches (150-mm)square by 0.125-inch(3.2-mm) thick. Follow manufacturer's standard with allowance for minimum embedment below finished grade. (6)Fencing should have a powder-coated finish or other appropriate protective finish. 1.4 Perimeter Wall (1)The need for solid perimeter walls, such as concrete masonry walls,may be dictated by the DBT,hardening needs,aesthetics,or the desire to fully screen a facility or asset from outside view.In those instances where hardening and aesthetics are both objectives, hardened(or crash-resistant)ornamental fencing is available. (2) Base-level concrete masonry unit(CMU)wall height should be 6-feet(1.8-m)high or greater. Enhanced-level CMU wall height should be 8-feet(2.4-m)high or greater.Wall thickness should be 8 inches (200 mm) as a suggested minimum with additional thickness as required to meet hardening designs. (3) Immediate wall columns should be spaced per design criteria and site conditions. (4) Corner columns should be positioned where directional changes in wall alignment occur. (5)Wall foundation and reinforcement should be provided per local design criteria and geotechnical conditions. 1.5 Fencing Topping (1) Fence topping may include barbed-wire topping or concertina barbed-wire tape topping, or a combination of both. (2) For base-level barbed-wire topping guideline,attach a three-strand of barbed wire, conforming to ASTM A176, "Standard Specification for Stainless and Heat-Resisting Chromium Steel Plate,Sheet,and Strip" (ASTM 2004b) and ASTM A 666,"Standard Specification for Annealed or Cold-Worked Austenitic Stainless Steel Sheet,Strip,Plate,and Flat Bar" (ASTM 2005a) to a 2-foot(0.6-m)high single outrigger;for enhanced-level climb resistance,use double Y-style outriggers with 3-strand barbed wire. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-3 (3)For concertina-wire topping,attach 12-gauge stainless steel wires to 2-foot(0.6 m)high double Y-style outriggers.Concertina wire should conform to ASTM F1910, "Standard Specification for Long Barbed Tape Obstacles" (ASTM 2003),and should be 24-inch to 30- inch(610 to 760 mm) diameter double coil concertina type. Each concertina loop should consist of 43 +/-2 clusters of needle-sharp barbs on 4-inch(100-mm) centers,each barb measuring a minimum of 1.2 inches(30 mm)in length. (4) Refer to ASTM A121,"Standard Specification For Metallic-Coated Carbon Steel Barbed Wire" (ASTM 2004a)and Federal Specification RR-F-191/4D,"Fencing,Wire,and Post, Metal (Chain-Link Fence Accessories)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center 1990c)for installation guidance. (5)Ornamental fencing with angled"pikes" can be provided as a fence topping to discourage or prevent access to a facility by climbing. 1.6 Perimeter Line (1) Periodic treatment of the perimeter line is recommended to prevent vegetation growth. (2) Provide a 1-foot(0.3-m) wide vegetation-free zone with fence or wall placed in center of zone,using 2-inch(50-mm) thick layer of 0.375-inch to 0.75-inch(10-mm to 19-mm) aggregates,and treat with herbicide. 1.7 Fence Foundation Enhancements (1)To prevent stretching of the fence fabric to allow an adversary to move under the fence, it may be appropriate to anchor the bottom fabric of the fence to create similar delay to that of fencing.For anchorage of fabric, the bottom fence fabric should be secured to a bottom rail and securely anchored at the midpoint between the fence posts along the fence line. For the base-level guideline, the bottom rail may be anchored to an eyebolt embedded in a "deadman" anchor,a concrete cube 3 feet by 3 feet(0.9 m by 0.9 m) as described in Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10,"Design Guidelines for Fencing,Gates,Barriers,and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b); the deadman should be buried in the soil below the fence rail. As an alternative,12-inch(300 mm) deep rows of metal bars or pickets may be embedded at 12- inch (300 mm)intervals along the base of the fencing. (2) For the enhanced-level guideline to prevent tunneling under fences,provide a continuous concrete curb at base of fence 8-inches (200-mm)wide by 24-inches (610-mm) deep. The maximum clearance between the bottom rail and the top of the grade strip should be no more than 2 inches(50 mm)maximum clearance with the bottom rail of fencing secured to the concrete strip at the mid-point between the posts and at intervals of 10 feet(3 m) or less. 2.0 Gates Personnel gates should be of similar construction guidelines as fences,or stronger,while vehicle gates will need additional strength due to the weight of the gate assembly,and to prevent vehicle incursion,if dictated by the DBT.Where the DBT justifies additional layered security,hardened (or crash resistant) gates are available. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-4 2.1 Chain-Link Gates (1)For detail specifications on chain-link gates,refer to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK- 1013/1A, "Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Facilities,"Table 6-Common Chain Link Fence Materials (NFESC 1993a),and Federal Specification RR-F-191/2D,"Fencing, Wire and Post,Metal (Chain-Link Fence Gates)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center 1990a). (2) Entry gates using perimeter fence double swing gates should have maximum 2.5-inch (64-mm) clearance between bottom rail and finished grade. (3)Entry gates should have reinforced steel latch with hardened steel padlock protection. (4) Posts for swing gates with fabric height up to 8 feet(2.4 m)should have nominal minimum dimensions of 2.875-inches (73-mm)outside diameter(OD) to 8.625-inches (219-mm)OD, depending upon the gate leaf width. (5) Posts for swing gates with fabric height of 9 to 10 feet(2.7 to 3 m)should have nominal minimum dimensions of 3.5-inches (89 mm)OD to 8.625-inches (219 mm) OD,depending upon the gate leaf width. 2.2 Electronic Gate Opening (1) Electrical gate operators should be Underwriters Laboratory (UL)-listed,heavy-duty, high-frequency electrical models designed to open and close sliding or other types of gates as selected for specific applications.Gates should have maximum 2.5-inch(64 mm) clearance between bottom tension bar and finished grade. (2) Electrical motors should be sized appropriately for gate size, duty rating,and frequency of operation. Provide industrial-quality motor overload protection with manual reset.Gate operators and other electrical appurtenances should be positioned within the fenced perimeter to avoid vandalism and tampering. (3) Recommended gate travel speed is a minimum 1 foot(0.3 m)per second. Speed adjusting feature that provides range of appropriate speeds for slide gate operation is recommended. (4)Provide positive limit switches that sense position of gate and provide control to prevent damage to gate operator. (5) Provide manual operation feature or disconnect for operation during power failure, malfunction,or emergency.The manual gate operator should be secured inside a locked weather resistant cabinet,with an attached key box as required. Gate operators should be located so they cannot be reached or tampered with from outside the fence.A variety of types of manual and automatic gate operators,from simple push-button type operators to complex electronic operating systems as well as associated hardware and safety devices,are available from gate manufacturers.Gate storage,housing for operators,and site-specific operating systems,warning devices,or signage should also be considered to ensure safe operation when authorized. (6) Component parts of gate operator,including attachments, should be constructed with materials or plated,coated,or finished as necessary to provide reliable service in an all- weather environment. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-5 2.3 Electronic Gate Control System (1)Pushbutton or card-reading sensor in weatherproof enclosure should be mounted on steel tube post or concrete bollard anchored to concrete foundation outside gate as required. (2) Consider providing loop,beam,or other vehicle detectors a minimum of 4 feet(1.2 m) away from each side of gate for safety. (3) Communication interface should enable remote monitoring of gate position from central location, such as central security office. (4)Suggested operation sequence: (a) Entry: Gate opens when activated by valid card presented to card-reading sensor. Gate closes after sensing loop/ sensing beam has determined that vehicle has passed through gate. (b) Exit: Gate opens when activated by detector loop in pavement or push button inside gate. Gate closes as for entry. (5) Other options for automated gate access control systems include radio controlled,remote operated (from control room or operations centers), guard operated,key switched,and others. Each type will have specific features to consider with respect to the overall access control system. 3.0 Site Areas 3.1 Clear Zones (1) The purpose of a clear zone is such that intrusion detection surveillance and assessment using visual observation or cameras can be applied and to provide an unobstructed area in which placed devices can be readily observed/detected.Clear zone regions are typically established: (a) On both sides of a perimeter security fence to allow unobstructed surveillance of the fence area (b) Between a perimeter fence and structures,buildings, or other critical assets enclosed within the fence to maintain a clear area for detection of intruders or placed devices (c) Around the perimeter of a building to prevent areas of concealment of intruders or placed devices. For additional information regarding clear zones, see "Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings," Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC)4-010-01 (DoD 2002). (2) Effective clear zone distances should be in accordance with the DBT,but a suggested minimum distance is 20 feet(6 m)or more between the outer perimeter fence and interior structures per UFC 4-010-01 (DoD 2002). DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-6 (3)Within the clear zone,prune or trim vegetation to a height of 4 inches (100 mm) or less, and remove large obstacles or rocks that can shield intruders from view. Avoid locating equipment within clear zones or with spaces below in which devices can be readily concealed. 3.2 Site Utilities (1)Wherever possible,incoming site utilities need to be protected from accidental or deliberate damage that might affect operations. It is recommended that the core site utility connections entering the site and facility be hardened. Hardening techniques may include burying,protecting within conduit,security cages or grilles or by adding redundant service feeds.The following utilities should be examined and protected to the extent possible: (a)Electrical Power (b)Natural Gas (c) Incoming Water (d)Wastewater (e)Fire Water Main(s) (2) Exposed pipelines should be protected,where possible,using fence barriers to limit access. (3) Alternatively,exposed pipelines could be run within carrier pipes to enable double-wall protection. (4) Redundant utility connection sources should be provided if available. Dual electrical that feeds off separate circuits or incoming water supply from different source mains should be utilized where available. (5)Electrical lines should be placed underground where applicable. 4.0 Facility Entrances 4.1 Sallyport Entrances (1) A sallyport is a combination of electrically operated gates or portals that are interlocked to prevent more than one gate from opening at a time.The sallyport provides a means for secured,controlled entry through the fence perimeter of the facility. Entry processing, paperwork review,and driver/load identification or verification occur within the sallyport. Sallyports may also be used to enable searching the interior and undercarriage of vehicles for explosives. (2)Typical vehicle sallyport dimensions are in the range of 75-feet(23-m) long by 20-feet(6- m)wide (and should be sized to accommodate the largest delivery vehicle),enclosed by fenced sides of height,construction,and configuration consistent with the site perimeter fencing. Vehicle gates should be consistent with the gate guidelines provided in Section 2.0, Gates,of this Appendix. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-7 (3)Sallyport gates should be equipped with an interlocking system to ensure that the inner and outer gates are not capable of being opened at the same time. (4)Gate controls should be located in an area so that the person operating the controls maintains a constant visual observation of the sallyport area. The controls should be protected and covered so that non-authorized use is eliminated. (5)A keyed manual override switch should be provided that allows the gates to be opened simultaneously. However, this override switch must be protected and covered such that the possibility of accidental operation is eliminated. 4.2 Building Entrances (1) Building entrances should provide a space for screening visitors.The area should provide enough space for visitors to wait, queue, and be logged in prior to entering the interior secure spaces. If frequent visitor entry is anticipated,anti-vandal furniture may be provided within the visitor waiting area. (2)Visitor management software can facilitate the log in and registration of incoming visitors.Some systems permit pre-registration prior to entry and notification upon visitor arrival. (3) If the DBT warrants,x-ray screening of incoming personnel and visitors may be considered. Additionally,explosive screening may be considered for incoming mail and packages. 5.0 Bollards and Other Vehicle Barriers (1) Bollards,jersey barriers,decorative planters, or other vehicle barriers,where applied, should be capable of stopping a 4,000-pound (1,800 kilogram [kg])vehicle traveling at 30 miles per hour(48 kilometers per hour)within 3 feet(0.9 m) or less. (2) Refer to Department of Defense Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/14,"Selection and Application of Vehicle Barriers," (NFESC 1999)for detailed descriptions,attributes, and stopping capabilities of several barrier types.This document has been approved for public release and is available online. 6.0 Exterior Surfaces (1) At surfaces subject to vandalism,incorporate glazed concrete masonry units,glazed ceramic tiles,or fiberglass coatings to resist vandalism attempts. (2) Apply non-stick,non-mark,polyurethane-based paints and coatings for external surfaces subject to vandalism. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-8 7.0 Outdoor Security Lighting (1) Depending on the DBT and local site environment,the amount of recommended illumination may vary. Consult with local code officials for additional restrictions that may apply to lighting levels. (2) In addition to the suggested illumination levels provided below,refer to the Illumination Engineering Society of North America (IESNA)handbook, "Guideline on Security Lighting for People,Property,and Public Spaces-G-1-03" (IESNA 2003). (3) General perimeter roadways and parking areas should be illuminated to 1 to 2 horizontal foot-candles (11 to 22lumens/square meter [lux]) on average. (4) Vehicle gate areas should be illuminated to 3 to 5 foot-candles (32 to 54 luces),average, measured horizontally. If this area will receive CCTV camera coverage,a recommendation is that the illumination levels be 5 to 10 foot-candles (54 to 108 luces),measured vertically at the subject height. (a)Horizontal illumination measures the lighting at a horizontal surface or plane, such as the ground surface. (b)Vertical illumination measures the illumination received on a vertical plane,such as a person's face or license plate of a vehicle. (5) If a gatehouse or sallyport entrance is used,an illumination level of 10 to 30 vertical foot- candles (110 to 320 luces)is the goal. (6) Building exterior door areas should be illuminated to 3 to 5 horizontal foot-candles (32 to 54 luces), on average,for a radius of 15 feet(4.5 m)beyond the exterior door. (7) General outdoor areas should be illuminated to 0.5 horizontal foot-candles (5 luces), average. (8) Provide a minimum light-to-dark illumination ratio of maximum 6:1,preferably 4:1. Preferably,a lighting engineering study should be performed using point-by-point lighting calculations with a point spacing not more than 25 feet(7.6 m) on center. (9) Where applicable,incorporate motion-activated lighting to provide instant-on lighting upon motion-alarm activation.Such a system will raise the illumination from 0.5 foot- candles (5 luces)to 2 to 3 foot-candles (22 to 32 luces). If motion-activated lighting is included,make sure that lamp re-strike time is quick enough to support instant-on activation. (10)When CCTV cameras are used,these additional lighting considerations should be taken (ASIS 2004,Chapter 19-Security and Protective Lighting): (a) Color Rendering Index:Choose an appropriate lamp that has accurate color reproduction. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-9 (b)Reflectance of Materials: Consider the material that will be illuminated,and its ability to reflect and transmit light. (c) Direction of Reflected Lighting: Identify whether reflected lighting will assist or interfere with camera operation. 8.0 Signage 8.1 Fence Signage (1)Post"No Trespassing" signs at 50-foot(15 m)intervals in multiple languages as consistent with local population. From a general legal standpoint,the fence and signage establishes a boundary that intruders must cross for violation. (2) Include appropriate federal, state and local laws prohibiting trespassing. For example, U.S.Code Title 42,Section 300i-1,titled,"Tampering with public water systems," states the following(42 U.S.C. §300(i)(1)): a)Tampering-Any person who tampers with a public water system shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years,or fined in accordance with title 18 <"Crimes and Criminal Procedure">,or both. b)Attempt or threat-Any person who attempts to tamper,or makes a threat to tamper,with a public drinking water system be imprisoned for not more than 10 years,or fined in accordance with title 18, or both. c)Civil penalty-The Administrator may bring a civil action in the appropriate United States district court(as determined under the provisions of title 28 <"Judiciary and Judicial Procedure">) against any person who tampers,attempts to tamper,or makes a threat to tamper with a public water system.The court may impose on such person a civil penalty of not more than$1,000,000 for such tampering or not more than$100,000 for such attempt or threat. d) "Tamper" defined-For purposes of this section,the term"tamper" means- (1) to introduce a contaminant into a public water system with the intention of harming persons;or (2) to otherwise interfere with the operation of a public water system with the intention of harming persons. 8.2 Primary Site Entrance Signage At the primary entrance to the site,post the address of the site so that first responder crews (such as police and fire departments)can confirm the address location. 8.3 Water Line Delineation At lake or river intakes,provide buoys or float lines with appropriate signage to delineate no-entry zones. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-10 9.0 Electronic Security Systems 9.1 Intrusion Detection Sensors—General (1)The intrusion detection system should be capable of detecting an individual(weighing 75 pounds (34 kg) or more)crossing the detection zone walking,crawling,jumping, running,or rolling (at speeds between 0.5 and 15 feet(0.2 and 4.6 m)per second),or climbing the fence,if applicable. (2)Perimeter intrusion detection should provide average false alarm rates of not more than one false alarm per week,per sensor,while maintaining proper detection sensitivity. (3) Interior intrusion detection should provide false alarm rates of not more than one false alarm every three months,per sensor. (4) Detection probability should be at a 95 percent confidence level.When calculating detection probability for multiple sensor systems, detection is assumed if any of the sensors detect the intrusion. (5) Intrusion detection systems should cover the entire length of the perimeter of a detection area. (6) Intrusion detection sensors should be provided with a redundant power source for a period of not less than four hours. (7) Detection sensors should be monitored for alarm and fault conditions by an attendant security monitoring system(an electronic system that monitors security alarms). 9.2 Exterior Intrusion Detection (1) Prevalent sensor technologies include active infrared,microwave, dual-technology, buried-line,fence-mounted sensors,and video motion detection. (2) Appropriate detection technology should be selected based on factors such as facility environment,location,climate,and ambient temperature conditions,and on the DBT. 9.2.1 Active Infrared Sensors (1) Active infrared sensors transmit infrared signals to a receiver. Interruption of the signal indicates an intruder or object has blocked the path. (2)Active infrared sensors require line of sight;the signal must be projected over a clear path where the line of sight remains unblocked. (3)Transmitters and receivers should be installed where they will not be misaligned due to earth tremors,objects hitting the unit(such as falling rocks,branches,or falling trees),or freezing and thawing of the ground. (4) Active infrared sensors do not work well in areas with heavy snowfall because drifts or snow mounds cover sensors and block transmission and reception paths.Weather conditions such as fog,heavy rain,or severe sand or dust will affect the reliable detecting range. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-11 (5) Nuisance alarm sources for active infrared sensors include animals and wind-blown debris. Fencing can minimize animal false alarms.Vegetation can also pose a problem if it is allowed to grow to a size where its movement will generate an alarm. 9.2.2 Microwave Sensors (1) Microwave sensors transmit or flood a designated area with an electronic field.A movement in the area disturbs the field and sets off an alarm. (2)The detection area should be free of bushes and obstructions. Close proximity to other high frequency signals can adversely affect the detection reliability of microwave sensors. Areas that contain strong emitters of electric fields(such as radio transmitters) or magnetic fields(large electric motors or generators)can affect the ability of the microwave sensors to function properly and should be avoided. (3) Grass should be cut to less than 3 inches (76 mm). A gravel surface prepared for water drainage is better than a grass surface. Avoid dead spots or areas of no detection created by metal objects such as dumpsters, shipping crates,trashcans,and electrical boxes.These dead spots create areas for intrusion attempts. (4) Nuisance alarm sources for microwave sensors include wind creating wave action on puddles or moving nearby fences or vegetation,or movement adjacent to,but outside, the protected area (because the signal can easily pass through standard walls,glass,sheet rock, and wood). 9.2.3 Dual Technology Sensors (1) Dual-technology sensors use both microwave and passive infrared (PIR) sensor circuitry within the same housing. PIR sensors pick up heat signatures from intruders by comparing infrared receptions to typical background infrared levels.Typically,activation differentials are 3 degrees Fahrenheit(1.7 degrees Celsius). (2) Dual-technology sensors generate an alarm condition if either the microwave or PIR sensor detects an intruder. (3) Dual-technology sensors can be installed along a perimeter line,a fence,or a buffer zone, or as a defense against intruders approaching a door or wall. (4) Nuisance alarms for microwave sensors are described in 9.2.2. Nuisance alarms for PIR sensors include reflected light and radiated heat. (5) In some dual-technology sensors,alarm settings may be adjusted to require that both the microwave and the PIR unit detect an intruder before an alarm condition is generated. With two independent means of detections,false alarms are reduced. 9.2.4 Buried Line Sensors (1)There are several types of buried line sensors,including fiber optic cable,ported cable, and ported coax cable. (2)The two principle advantages of buried cable are that it is covert and it follows the terrain. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-12 (3) Buried line systems do not work well with shrubbery or trees that require landscaping and maintenance. (4) It is important that the cable be buried to a uniform depth. Changes in soil conductivity can affect the sensor readings. (5) Nuisance alarms can be caused by the ground shifting due to standing or puddling water,or erosion.Tree roots can also be a cause for nuisance alarms when windy conditions aboveground cause movement in the roots. Large animals passing over the detection zone can also generate alarms. 9.2.5 Fence-Mounted Sensors (1) Fence-mounted sensors detect vibrations on fence fabric associated with sawing,cutting, climbing,or lifting the fence fabric. (2) Fence-mounted sensors are not reliable in areas where high vibrations are likely to be encountered,such as in close proximity to roadway activity or construction. Do not use in areas with high wind or numerous animal interactions with the fence line. (3) Fence-mounted sensors perform best when mounted directly to the fence fabric. Each sensor is connected in series along the fence with a common cable to form a single zone of protection. (4)Sensor zone lengths have a typical recommended range of 300 feet(90 m), although some systems permit longer sensing zones. (5)Install on high-quality fencing. Poor quality fences with loose fabric can create too much background activity due to flexing, sagging,or swaying. (6) Nuisance alarms can be generated from shrubbery and tree branches as well as animals and severe weather that come in contact with the fence,causing it to vibrate. 9.3 Interior Intrusion Detection (1) Provide appropriate interior intrusion detection according to the DBT and the building environment. (2) Applicable technologies include dual-technology(passive infrared and microwave), linear beam,and glass-break sensors. (3)Select products that are consistent with the ambient temperature,environment,and moisture content of the structure to be protected. 9.3.1 Dual Technology Motion Sensors (1) Dual technology motion sensors use passive infrared and microwave technology to detect motion. Described in 9.2.3,these sensors are applicable for both interior and exterior applications. (2) Do not use dual-technology sensors in areas where the PIR sensor can be exposed to sudden changes in temperature,such as near an exterior door. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-13 (3) Nuisance alarms can be generated from heat radiating objects such as heat-system registers or other warm objects (including things as innocuous as a mop bucket with hot water in it). 9.3.2 Linear Beam Sensors (1) Linear beam sensors transmit a beam of infrared light to a remote receiver creating an "electronic fence." Once the beam is broken,an alarm signal is generated. It has a high probability of detection and a low false alarm rate. (2) This type of sensor is often used to cover openings such as doorways or hallways, acting essentially as a trip wire.The infrared beam is unaffected by changes in thermal radiation, fluorescent lights,electronic frequency interference (EFI), or radio frequency interference (RFI). (3)The transmitter and receiver can be up to 1,000 feet(300 m) apart. (4) Nuisance alarms can be created by any objects that may break the beam,such as paper blowing off of a shelf or desk. 9.3.3 Glass-Break Sensors (1)There are three basic types of glass-break sensors:acoustic sensors(listens for an acoustic sound wave that matches the frequency of broken glass),shock sensors (feels the shock wave when glass is broken),and dual-technology sensors (senses acoustic and shock vibrations). (2) Using dual-technology sensors significantly reduces false alarms from background noise such as RFI and frequency noise created by office machines. (3)Glass-break sensors provide intrusion detection for windows and doors with glass panes. Mount on the window,window frame,wall, or ceiling. If mounted on the wall or ceiling (this is the preferred placement),place opposite the window. If mounted on glass, place in the corner,approximately 2 inches (50 mm) from the edge of the frame. (4) Use mounting adhesive specified to withstand long exposure to summer heat,winter cold, or condensation. (5) Regardless of the type of sensor,coverage typically does not exceed 100 square feet (9 square meters) of glass surface. (6) Nuisance alarms can be caused by improper calibration or installation. In addition,RFI, sharp impact noises,and background noise such as office,industrial,and cleaning machinery can cause false alarms. 9.4 Door and Hatch Contact Alarm Switches (1) Door and hatch contact alarm switches should interface to a security monitoring system in addition to the SCADA system. (2) Magnetic door contact switches should be installed at all building exterior doors to monitor for door ajar and door forced-open conditions. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-14 (3) Exposed exterior locations,such as exterior hatches or vaults,should utilize high- security balanced magnetic switches. (4) Industrial doors, gates,and roll-up doors should use high-security rugged duty,sealed, wide-gap magnetic switches. 9.5 Pipeline Vibration Detection (1) Emerging technologies are being developed that provide vibration detection within pipeline sections.By incorporating this technology,attempts at sabotage such as cutting, hammering or detonation of the pipeline can be detected and a response can be initiated. Such detection systems might be considered for critical pipeline sections without redundancy.The detection systems monitor vibration within the pipeline section.If the vibration level exceeds a threshold amount,then an alarm may be transmitted back to a central monitoring station.Such systems are relatively new technology,but are in operation currently for critical utility (oil,natural gas)pipelines within the United States. 10.0 Access Control Systems 10.1 Access Control Systems— General A means of providing access control should be incorporated into all security systems. Access control measures should consist of one or more of the following systems:key locks and/or padlocks,numeric keypad locks, or card reader systems. 10.2 Locks and Padlocks (1) Padlocks should be weather-resistant with a hardened-steel shackle. (2) Padlock pulling resistance should be 4,500 pounds(lbs.) (20,000 Newtons) at minimum. (3) Padlock pressure resistance to bolt cutters should be 10,000 lbs. (44,000 Newtons) at minimum. (4) Key locks should use hardened steel inserts protecting the plug face,shell,and sidebar from drilling attack. (5) Provide an access guard of channel steel or other material against bolt-cutter or torch access to padlocks. (6)Whenever possible,avoid using"daisy chains" of padlocks. Instead,use a programmable lock that allows for authorized entry by multiple individuals using unique codes. 10.3 Numeric Keypad Locks (1) Numeric keypad locks are locking systems that include a programmable keypad in addition to the door latch or deadbolt and lever handle.A user must enter a code at a keypad before the door will unlock and allow access. New codes can be added or changed at the keypad. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-15 (2) Models are available that require both a credential and a code. This dual method can provide an additional layer of protection. (3) Models are available to mount on various door thicknesses and doors with narrow stiles. 10.4 Card Reader Systems (1) Card reader systems should incorporate: (a) Alarm Display and Programming: A computer server or workstation that displays alarm conditions and allows programming of the system. (b) Badge Creation: A badge station, allowing creation and programming of badges. (c) Local Control: Local control panels that control the doors,card reader units,and access cards. (d) Printer Unit: A printer unit that can print a report for each event and alarm condition. (2) Under normal operation,the system should grant access at doors with card readers by comparing the time and location of any attempted entry with information stored in local (at the door controller) memory. (3) Access is granted only when the security card used has a valid entry code at the card reader for the designated time frame. (4)The access card should be a standard credit-card-size passive component with an integral coding technology, such as coding contained within a chip in the card. (5)Electrical locking means should be electric strike,magnetic lock,or other approved means.Great care should be taken in designing access control for doors used for egress to ensure free egress is permitted at all times. (6) Refer to NFPA 101,"Life Safety Code"(NFPA 2006),and NFPA 1O1B,"Code for Means for Egress for Buildings and Structures" (NFPA 2002)for code guidance on egress and ingress doors. 11.0 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance 11.1 General Considerations (1)CCTV cameras can be analog or IP-network cameras, depending on factors such as the suitability to the installation,site conditions,and availability of local area networks. (2)The ASIS publication"Protection of Assets," Chapter 38-Television in Security (ASIS 2004),identifies the following specification items to consider when specifying CCTV cameras: (a) Imager:The size of the image-sensing device within the camera. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-16 (b) Resolution:The measure of detail that the camera can distinguish,usually measured in horizontal TV lines per inch(25 mm).The larger the number,the sharper the image and the better the camera. (c)Sensitivity:Typically,the minimum lighting illumination level required for full video.The lower the required illumination level,the more sensitive the camera. (d) Signal-to-Noise Ratio:The ratio of the peak value of the video signal to the peak value of the noise or electromagnetic interference,measured in decibels.The greater the ratio, the sharper and better the picture image. (e)Automatic Light Compensation:The process whereby the amount of illumination on the image sensor is automatically adjusted to the scene brightness.A high ratio indicates that the camera can automatically adjust to wide variations in scene illumination without noticeable distortion in the transmitted image. (f)Backlight Compensation: A feature available in many cameras that automatically reduces contrast and silhouetting between near and far objects. (g)Video Output:A measurement,stated in Volts peak-to-peak,between the darkest black to brightest light levels of the signal.Typical values are 1.0 Volts peak to peak. (h)Synchronization: A means of controlling the imager scanning so that the camera image will not roll when switched between video monitors. Better cameras allow for synchronization adjustment to accommodate multi-phase power supplies. (i) Environment: Upper and lower temperature and humidity limits for the cameras. It is important to specify a camera that works in the intended environment, including weather. (j) Dimensions:The outside measurements of the camera case. (k)Weight:The weight of the camera within its casing. (3) Because camera technology is improving so rapidly,detailed performance specifications are not provided here;it is recommended that utilities consult with a security engineer for current camera hardware standards and sensitivity ratings. 11.2 Field of View (1) Provide fixed-position or pan/tilt/zoom cameras depending upon desired field of view and intended application. (2) Provide appropriate camera lenses corresponding to camera application and field of view requirements. (3)The CCTV surveillance system should be capable of viewing prescribed objects within the field of view as follows,considering a screen height of 480 pixels to be full-screen (100 percent=480 pixels). (a)For intrusion detection purposes,the object should occupy a minimum of 10 percent of the screen height or be 48-pixels tall. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-17 (b)For recognizing a person's face,the body of the person should be a minimum of 50 percent of the screen height or 240-pixels tall. (c)To identify a license plate,the plate height should be a minimum of 5 percent of the screen height or 24-pixels tall. (4) In some cases, the field of view of a camera may include public areas or private residential areas that should not be monitored by video surveillance. In these cases,to minimize liability issues, a current capability with modern CCTV systems allows masking of these areas or views so that they cannot be seen by the attendant staff. 11.3 CCTV Housings and Mounts (1)CCTV housings should be adequate for the intended application and site location. (2) Incorporate heater/blower units,wipers,or other elements as necessary to accommodate site environmental conditions. (3) Incorporate pole-mount,building-mount,or other mounting means so that the camera obtains a clear field of view of the intended target. (4)Specify and locate housing and camera mount such that tampering or vandalism of the camera units is prevented. 11.4 Video Network Servers (1)The video network server should be high-performance Internet-Protocol(IP)network- compatible video system. (2)The network server should be capable of streaming images at a frame rate of 30 frames per second. (3) The video communication system should be capable of transmitting live video across communication networks and enable video cameras to be remotely monitored and controlled over the network,provided password authentication requirements are met. (4) The camera view desired should be selectable by designated camera name and IP address. 11.5 Digital Video Recorders (1) As a minimum,it is recommended to provide adequate digital recording capacity for all cameras at 30 days of continuous storage at 5 frames per second. (2) Provide a means for archiving video to digital video disc (DVD) or other long-term storage format. (3)Specify the physical location of recorder unit based on environmental considerations, location,network,and bandwidth availability. (4) Identify appropriate video compression technology to conserve network bandwidth and storage needs. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-18 11.6 CCTV Computer Application Software (1)CCTV application software should be full management software to monitor and manage single or multiple sites. (2)Software should allow monitoring and recording of images from multiple simultaneous cameras at frame rates up to 30 frames per second. (3)System should enable customized layouts for intuitive and interactive ways of representing the camera network. (4)Software should provide flexible live and recording settings per individual camera input. (5)Software should allow connectivity to other systems,via application programming interface (API) alarm and pre-alarm recordings,and enable support for external joysticks to perform pan and tilt operations. 12.0 Security, Controls, and SCADA Wiring (1)All security,controls,and SCADA wiring should be protected within conduit. (2)All interconnecting wiring between security components should be monitored for integrity so that an abnormal condition(wire-to-wire short,wire break,or wire ground-fault condition)is automatically indicated to the user upon arming the system. (3)The security wiring configuration at the end device should be a 4-state configuration using an end-of-line (EOL)resistor network where neither alarm nor normal condition are 0 ohms or open-circuit. (4) Conceal security conduits,telephone lines,and other critical utility connections from view and access,or locate them in the interior of buildings. (5) Provide a backup power source(4 hours minimum)to security components and SCADA and other crucial control systems. (6) Backup power sources may include battery units,auxiliary power supplies, uninterruptible power supplies (UPS),or generators. (7) Refer to NFPA 70, National Electrical Code(NFPA 2005),for code guidance on electrical wiring requirements. 12.1 SCADA and Electrical Control Panel Enclosures (1) Provide a tamper switch at all security and SCADA control panel enclosures. Upon enclosure door opening,an alarm condition should be logged by the system. (2)Though panels should be locked, the electrical disconnect should never be locked. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-19 13.0 Building Elements 13.1 General (1)When new buildings are being designed,discuss with the building architect and structural engineers the opportunity to incorporate design elements that prevent progressive collapse of the facility in the event of explosion within or adjacent to the building. Progressive collapse is defined by the ASCE and SEI (Structural Engineering Institute) in"Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures" (ASCE/SEI 2006) as"The spread of an initial local failure from element to element eventually resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionate large part of it." 13.2 Doors (1)Exterior doors should be heavy-duty steel-metal door,ASTM F476 Grade 40 high- security level door(ASTM 2002),prepped for security door hardware. Doors should comply with ANSI/NAAMM HMMA 862-03"Guide Specifications for Commercial Security Hollow Metal Doors and Frames" (ANSI/NAAMM HMMA 2003). (2) Doors should have a maximum window opening of 96 square inches (62,000 square mm) or nominal 4-inch by 16-inch(100-mm by 400-mm)size with a minimum side panel size. (3) Door frame should be heavy-duty with concrete fill. (4)Hinge pins should be on the secure side or be non-removable/tamper-resistant to eliminate door compromise by removing hinge pins. (5) Consider electronic door status monitoring for door forced and door ajar conditions. (6)The following door recommendations are provided for example purposes from the U.S. General Services Administration Publication"Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service," Section 3.5-Building Elements(GSA 2005). (a) Glazed exterior doors and frames should be steel and meet the requirements of SDI Grade III with a G-90 galvanic zinc coating. (b)Hinges,hinge pins,and hasps must be secured against unauthorized removal by using spot welds or peened mounting bolts. (c) All exterior doors must have automatic closers. (d)The exterior side of the door should have a lock guard or astragal to prevent jimmying of the latch hardware. (e) Doors used for egress only should not have any operable exterior hardware. 13.3 Security Grilles (1) Base-level security grilles (for windows,louver openings,roof hatches,culverts,etc.) should be woven#10 wire gauge steel,1.5-inch(38-mm) diamond mesh,or welded #10 wire gauge,2-inch(50-mm)square welded mesh screens. (2)The grilles should be hot galvanized with a hot-powdered coat finish. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-20 (3) Use tamper-resistant and tamper-proof fasteners for mounting window grilles. (4)For enhanced-level protection,refer to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10,"Design Guidelines for Fencing,Gates,Barriers,and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b)for security grilles. 13.4 Security Cages (1) Caged partitions(for critical equipment,pumps,motor control centers,and so on) should be#10 wire gauge steel with 2-inch(50 mm)welded openings in 1.25-inch by 1.25- inch by 0.125-inch(32-mm by 32-mm by 3-mm)angle iron framework. (2)Ensure the partitions include framework supports,access gates,locks,and other accessories. 14.0 HatchesNaults and Vents 14.1 Hatch, Vault, and Vent Alarms— General (1) Hatch,vault,and vent alarms should use similar alarm contact hardware such as magnetic door contact switches,depending on the final hatch/vault design. (2) Interconnect alarm contacts to a security monitoring system. (3) Note that curb and sidewalk devices may become a tripping or safety hazard.Consider the location and application carefully when designing the system. (4) Provide locking covers for valve operators. 14.2 Roof or Sidewalk Hatches (1) Provide a lock on a manufacturer's metal door system that is set into concrete curb with gutter and drain. (2) Consider an additional protected keyed bar lock across the door that is mounted directly to the structural curb,especially for large,publicly accessible pumping stations. (3) Consider an elevated upper structure cover surrounding the sidewalk door,especially for large,publicly accessible pumping stations.This cover is to prevent drilling through the doorplate and adding liquids to the contents as well as to delay access to the sidewalk door hatch.This additional layer delays someone attempting to gain access to water to introduce a contaminant. (4) Alarm upper structure using exterior-rated balanced magnetic door contacts. 14.3 Roof Vents (1) Provide metal roof vents with numerous small openings rather than vents with fewer, larger openings (96 square inches [62,000 square mm] is considered a person-passable opening). Contaminants can be introduced through much smaller vents;prevent direct passage of contaminants through a vent by using traps. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-21 (2) Position or barricade vent openings to prevent spray of a contaminant liquid into vent opening. (3) Provide a metal structure cover surrounding the vent to delay access to the vent structure,with adequate standoff(nominally 8 inches [200 mm] or more)from the vent to limit drilling attempts into the vent assembly. (4) Provide protected dual locks on a metal vent cover system set on a concrete curb. (5) Alarm protective cover using exterior-rated magnetic door contacts. 14.4 Vault Hatch with Elevated Curb (1)Provide lock on manufacturer's door system.Alarm the vault hatch using exterior-rated magnetic door contacts. (2)Consider an additional protected key bar lock across the door that is mounted directly to the structural curb. 14.5 Vault Door Hatch Set Flush with Top of Structural Slab (1) Provide a lock on a manufacturer's door system. Alarm vault hatch using exterior-rated magnetic door contacts. (2) Consider an interior keyed bar lock system or secondary horizontal structure immediately below the vault sidewalk door hatch to block access. 15.0 Online Water Quality Monitoring (1) A suite of online instruments to monitor some surrogate water quality parameters should be installed. (2) Among parameters to monitor in water distribution systems are pH,chlorine residual (either total or free, depending on the type of residual maintained in the system),specific conductance,turbidity,and total organic carbon. (3) Among parameters that could be considered for monitoring wastewater collection systems are pH and volatile organic carbon. (4)Periodic readings from the online instruments should be compared with baseline water quality values to determine if there is potential contamination. (5)The placement of the sampling location for the instruments depends on the type of asset. For example,in water storage tanks,the sampling location should be from the outlet pipe near the tank,ideally between the tank and the isolation valve. If there is a common inlet/ outlet pipe, then the sampling location should be installed on the common pipe near the tank,ideally between the tank and the isolation valve. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-22 16.0 Operator Devices 16.1 Man-Down Transmitter (1) A man-down transmitter is worn by personnel for automatic man-down signaling. (2)The unit should be portable,lightweight,and supplied with a belt clip or holster for mounting. (3) Built-in tilt switches should automatically activate the man-down transmitter when the user is knocked down. (4) A pull cord should activate the alarm or emergency signal when an attempt is made to remove the unit from a belt. (5)The transmission mode should integrate both radio frequency (RF) and Infrared (IR) signaling for redundant communications. (6) Power should be provided by a long-life lithium battery. 17.0 Chemical Fill-Line Locking Devices (1) Connections for filling chemical tanks should be locked to restrict access to only authorized personnel.Chemical fill lines usually are fitted with quick-connect,cam-arm actuated couplings for ease of use by the chemical vendor. Locking devices for contractor's temporary connections are recommended. (2) Lockable dust caps or dust plugs with hardened key locks should be installed on the individual couplings. (3) Where multiple fill lines are collocated,a hardened box or port integrated into the building masonry complete with shrouded and hardened lock can be used in lieu of the individual coupling locks. 18.0 Hydrants (1) Provide tamper seals on hydrants.Tamper seals reduce the possibility of tampering or unauthorized operation of the hydrant. (2) Provide locking mechanisms on hydrants.Hydrant locking systems should be designed so that the hydrants can be operated using a special keyed wrench without the need to remove the lock. (a) If locking mechanisms are used on hydrants,it is important that training on unlocking the mechanisms be provided to all local firefighting personnel and any other fire departments with which there are mutual aid agreements in place who would respond in an emergency. (b) Provide the specialized wrenches in sufficient quantity to the fire department and other authorized persons so that they can operate the hydrants as needed.These wrenches are typically only sold to fire authorities and water utilities. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-23 19.0 Manholes (1)Securing manholes can be accomplished in three ways;tack welding,bolt locks,and pan locks: (a) Tack welding provides a fast method of securing manholes. It is economical and effective for manholes not frequently accessed.The disadvantage is that the tackweld must be removed or broken before utility staff can access the manhole. (b) Bolt locks anchor the manhole to the manhole frame.They have a specialized bolt head which requires a specialized tool to unbolt or unlock the manhole.To remove or access the manhole,the bolt locks must be removed.This system of locking manholes is more flexible than the tack welding method,but more expensive to install. (c) Pan locks prevent entry into the manhole,as well as eliminating dumping into the collection system.The pan unit is installed into the manhole,with the edge of the pan resting within the manhole opening.The manhole is then locked into place into the pan unit.This system of locking manholes is more flexible than the tack welding and bolt locking methods,but more expensive to install. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES A-24 APPENDIX B Glossary and Abbreviations access control.The physical guidance of vehicles and/or people going to and coming from a space through judicious placement of entrances,exits,landscaping,lighting,and controlling devices (such as, guard stations,turnstiles,etc.) ACI.American Concrete Institute. agent. Any physical,chemical,or biological entity that can be harmful to an organism. AISI.American Iron and Steel Institute• AMSA.Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (now National Association of Clean Water Agencies [NACWA]). ANSI.American National Standards Institute. API.Application programming interface. ASCE. American Society of Civil Engineers. ASDWA.Association of State Drinking Water Administrators. asset.Anything of value (such as,people,information,hardware, software,facilities, equipment,reputation,activities,or operations) that may be a target of the design basis threat adversary. Assets are what an organization needs to get the job done—to carry out the mission.The more critical the asset is to an organization accomplishing its mission, the greater the effect of its damage or destruction. ASTM.American Society for Testing and Materials. AWWA.American Water Works Association. AwwaRF.American Water Works Association Research Foundation. base. Minimum recommended. bollard.One of a series of posts preventing vehicles from entering an area. CCTV.Closed-circuit television. clear zone.An area surrounding the perimeter of a facility that is free of shrubs and trees, and features well-maintained landscaping that does not provide hiding places for an adversary. CMU.Concrete masonry unit. contaminant.Any physical,chemical,biological,or radiological substance or matter that has an adverse effect on air,water, or soil. contamination.Introduction of microorganisms,chemicals, toxic substances,wastes,or wastewater into water,air,and soil in a concentration that makes the medium unfit for its intended use. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES B-1 countermeasure.A reaction to or a defense against a hostile action to deal with a threatening situation. criminal.The primary motivation for a criminal is the desire to obtain equipment,tools,or components that have inherent value and can be sold.Criminals typically use stealth to avoid apprehension,and response times should focus on the time for the adversary to obtain the asset.See also Table 1-1. CSC.Codes and Standards Committee. daisy chain.Groups of padlocks connected and hooked to a common chain in such a way as to allow access through a key that can unlock any one of the padlocks. delay features.Security objects such as physical barriers designed to occupy or limit an adversary until a response force can interrupt accomplishment of the adversary's objectives. Delay features consist primarily of physical hardening features and are often employed in multiple layers to provide protection in depth. Delay features are only effective when placed within a layer of detection. design basis threat (DBT).The adversary against which a utility must be protected. Determining the DBT requires consideration of the threat type,tactics,mode of operations,capabilities,threat level,and likelihood of occurrence. detection.The point at which a potential attack is discovered,assessed,and determined to be an attack in progress rather than a false alarm. detection features.Security items such as sensors that are intended to detect the presence of an intruder.A complete detection system generally includes electronic features such as sensors as well as cameras or visual observation for assessment of alarm validity. Depending on the types of sensors,a detection system may also include lighting systems, motion detectors,monitoring cameras,access control equipment,or other devices. deterrence.Security measures such as lighting or the presence of closed circuit television or people in the area that may discourage an adversary from attacking the facility. Deterrence is not generally considered a part of a physical protection system with a predictable level of effectiveness,however,it can reduce the occurrence of crime or low- level vandal attacks. DoD. Department of Defense. DSTU. Draft American National Standard for Trial Use. DVD.Digital Versatile Disc,Digital Video Disc. EFI.Electronic frequency interference. enhanced.Augmented with improved,advanced,or sophisticated features. EOL.End-of-line. EWRI.Environmental and Water Resources Institute of the ASCE. foot-candle.A unit of light intensity defined as the amount of light measured on a surface one foot from a uniform point source of light equal to the light of one candle. A foot- candle is equal to one lumen per square foot. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES B-2 FRP.Fiberglass-reinforced plastic. GSA.General Services Administration. harden.To improve the physical strength of a protective measure. IESNA.Illuminated Engineering Society of North America. improvised explosive device (IED).An apparatus or contraption placed or fabricated without detailed manufacturing that incorporates destructive,lethal,noxious, pyrotechnic,or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy,incapacitate,harass,or distract through high-speed projectiles and overpressure. improvised incendiary device (IID). An apparatus or contraption placed or fabricated without detailed manufacturing that incorporates destructive,lethal,noxious, pyrotechnic,or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy,incapacitate,harass,or distract by creating intense heat and fire. insider.An individual who is granted normal access to a facility.This may be an employee, a contractor,custodial worker,or an authorized visitor.See also Table 1-1. intrusion.Entrance by force or without permission or authorization,either physically or via electronic methods. IP.Internet protocol. IR.Infrared. lb.Pound. lumen.The SI unit of measuring the power of light being produced by a light source or received by a surface. luces.Plural of lux. lux.The SI unit of light intensity defined as the amount of light equal to one lumen per square meter. m. Meter. mm.Millimeter. mantrap.Secured entry system that prevents an individual from gaining access to an area by holding them first in an assessment area. NACWA.National Association of Clean Water Agencies (formerly Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies [AMSA]). NDWAC.National Drinking Water Advisory Council. NETCSC.National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities. NFPA.National Fire Protection Association. NRWA.National Rural Water Association. OD.Outside diameter. PIR.Passive infrared. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 0-3 PL.Public law. protection in depth.The strategy of providing multiple layers of protective measures, therefore requiring an adversary to defeat a system,travel to the next protective layer and defeat that system,and so forth until reaching the target. An example of protection in depth is the application of layers of protective measures at the site boundary (perimeter fencing system), at the building envelope (exterior walls, doors,windows, grilles,and roof system),and at the target enclosure (the room in which the targeted asset is housed). psi.Pounds per square inch. PTZ.Pan,tilt, and zoom. PVC.Polyvinyl chloride. RAM-WTM.Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities. response.Actions taken to interrupt the adversary's task. Utility staff,the utility's security response force,or law enforcement may carry out response, depending on the threat and policy of the utility. RF. Radio frequency. RFI.Radio frequency interference. risk.The potential for realization of unwanted,adverse consequences to human life,health, property, or the environment.The quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the probability that a hazard will cause harm and the consequences of that event. Risk is usually expressed as a function of the probability that an adverse effect will occur and the criticality of the effect on the ability to fulfill a mission or function. RTU.Remote terminal unit. saboteur.A saboteur is typically motivated by political, doctrinal,or religious causes, although revenge may also be a motivation.These individuals primarily use stealth to achieve their objectives,but they can be armed and willing to injure or kill others if threatened.The saboteur is bent on damage or destruction of the utility's facilities or generating a lack of public confidence in the utility's ability to protect the public. See also Table 1-1. SCADA.Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. SI. International System of Units. significant.Having or likely to have a major effect;important;fairly large in amount or quantity. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).The system that provides automatic or semi-automatic sensing of key parameters and control of key elements of the water or wastewater system. It generally provides for communications,notifications,and alarms, as well as for manual over-ride of controls. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES B-4 surveillance.The placement of physical features,activities,vehicles, and people that maximize visibility by others during their normal activities. Surveillance may be natural or electronic,informal (office windows placed to facilitate surveillance of entry roads),or formal(continuous monitoring).Surveillance provides the link between detection (sensors activated due to the presence of an intruder) and assessment(confirming that the detection is valid and not a nuisance alarm). SWAT.Special Weapons and Tactics. target.This term is used synonymously with asset throughout this document. terrorist.A radical who employs terror as a political weapon;with significantly enhanced tool and weapon capabilities,terrorists may be politically or doctrinally motivated to cause maximum human casualties,often without regard for the terrorist's personal survival. TISP.The Infrastructure Security Partnership. UL.Underwriters Laboratory. UPS. Uninterruptible power supply. USEPA.U.S.Environmental Protection Agency. VA.Vulnerability assessment. vandal.An individual acting alone or in a group,unarmed and using spray paint to deface property or using hand tools to inflict damage to utility assets.See also Table 1-1. vehicle sally port.Interlocking gates within a fenced area where incoming drivers pass through the first gate and stop at the second gate. Once both gates are closed and the vehicle is captured within the sally port, a security guard may confirm the identity of the driver and,if necessary,search the vehicle to confirm the contents.Once the vehicle and driver are approved,the second gate opens and the vehicle may drive onto the facility. VSATTM.Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool. vulnerability.A characteristic of a critical infrastructure's design,implementation,or operation that renders the infrastructure susceptible to destruction or incapacitation by a threat.Vulnerabilities may consist of flaws in security procedures,software,internal system controls,or installation of infrastructure that may affect the integrity, confidentiality,accountability, or availability of data or services. Vulnerabilities also include flaws that may be deliberately exploited and those that may cause failure due to inadvertent human actions or natural disasters.Vulnerability may be considered any weakness that can be exploited by an adversary or,in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES 0-5 vulnerability assessment(VA).An assessment of the vulnerabilities of a water or wastewater system.The six common elements of vulnerability assessments identified by USEPA are: (1)characterization of the system,including its mission and objectives;(2) identification and prioritization of adverse consequences to avoid;(3) determination of critical assets that might be subject to malevolent acts that could result in undesired consequences;(4)assessment of the likelihood(qualitative probability)of such malevolent acts from adversaries;(5)evaluation of existing countermeasures;and(6) analysis of current risk and development of a prioritized plan for risk reduction.Two example approaches to VAs are the Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-Wan)and the Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool(VSATTM). WEF.Water Environment Federation. WISE.Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements. WISE SC.Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements Standards Committee of the EWRI of ASCE. WSWG.Water Security Working Group. DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES B_6 APPENDIX C References For a comprehensive list of resources related to water and wastewater security,see the USEPA WISE Phase 1 documents developed by the American Society of Civil Engineers(2004),the American Water Works Association(2004a),and the Water Environment Foundation(2004). Reference Annotation American Concrete Institute(ACI).1998.371R-98:Guide for the Analysis, This ACI guide presents recommendations for materials,analysis, Design,and Construction of Concrete-Pedestal Water Towers(Reapproved design,and construction of concrete-pedestal elevated water storage 2003).www.concrete.org/bookstorenet/ProductDetail.aspx?itemid=37198 tanks.These structures are commonly referred to as composite-style elevated water tanks that consist of a steel water storage tank supported by a cylindrical,reinforced concrete pedestal. American National Standards Institute(ANSI)/National Association of This document provides specifications for commercial security hollow Architectural Metal Manufacturers(NAAMM)Hollow Metal Manufacturers metal doors and frames.Its focus is protection from vandalism,forced Association(HMMA).2003.Guide Specifications for Commercial Security Hollow entry,theft,and firearms attack. Metal Doors and Frames.Chicago,IL.www.naamm.org/hmma/pdfs/HMMA862- 03.pdf ----------------------------- -- ------------- -- ------- ------ American Society of Industrial Security(ASIS).2004.Protection of Assets. Although the availability of security literature is growing rapidly,with Alexandria,VA. general and specialized texts,it has not been possible—until now—for a business manager or protection professional to find in one place, current,accurate,and practical treatment of the broad range of protection subjects,strategies,and solutions. American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE).2006.Minimum Design Loads for This update to ASCE/SEI Standard 7-02 and its supplement provides Buildings and Other Structures,ASCE/SEI Standard 7-05.Reston,VA:ASCE. requirements for general structural design and includes means for https://www.asce.org/bookstore/book.cfm?book=5581 determining dead,live,soil,flood,wind,snow,rain,atmospheric ice, and earthquake loads,and their combinations that are suitable for inclusion in building codes and other documents. American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE).2004.Guidelines for Designing an USEPA WISE ASCE/AWWA/WEF Phase 1 Documents Online Contaminant Monitoring System.Reston,VA. (December 9,2004)are available at the ASCE,AWWA,WEF,and www.asce.org/static/1/wise.cfm USEPA web sites. American Water Works Association(AWWA).2006.A100-06:Water Wells. This standard provides the minimum requirements for vertical water Denver,CO.www.awwa.org/bookstore/product.cfm?id=41100 supply wells,Including geologic/hydrologic conditions and water quality and well construction. DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES I Reference Annotation American Water Works Association(AWWA)and American Society of Civil This book is a reference for water treatment plant upgrades or new Engineers(ASCE).2005a.Water Treatment Plant Design,Fourth Edition. construction.Topics included range from initial plans and permits, McGraw-Hill. through design,construction,and startup. American Water Works Association(AWWA).2005b.D100-05:Welded Carbon This standard provides guidance to facilitate the design,manufacture, Steel Tanks for Water Storage.www.awwa.org/bookstore/product.cfm?id=44100 and procurement of welded steel tanks for the storage of water.This standard does not cover all details of design and construction because of the large variety of sizes and shapes of tanks. American Water Works Association(AWWA).2004a.Interim Voluntary Security USEPA WISE ASCE/AWWANVEF Phase 1 Documents Guidance for Water Utilities.Denver,CO.www.awwa.org/science/wise/ (December 9,2004)are available at the ASCE,AWWA,WEF,and USEPA web sites. American Water Works Association(AWWA).2004b.D110-04:Wire-and Strand- This standard details recommended practice for the design, Wound,Circular,Prestressed Concrete Water Tanks.Denver,CO. construction,inspection,and maintenance of these types of water www.awwa.org/bookstore/product.cfm?id=44110 tanks. American Water Works Association(AWWA).2002.D120-02:Thermosetting This document discusses the composition,performance requirements, Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic Tanks.Denver,CO. construction practices and workmanship,design,and methods of www.awwa.org/bookstore/product.cfm?id=44120 testing thermosetting fiberglass-reinforced plastic tanks for the storage of water and other liquids. American Water Works Association(AWWA).1998.Steel Water-Storage Tanks This manual provides information on the selection,design,construction, (M42).Denver,CO.www.awwa.org/bookstore/product.cfm?id=30042 and maintenance of steel tanks for potable water storage. American Water Works Association(AWWA).1995.D115-95:Circular This standard Includes current and recommended practice for the Prestressed Concrete Water Tanks With Circumferential Tendons.Denver,CO. design,construction,and field observations of circular prestressed www.awwa.org/bookstore/product.cfm?id=44115 concrete tanks using tendons for circumferential prestressing. Association of State Drinking Water Administrators(ASDWA)and National Rural This guide is intended for water utilities that serve a population of less Water Association(NRWA).2002a.Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide than 3,300.Its purpose is to help utilities identify critical assets and list for Small Drinking Water Systems.May 30. appropriate security measures. http://www.asdwa.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pagelD=733 Association of State Drinking Water Administrators(ASDWA)and National Rural This guide is intended for water utilities that serve a population from Water Association(NRWA).2002b.Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide 3,300 to 10,000.It was developed to help utilities meet the for Small Drinking Water Systems Serving Populations Between 3,300 and requirements of the"Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 10,000.November 13. Preparedness and Response Act of 2002." http://www.asdwa.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pagelD=733 ASTM International.2005a.A 666,Standard Specification for Annealed or Cold- This specification covers the required annealed and cold-worked Worked Austenitic Stainless Steel Sheet,Strip,Plate,and Flat Bar. conditions for austenitic stainless steels in a variety of structural, http!/www.astm.org/cgi- architectural,pressure vessel,magnetic,cryogenic,and heat-resisting bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/A.htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 applications. —_— — DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES C-2 • Reference Annotation ASTM International.2005b.A853-04,Standard Specification for Steel Wire, This standard specification covers carbon steel wire that intended for Carbon,for General Use.http://www.astm.org/cgi- general use that is supplied in coils and is produced hard drawn, bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/REDLINE_PAGES/A853.htm?L+mystore+uid annealed in process,or annealed at finish size. i9817 • • ASTM International.2005c.F1043-06,Standard Specification for Strength and This specification covers the strength and protective coating Protective Coatings on Steel Industrial Chain Link Fence Framework. requirements for industrial steel chain link fence framework.Details http://www.astm.org/cgi- include the maximum allowable heights of framework,post spacing bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 based the mesh size and gages of the fence fabric,and specified wind loads.Also include are factors to consider when determining wind load as well as the cross-sectional shape and approved fabrication methods for posts and rails. ASTM International.2005d.F552-02,Standard Terminology Relating to Chain This specification contains the standard terminology associated with Link Fencing.http://www.astm.org/cgi- aspects of chain-link fencing design and construction. bin/S oftCa rt.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+q kng 6334+1140140874 ASTM International.2005e.F567-00,Standard Practice for Installation of Chain- The standard of practice pertaining to the installation procedure for Link Fence.http://www.astm.org/cgi- chain-link fence is described in this document.While this practice bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 describes performance under varying conditions,weather,intended use,materials,etc.it does not address all of the safety problems,with the installation of a chain-link fence. ASTM International.2004a.A121-99(2004),Standard Specification For Metallic- This specification describes two-strand metallic-coated steel barbed Coated Carbon Steel Barbed Wire.http://www.astm.org/cgi- wire fabricated of aluminum,zinc,and zinc-5%aluminum-mischmetal bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/A.htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 alloy coatings,with a number of coating weights,in a variety of designs. ASTM International.2004b.A176-99(2004),Standard Specification for Stainless This specification covers stainless and heat-resisting chromium steel and Heat-Resisting Chromium Steel Plate,Sheet,and Strip. plate,sheet,and strip.A wide variety of surface finishes may be http://www.astm.org/cgi- available for the steel plate,sheet and strips described in this bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/A.htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 specification. ASTM International.2003.F1910-98(2003),Standard Specification for Long This specification covers barbed tape materials and configurations used Barbed Tape Obstacles.http://www.astm.org/cgi- for security barriers.Referenced in this document are the ASTM bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F,htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 specifications A764,F1379,A176,A666,A370,and A240. ASTM International.2002.F476-84(2002),Standard Test Methods for Security of The standard test methods covered in this document are designed to Swinging Door Assemblies.http://www.astm.org/cgi- measure the capability of a swinging door assembly to restrain or delay bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+gkng6334+1140140874 and to frustrate the commission of"break-in"crimes.Door assemblies of various materials and types of construction covered by these test methods also include individual components such as the hinge,lock, door,jamb/strike,and jamb/wall. DECEMBER 2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES C-3 Reference Annotation Department of Defense(DoD).2002.Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for The Unified Facilities Criteria(UFC)system is prescribed by MIL-STD Buildings.Unified Facilities Criteria UFC 4-010-01. 3007 and provides planning,design,construction,sustainment, www.tisp.org/les/pdf/dodstandards.pdf restoration,and modernization criteria. Garcia,Mary Lynn.2001 The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection This book provides detailed information on the full process of security Systems.Burlington,MA:Butterworth-Heinemann. system design and integration,illustrating how the various physical and electronic elements work together to form a comprehensive system. Illumination Engineering Society of North America(IESNA).2003.Guideline for This guideline covers basic security principles,illuminance Security Lighting for People,Property,and Public Spaces(G-1-03).New York, requirements for various types of properties,protocol for evaluating NY. current lighting levels for different security applications,and security survey and crime search methodology.This guideline includes exterior and interior security lighting practices for the reasonable protection of persons and property. Jones,Garr M.,Robert L.Sanks,George Tchobanoglous,and Bayard E. This document provides detailed information needed to design,equip, Bossemlan,II.Eds.2005.Pumping Station Design,3id edition.Butterworth- and build efficient,reliable pumping stations that are easy to operate Heinemann. and maintain. Mays,L.R.,ed.2000.Water Distribution Systems Handbook.McGraw-Hill,NY, This handbook provides material to design,analyze,operate,maintain, NY. and rehabilitate water distribution systems.Topics include from hydraulic design for pipelines and tanks to water quality issues, computer models,and rehabilitation/replacement information Murphy,B.,L.L.Redder,G.J.Kirmeyer.2005.Distribution Systems Security This document provides tools to assess,prioritize,and address water Primer for Water Utilities.AwwaRF.Denver,CO. distribution system vulnerabilities.National Association of Clean Water Agencies(NACWA).2005.Vulnerability Self Three versions of the Vulnerability Self Assessment TooITM(VSATTM) Assessment TootT"'for Water&Wastewater Utilities(Version 3.2 Update). software—wastewater,water/wastewater/and water—can be ordered February.httpJ/www.nacwa.org/pugs/index.cfm from this web site.This tool was originally developed under NACWA's former name,Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies(AMSA). National Association of Clean Water Agencies(NACWA).2002.Asset Based This document was developed to help wastewater utilities identify and Vulnerability Checklist for Wastewater Utilities©. evaluate the vulnerability of their assets,as well as the threats against http://www.nacwa.org/pugs/index.cfm them.This document was originally developed under NACWA's former name,Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies(AMSA). National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities(NETCSC).2002. This guide allows decisionmakers for small wastewater treatment Protecting Your Community's Assets:A Guide for Small Wastewater Systems. systems to evaluate the security of their systems and to plan for November.httpJ/www.nesc.wvu.edu/netcsc/netcsc tresource.htm#tool emergencies.Tools provided in the guide include an Inventory of Critical Assets,Threat Assessment,Vulnerability Assessment Checklist,and Prioritization of Potential Corrective Actions. DECEMBER 20W GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES C-4 Reference Annotation National Fire Protection Association(NFPA).2006.NFPA 101®:Life Safety This code addresses those egress features necessary to minimize Code®.Quincy,MA. danger to life from fire and smoke,crowd pressures,and movement of Individuals and groups,and provides minimum criteria for the design of egress facilities in order to permit prompt escape of occupants from buildings or,where desirable,into safe areas within buildings. National Fire Protection Association(NFPA).2005.National Electrical Code® This code describes the safe Installation and use of electrical (NFPA 70)Handbook.Quincy.MA. equipment by consumers. .---- ------------------- National Fire Protection Association(NFPA).2002.NFPA 10113:Code for Means This code includes the latest technologies,advances,and safety of Egress for Buildings and Structures.Quincy,MA. strategies in areas such as alarms,egress,emergency lighting,and special hazard protection.The contents are not meant as a standalone document,but for inclusion in a building code. Naval Construction Battalion Center.1990a.Federal Specification Sheet:Fencing, This document provides detailed requirements for chain-link fence gates Wire and Post,Metal(Chain-Link Fence Gates)(Detail Specification). and accessories. http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIUrrf1912d.pdf Naval Construction Battalion Center.1990b.Fencing,Wire and Post Metal(and This specification covers general requirements for chain-link fencing and Gates,Chain-Link Fence Fabric,and Accessories)(General Specification). accessories including classification for various parts of fencing,wire and httpJ/www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIUrrf191k.pdf post metal,fencing fabric,gates,posts,top rails,braces,and accessories. Naval Construction Battalion Center.1990c.Fencing,Wire and Post,Metal(Chain- This specification covers general requirements for chain-link fence Link Fence Accessories)(Detail Specification). accessories including:caps,rail sleeves,brace bands,rail and brace http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIUrrf1914d.pdf ends,wire ties and clips,tension wires,tension bars,truss rods,barbed wire,barbed wire support arms,and other miscellaneous accessories. Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center(NFESC).1999.Selection and This handbook provides guidance to ensure that appropriate design, Application of Vehicle Barriers(MIL-HDBK-1013/14).Washington Navy Yard,DC. operational,environmental,cost,security,and safety considerations www.wbdg.org/ccb/NAVFAC/DMMHNAV/1013_14.pdf are included in the selection process for vehicle barrier systems.Topics covered in the handbook include:vehicle barrier requirements,vehicle barrier installation and design,and descriptions and data on commercially available vehicle barriers and passive barriers that can be constructed on site. Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center(NFESC).1993a.Design Guidelines This manual provides guidance to ensure that appropriate physical for Physical Security of Facilities(MIL-HDBK-1013/1A).Washington Navy Yard, security considerations are included in the design of general facilities. DC.www.wbdg.org/ccb/NAVFAC/DMMHNAV/1013_1a.pdf Aspects considered in this manual Include the pre-design phase,the assessment of physical security threats,and an overview of the design phase.Specific technical sections in the manual also describe exterior site physical security,building physical security,ballistic attack hardening,standoff weapon hardening,and bomb blast hardening. DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES CS • Reference Annotation Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center(NFESC).1993b.Design Guidelines This military handbook provides guidance and detailed criteria for the for Security Fencing,Gates,Barriers,and Guard Facilities(MIL-HDBK-1013/10). design,selection,and installation of new security fencing,gates, Washington Navy Yard,DC. barriers,and guard facilities for perimeter boundaries of Navy and www.wbdg.org/ccb/NAVFAC/DMMHNAV/1013_10.pdf Marine Corps installations or separate activities,and designated restricted areas. Sandia Corporation.2002.Risk Assessment Methodology for Water(RAMTm). This document is a two-volume training guide used in the RAM-WrM May. methodology workshops. 42 U.S.C.§300(i)(1).http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- This web site provides the text of U.S.Code Title 42,Section 3001-1, bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+42USC300i-1 "Tampering with public water systems." U.S.General Services Administration(GSA).2005.Facilities Standards for the These design standards and criteria are to be used in the programming, Public Buildings Service.Washington,DC. design,and documentation of GSA buildings. http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeld=8195&channelPa ge=%2Fep%2Fchannel%2FgsaOverview.jsp&channelld=-17304 Water Environment Federation(WEF).2004.Interim Voluntary Security Guidance USEPA WISE ASCE/AWWANVEF Phase 1 Documents for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities.Alexandria,VA.www.wef.org/Conferences (December 9,2004)are available at the ASCE,AWWA,WEF,and Training/TrainingProfessionalDevelopment/WaterSecurity/ USEPA web sites. Water Security Working Group(WSWG).2005.Recommendations of the National This report presents the consensus reached by WSWG on 18 findings Drinking Water Advisory Council to the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency on that:(1)establish the features of active and effective security programs, Water Security Practices,Incentives,and Measures. (2)identify ways government and others might encourage utilities to www.epa.gov/safewater/ndwac/pdfs/wswg/wswg_report_finaljuly2005.pdf adopt and maintain active and effective programs,and(3)suggest utility- specific and national measures of water sector security progress. Welter,G.J.2003.Actual and Threatened Security Events at Water Utilities. This report documents the security incidents,threats,and hoaxes that AwwaRF.Denver,CO. have occurred involving or of direct relevance to water systems.The report includes a review of 264 incidents,classifying them by geographic region,type of attacker,mode of attack,targeted asset,and other categorization.The report reviews the incidents and discusses specific types of contaminants and the purported motivation of attackers. DECEMBER2006 GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WATER UTILITIES C-6 From: Michelle Treptau (mailto:trepfre@hotmail.com] Sent: Friday,June 10, 2016 7:50 AM To: Oehme, Paul<poehme@ci.chanhassen.mn.us> Subject:West Water Filtration Plant Hello, I'm wondering who I should contact with some comments regarding this project. If you could forward this email to them it would be appreciated. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to attend the June 2 open house at the library but I have studied all the information on the website. I live in Ashling Meadows(Ruby Lane)and I will see this new plant from my property and of course drive by it constantly thus my interest in the project. -I strongly oppose cutting down the extensive row of beautiful mature evergreen trees where a cul-de-sac is now proposed -I appreciate the concession of a playground the city is trying to give the community to off-set the intrusion of a big, city building in a residential area BUT I think it is absolutely not necessary. Our neighborhood has it's own private playground and would not use it and other neighbors around Lake Harrison use Pheasant Hills Park or their own backyards. -I do not know all the residents of Manchester Drive, but I think it's not right to build a cul-de-sac and playground right in someone's side yard and cut down more than a dozen mature trees. -I support eliminating the cul-de-sac, both playgrounds and the shelter from this project. Thank you, Michelle Treptau treofre(o..hotmail.com HOA CONSORTIUM'S POSITION REGARDING CHANHASSEN'S PROPOSED WEST WATER FACILITY SEPTEMBER 2016 The HOA Consortium's position at this time is that there are a number of issues and concerns that have still not been adequately addressed. The 400+ households that make up the Consortium continue to have questions regarding the following issues and concerns and believe further due diligence and study are required to determine if this project should move forward. 1)Planning&Zoning-Given the full opportunity to place the proposed facility in the most appropriate location for the overall good of the City's Master Plan, is the proposed site truly the best location? Would it be more appropriate to have the facility located in proximity of other commercial buildings (Keeping like things together not in the middle of a residential area)?Given all of the recent developments involving the land parcels of Prince and Gorra,should the City consider what impact and opportunities this will have on the future Master Plan? Is the City making decisions regarding this proposed site, based on information that is 10+years old or truly looking to the future and what is in the best interest of the overall Master Plan? 2)Safety and Security- Has proper due diligence been exercised to study the true impact this proposed facility,which operates with chlorine gas, will have on the surrounding residential area? If a chlorine gas accident occurs what will be the impact on humans,wildlife, wetlands and the environment?According to the Department of Homeland Security, if guidelines for security measures are followed with this proposed facility, it will take on the qualities of a "high-security prison". Is this truly the type of facility the City wants to have in the middle of a residential area? 3) Economic&Tax Implications- Has the City studied the potential negative impact on future residential developments as land along the Galpin Blvd. corridor is developed, by placing the water treatment facility in the proposed location? Has the City Studied the "real impact" on property values and tax base for the surrounding 400+ residences, by locating the facility on the proposed site verses another site with commercial zoning? What is the negative impact on property values if the Department of Homeland Security's guidelines are implemented into this proposed facility? 4) Environmental &Wetland Concerns-The City has told us there is no need for an Environmental Impact Study.This may be factually true, but,there will be some amount of negative impact on the surrounding wetlands by placing the facility on the proposed site. Should the City consider how much impact is truly acceptable,verses"no impact"with an alternative site?What is the "real impact" on the surrounding residential area if an environmental chlorine gas accident occurs on the proposed site? 5)Alternative Site Costs—What are the "real costs" not estimated costs associated with locating the proposed facility at another site? If the "real costs" are not significantly more, should the City consider an alternative site for the overall good of all of Chanhassen? Respectfully Submitted, Consortium of HOA's-Ashling Meadows, Lakeview at Pinehurst, Long Acres, Pinehurst &Woodridge Heights Potter, Jenny From: Generous, Bob Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2016 8:58 AM To: Potter,Jenny Subject: FW: HOA Consortium's Letter to Commissioners Regarding the West Water Treatment Facility Attachments: CONSORTIUM of HOA (1).docx Here's another one. I forwarded it to PC. From:Aanenson, Kate Sent:Thursday,September 01, 2016 8:50 AM To: Generous, Bob Subject: FW: HOA Consortium's Letter to Commissioners Regarding the West Water Treatment Facility From: Robert Kline fmailto:rikline123ftemail.coml Sent:Thursday, September 01, 2016 8:48 AM To:Aanenson, Kate Cc:Jag Reddy; Steven Mueller; Mark Wagner;Todd Allard;Angela Vukovich; Matthew Quinn; woodrideeheightspresidentPgmail.com Subject: HOA Consortium's Letter to Commissioners Regarding the West Water Treatment Facility Dear Ms. Aanenson, Please forward this email and the attached document to all Planning Commission Members. I unfortunately do not have email contacts for the Commissioners and would appreciate your help in forwarding this information to all Members before the Planning Commission Meeting next Tuesday September 6. Thank you, Robert Kline September 01, 2016 Dear Planning Commission Members, I am a resident of Chanhassen and a member of the 400+Homeowners Consortium that has been formed to address issues and concerns regarding the Proposed West Water Treatment Facility. I am writing on behalf of the Consortium to express the (5) overarching concerns that residents have with the Proposed Facility. Please see the attached document outlining the concerns. Representatives from the Consortium and the (5) surrounding neighborhoods, plan to speak at the meeting next Tuesday, to provide additional insights regarding the enclosed document. 1 In addition, Planning Commission Members should have received a separate email from Jag Reddy outlining specific concerns regarding Safety and Security. Jag will be speaking at the meeting on Tuesday as well. The Consortium fully agrees that we need to thoughtfully plan for the future and invest in water and waste water infrastructure. We sincerely hope the Planning Commission and City Officials take into consideration all potential issues and address all concerns before approving this project. We look forward to our discussion on Tuesday September 6 regarding the issues and concerns involving the Proposed Water Facility. Thank you for your time and your service on the Planning Commission. Sincerely, Robert Kline - President Lakeview at Pinehurst HOA 2 From: Arjav Krishna [ariay.krishnaamaiLcom1 Sent:Thursday, September 01, 2016 8:00 PM To: Laufenburger, Denny Cc: Tjornhom, Bethany; Ryan, Elise; McDonald,Jerry; Campion, Dan Subject: Chanhassen West Water Treatment Plant on Lake Harrison Road Dear Mr. Mayor Denny Laufenburger My name is Arjav and I am a resident of Lake Harrison Circle. I am 10 years old, I have lived in Chanhassen for more than six years and I am writing to you about the water treatment plant that you plan to build in my neighborhood. First of all,the water treatment plant is going to use chlorine. This is going to be dangerous for us. Less than two months ago, an accident happened in Arizona. Here is the link that you can view. http://www.12news.com/news/local/valley/chlorine-leak-nromnts- evacuation-of-several-neoria-homes/280316586. As I learned in Chemistry, some pure elements on the Periodic Table can be lethal and chlorine is one of them.A more dangerous situation could arise in Chanhassen but it can be definitely avoided by using a different way to treat the water.We all know that chlorine gas is bad for people. If you are going to put a chlorine gas plant,then everyone is going to leave. You are going to do this in a neighborhood where almost every single house has at least one kid.Why do you plan to do this? How can you call Chanhassen the "The best place to live in Minnesota"when there is a water treatment plant using chlorine gas in a residential area? One of the reasons I like the neighborhood is that there is nothing that looks industrial. I like biking in the neighborhoods in the summer and playing with my friends outside both in the summer and winter. But if you put the water treatment plant,you will change a mostly natural place to a half industrial and half natural. That does not link up!Why don't you put the plant in a place that is already an industrial area?There are definitely such areas in Chanhassen further away from neighborhoods. Finally, please take a moment and put yourself in our place.Would you want an industrial plant in your neighborhood? No one would, so why do it?Why not put it in an industrial location?That is where it is meant to be. In conclusion, please consider putting the water treatment plant in a different area. If you cannot find another place, then you must definitely look for safer methods of treating the water for the sake of our health and those of the families in our neighborhood. if you are going to spend money to put something that people are protesting against,then don't do it. Please do something about this, otherwise you will lose a lot of your population and Chanhassen will no longer be "The Best place to live in Minnesota". Everyone is against the plant in the middle of houses, so please don't do it. Sincerely yours, Arjav K ARJAV K. ■ ■ \ ■`� ■ ) ■' ■ 1 ■ ■ ■) ■ f ■) ■ ) I i eJ0t c. . I i b 3 i N d I r�-� --7-• ,... -,. . . .... , ‘... i t k 2 ‘ 4 i kT °ill i i" 1 g ' ) u , , _., S T� J cs T S e N w' 11 O a 0 V p V) N rd �lC ,„ . S A) ,, ..,10 _ 2 t O C > %. § v �. D 41 �5 4 dia 0 ' i' a $30 E'' -1 40 *s 4 Z W cam, W N N ` � E. 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Return comment card to City Staff or mail to City of Chanhassen Engineering Department,7700 Market Blvd., P.O. Box 147, Chanhassen, MN 55317. �e__ r Name: �(C(/tLal�—Fr- 1 Email: `t-re,r-f t VI yki' t ct;l, CSD Address: ( 79 12(424 I .10 . Phone: q S dam— i 7 0— I r y Comments: n s c Por-(- P rov10 -- o±- i i 5i e , tat , td ( (c<e, 4- - �+' 4 t c.-1'I oo se, n or► -/- S-1 1-2, for--t'1/"rs Pry e c - -MGr - i st-144. rt-S( a zezu, 'is v o+ nyri p o. +b .9L-u0 v, 1(a 9e_ I nd.fAS e /e So re-- ta -s o 74 ---_,tA\ \, \\\ Z \\\ r\\ Z-,„ \\r \ mg1S y�\ \\m \\ Black Hills S race 3 Ponderosa Pine I1 \\ G (P \\m \ ----. 6'B&B 6'B&B \\ ` 31Black Hills Spruce 31Ponderosa Pine 3IBIack Hills Spruce \\ 6'B&B 6'B&B 6'B&B I 5 Wentworth Cranberry Bush Viburnum Clir.iiiks.1.. li.7::-- ''''----,,-,„ , P' ° .10')'`‘...✓.10')'`‘... I I 10 gal ' I I 4 416°. ' 1 0 I -, r„e � --��- —� i�._ ii ibts I g 5 \\\\\ WINDMILL I\�� \I�-.�--- I • I ;I / 1 1''OND \ _ BurOak 1 t• Art..*.„,,0,) . . g --_ - 2.5"CaIB&B gg / / FUTURE PRE-K AND / I 8 %/ i i gs���- ���em,a�a ELEMENTARY it / � I I r 0 S a s �v�F PLAY AREAS / 3 B(aCk Hills Spnicto ® 1 I �1i ffff ease �� 6 B&B -��s 3 :ur Oak 1 �.\GSi ff a� ��� _ �� .5"CaIB&B / . , , �0 isf/ ��$� N-• \ Bur Oaklt i 1 / a < f @ ks N, \ 2.5"CaIB&BI I 4/ SP9 *� N'4 \\ • ./ 2PonderosaPine I , / fit; g N' S \\ STEEL !%• t B �:� c o / 6$ \ MIEl7(iER . ,_, . 3 B:c Hills Spruce a / g6 \V A Black Hills Sorucel4 �• I ' \ X33 \\ 6'B&W •L �•• e•4 2 Pone• a Pine I / � 6 \o it I LI�a► I 9• • \ / t A \,., Ponderosa Pine 1 �� .a1, '6,,..-4--44111-3,1111,, \ / . ..4.e... I \ Vi-, , / LEGEND \\ \\ \` \ N I / \ Q a \ # p a \\\ \\ \\� Bur Oak 1 4 \\ Z : 4 SEEDED TURF AREA 0 0 \\ \ 5"Cal B&B 0 \ \ ..\ ® ` 1 Bur Oak \\ / O (MnDOT SEED MIX 25-131 WITH1-1.t 0 �`� �\ \ \\\ \\ ��\ s e. ;a ® �� 2.5"Cal B&:. \ a EROSION CONTROL BLANKET) a \ \\\ \\ �\ ,,len SEEDED HILLSIDE AREA \ \ \ I �`Y�/�� t ®� \Or \ ~ W Black'Pfil S.ruce 2 , \\ ® \ / Z �" Z (TWIN CITY SEED COMPANY LOW 0 \\ \ 6 gg ` \ GROW FESCUE MIXTURE OR EQUIVALENT \ \ �� - �\ \ / Q W O z WITH EROSION CONTROL BLANKET) �. a \\ IP \\ Ponderosa Pine s / . 2 \ Iq 3'Autumn:rilliance erviceberry I / / ti 1- C � \ J \ 6'B&B \ G -v. a \ \ \ \ \ 6'Clump B&B 1 / / m Q 3/4"WASHED RIVER LANDSCAPE ROCK •p, \� \ \ ® ?:.-7 p \� \ \ fir' Black Hills S•rues 3 / / 111 LU (3"DEPTH OVER NON-WOVEN \ \ \ \ \ POND 6'B&B i l'Aulumn Bril'ahce Serviceberty / = Z WEED BARRIER FABRIC) %%%% \ \\\ \ Is•Clump B&' / \\ y \' \\ Bur Oak 1 / '^ O \ \ \ 2.5"Cal B&B Iif* t Ponderosa Pine v,AI \\ \\ \\ \ 6'B&B i- O V+ PLANT SCHEDULE \ .31 / I / @\ \\ \�\lc \\\ / < Q \ \ \ / / I / TREES BOTANICAL NAME/COMMON NAME CONT QTY y, \\ \\ \\ I I �\ \5% \\\ \\ \N_� I Y' j N L Amelanchier x grandiflora'Autumn Brilliance /'Autumn Brilliance'Servicebeny 6'Clump B&B 9 Q\\ \�\\ I Q \ \V vv / / / i�. Oidir_ Picea glauca'Densala'/Black Hills Spruce 6'B&B 24 \ NN N . 441 II) opek4'Autumn Brildance'Serviceberry / / Q\ �� • 6'Clump B4B / cc, x'41 ..n Brilliance Servicebe 1 I W' - / Pinus ponderosa/Ponderosa Pine 6'B&B 12 \\� Na "-. Bir lump B&B - —__ / --../ / a a g � I . ..," IP/IP O as �, - o SW - '-1 _ ss_�,«� Quercus macrocarpa/Bur Oak 2.5"Cal B&B 8 �.�� as ,� coN ����s 0 TiAW SHRUBS BOTANICAL NAME/COMMON NAME SIZE WY N�%� '���- /_ � ''��_�- — -- - 0 Viburnum trilobum'Wentworth'/Wentworth Cranberry Bush Viburnum 10 gal 5 �`%%cam Cir-r-----------Iii! 4:4, \ tea„ "" � �� / I . ,_,__ _ LAKE HARRISON ROAD fta��` aTOTAL NUMBER OF PROPOSED TREES: 53 / $ X o Z -Fd 9 I TOTAL NUMBER OF PROPOSED SHRUBS: 5 iii. 3 0 / 0 30 i' Scale:1"=3 ' P CITY PROJECT NUMBER 15-03 WEST WTP C-22 WSB PROJECT NUMBER 01694-720 LANDSCAPE PLAN